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Abstract 
Contending Views and Conflicts over Land in the Red River Delta 
since Decollectivization is an anthropological study in which I offer a new 
approach exploring the viewpoints of various parties to analyze their 
attitudes, relations and conflicts over land in Vietnam's dynamic Red River 
delta after decollectivization. I also evaluate how and in what ways 
industrialization and modernization, as well as the effects of urbanization, 
marketization, and to a lesser extent globalization, have affected Red River 
Delta villagers' views and relations towards agricultural land. 
Drawing on various sources of data, especially ethnographic field 
research, I examine local responses to a number of essential land issues such 
as the process of agricultural decollectivization, programs for land use rights 
compensation, the politics of communal land management and use, and the 
problem of local cadre corruption in relation to land resources. My detailed 
descriptions and analyses of a number of land-based conflicts not only 
demonstrate the various meanings and values of land for the parties 
involved, but also show the complicated picture of attitudes, relations and 
conflicts over land. 
Moving beyond reflections of various existing theoretical 
perspectives on agrarian and peasant studies such as moral economy, 
political economy, socio-cultural dynamics, everyday politics and others, I 
present an overall argument of contending views as the dynamics for 
conflicts over land rights. More specifically, I argue that in the context of 
significant changes in the land tenure regime and related socio-economic 
programs in Vietnam, and under the effects of urbanization, marketization 
and globalization in the studied area since decollectivization, the meaning 
and value of agricultural land have increased to both villagers, the state and 
other parties. In such a dynamic context, diverse groups of ordinary 
villagers share some· common views that both agree and disagree with the 
view of some state institutions over decision-making, distribution, and 
holding of quyJn sa hitu [ownership rights], quyJn quim ly (management 
vii 
rights], and quyJn sit d1,mg [use rights] to agricultural land. The contending 
views toward such land rights have led a number of villagers to become 
involved in public resistance in land conflicts, and as a result, in the 
dynamics of land-based conflicts in a number of communities. These 
contending views and conflicts over land have affected the state in different 
ways, including changing state land tenure policy to accommodate the 
villagers' views and to resolve land-based conflicts. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
I. Contending Views and Conflicts over Land 
In the late 1950s, shortly after a radical land reform, agricultural 
production in the northern half of Vietnam that had previously been based 
on family household farming was gradually collectivized into a collective 
production that took the small-scale cooperative as the main production unit. 
From the early 1960s, collectivization continued to increase in scale and 
intensity on the grounds of three key principles: collective ownership of 
means of production, centralized management of production, and equal 
allocation of output on the basis of working points (Chu Van Lam et al. 
1992). From the early 1980s, however, a process of decollectivizing the 
agricultural system started, and proceeded till the early 1990s. This process 
accompanied the development of a new land tenure system that is based on 
three types of rights to land: quy~n sa hiiu [ownership rights], quy~n quem ty 
[management rights], and quy~n su d1,mg [use rights], and also marked the 
time since the state has been implementing essential programs of 
industrialization and modernization in the rural areas. In the area, which my 
study focusses on, located close to Ha N(li capital and in the middle of 
several key economic zones, the effects of urbanization and globalization 
have also been intruding into various aspects of rural people lives. 
This anthropological doctoral thesis explores and analyzes the views 
of Red River delta villagers in relation to land rights and compares these 
with the views reflected in the state land tenure system. It focuses on three 
types of rights to agricultural land that have been defined in state land tenure 
regime since decollectivization: quy~n sa hiiu [ownership rights], quytn 
quan ly [management rights], and quytn su d1,mg [use rights]. The thesis 
also evaluates how various modernization and industrialization programs, as 
well as the effects of urbanization, marketization, and to a lesser extent 
globalization, have affected Red River delta villagers' views and relations 
towards agricultural land rights. Finally, it uncovers conflicts over land 
rights. 
To achieve these aims, the study first analyzes the process of 
decollectivization, and then examines why and in what ways agricultural 
decollectivization, the new land tenure system, and recent industrialization 
and modernization, have produced conflicts over land rights among the 
various parties, especially a number of villagers and different institutions of 
the state. 
There are three key arguments in this thesis. First, in the context of 
significant changes in the land tenure regime and related socio-economic 
programs in Vietnam, and under the effects of urbanization, marketization 
and globalization in the studied area since decollectivization, the meanings 
and values of agricultural land have increased to both villagers and other 
parties. Second, in such a dynamic context, diverse groups of ordinary 
villagers share some common views that either agree or disagree with the 
views of state land tenure policies and the authorities who make and 
implement such policies over decision-making, distribution, and holding of 
quy~n sCI hiiu [ownership rights], quy~n quan ly [management rights], and 
quy~n sir d¥ng [use rights] to agricultural land. The contending views 
toward these essential rights to land have Jed a number of villagers to 
become involved in conflicts over land rights in a number of communities. 
The third key argument is that these contending views and conflicts over 
land rights have affected the state in different ways, including driving the 
state to change its land tenure policies. 
The first and the third key arguments will be discussed later in the 
thesis, however, the second key argument needs elaboration. The findings of 
my study illuminate both agreements and contradictions between the views 
of a number of villagers and the land tenure system and other state 
institutions which make and implement land tenure policies. The main 
agreement concerns the state-formulated quy~n sCI hfru of "the entire 
people." Villagers in my study do not challenge or question the Land Law, 
which reserves quy~n sCI hiiu for "the entire people." In regard to quy~n 
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quem ly and quydn su d1,lng, however, there have been both agreed and 
contending views. By agreed, I mean that the new land tenure system has 
given villagers what they have desired: quydn su d1,lng to land. On the other 
hand, the contradictory views between the two over how land management 
rights, especially land use rights, should be distributed, held, taken, 
transacted, and compensated, have resulted in various conflicts. Such 
contending views do not produce conflict among villagers in many 
circumstances because they do not have any practical impact on villagers' 
views and relations with their land use rights. This is because villagers 
continue to be the subjects who hold and control land use rights and enjoy 
the produce from the land they till. They are also able to dispose of the land 
use rights they hold. But on some occasions, especially in situations such as 
land use rights acquisition and private encroachment on land use rights, the 
different views have important practical implications and these have 
resulted in conflict. 
The contending views between a number of villagers and certain 
institutions of the state over use rights (and management rights in relation 
to communal land) in these cases have occurred at two levels. The first is 
the villagers' disagreement with different points of the state land tenure 
policy at large, and the second is the competing views between some 
villagers and a number of local cadres who implement state land tenure 
policies at the local level specifically. At both levels, conflict has arisen 
because the villagers place greatest emphasis on their use rights. While they 
accept that the entire people is the ideological holder of ownership rights, 
and that this gives the state some overall management rights, they argue that 
their use rights mean that they are entitled to have a say in how land use 
rights should be distributed, held, used, by whom and for whose benefit, and 
what values these land use rights have at disposal. 
To approach the subject, I investigate the views of villagers and other 
parties on decision-making, distribution, and holding of land rights. This 
means that I explore the rationales of different parties on questions of how 
land rights should be distributed, held, managed, used, by whom, and for 
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whose benefit. Who can decide these essential issues? What role should 
state authorities, particularly local cadres, take in such processes? 
Investigating the views of villagers and other parties involved, therefore, 
can be seen as an effective approach to explore and analyze attitudes and the 
multi-sided relations of the various parties to land rights and conflicts over 
land rights since decollectivization. 
The various views of these different parties towards land rights will 
be analyzed in the dynamic context of agricultural decollectivization, the 
development of a new land tenure system, modernization and 
industrialization programs, population ·growth, and the effects of 
urbanization, marketization and globalization. In many senses, my analysis 
needs to consider history. 1 By situating different views of different parties 
in such a context for analysis, I want to evaluate the effects of both internal 
and external impacts, and the various meanings and values that embed and 
affect the relationships, attitudes and behavior of villagers, local cadres and 
other agents of the state towards land rights. In addition, I attempt to explore 
the major threads of the views of villagers and state institutions towards 
land rights through time, and also to investigate the question of how and in 
what ways land rights have become essential to the different parties 
involved, which have created conflicts since decollectivization. 
In short, my overall analytical framework critically emphasizes four 
major issues. One stresses the parties whose attitudes and relations towards 
land rights I explore. In the Red River delta since collectivization, these 
parties include ordinary villagers, local cadres, higher state officials, and 
state land tenure policies on the whole. Another issue emphasizes land 
tenure arrangements. In the following section, I will discuss the framework 
of a bundle of rights and a bundle of rights holders to analyse land tenure 
arrangements in Vietnam. The third issue calls for the analysis of the 
various views of the different parties towards decision-making, distribution, 
1 In regard to the context issue, Chapter Two and part of Chapter One provide a broad 
context of decollectivization, a new land tenure system, modernization and industrialization 
(and conflicts too) in the district, province (and beyond) my research emphasizes. 
Whenever and wherever factors such as the effects of urbanization, globalisation and the 
issue of history are essential to my analysis, they will be highlighted. 
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and holding of land rights to be placed in the context and history of the 
studied area in order to reveal numerous factors that affect the attitudes, 
relations, and conflicts over land rights. In the Red River delta, such factors 
include history, decollectivization, a new land tenure system, modernization 
and industrialization, and the effects of urbanlization and globalization. 
Finally, essential to this approach is my theory of contending views as the 
dynamics for conflicts over land rights. 
The most important task I need to do now is to define various essential 
conceptions that I mentioned and that are heavily used in this study. 
Land Rights and Land Right Holders 
A Bundle of Rights and A Bundle of Rights Holders. 
In their study, Schlager and Ostrom offer an analytical framework of a 
bundle of rights and a bundle of rights holders for analyzing natural 
resources (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).2 In brief, Schlager and Ostrom argue 
that there are different rights to a thing/resource held by different holders. A 
right to a thing/resource is the authority to undertake particular actions in 
relation to it_3 For example, right of"access" is "the right to enter a defined 
physical [thing]" (1992: 250). Right to a thing/resource is not only 
formulated by rules/ideologies but also by practices/realities. In contrast to 
2 Similarly, Benda-Beckmann (1999) uses the framework of a bundle of rights and a bundle 
of rights holders, however, he critically emphasizes numerous socio-economic functions of 
property rights in his analysis. He agues that "property rights have different social and 
economic meanings for various categories of peoples as well as for individuals, and that 
conflicts about property rights usually proceed from their different socio-economic 
functions, both in law and in practice" (Benda-Beckmann 1999: 7). His emphasis on socio-
economic functions of rights is also relevant for analysing land tenure arrangement in 
Vietnam after decollectivization. However, my thesis stresses the views of holders towards 
decision-making, distribution and holding of rights to land. 
3 Against the view that defines "property" as "things," Macpherson (1978) argues that 
"property" is "rights" to "things." Applying his view of property to land in Vietnam, we 
can see various types of property such as private property, communal property, state 
property and open access because land rights are held by various parties as I discuss in the 
thesis. For further discussion of the concept of property see Munzer (1990, Chapter Two: 
Understanding of Property, pp 15-36); for the concept of property rights see Bromley 
(1991: Chapter Two: Property Rights and Property Regimes in Natural Resource Policy, pp 
14-40.) 
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Hann ( 1991, 1998), 4 Schlager and Ostrom argue that property rights are the 
relations between people and the owned thing. Therefore, the holder of a 
right has the power to access and determine how the thing is used and for 
whose benefit, although they also emphasize that to hold a right implies that 
the holder has a duty. Regarding common-pool resources, for example, 
Schlager and Ostrom consider two levels of property rights: operational 
level and collective-choice level. Operational level property includes right 
of "access" and right of "withdrawal." The collective-choice level property 
ranges from right of "management" to right of "exclusion" and right of 
"alienation." These five rights are held by four classes of holders, including 
"owner," "proprietor," "claimants," and "authorized user." Each of these 
rights holders can have certain power to common-pool resources depending 
on what right/s the holder possesses. For example, "proprietors ... who 
possess collective-choice rights to participate in management and exclusion. 
Propietors authorize who may access resources and how resources may be 
utilized, however, they do not have the right to alienate either of these 
collective-choice rights" (Schlager and Ostrom 1992: 253). 
I adopt Schlager and Ostrom's analytical framework of a bundle of 
rights and a bundle of rights holders to analyze land tenure arrangements in 
Vietnam after decollectivization. In so doing, I need to clarify four key 
points in their analytical framework. First, a bundle of rights and a bundle of 
rights holders must be analyzed in the context of the studied society, as the 
form of rights might differ from one society to another and also from one 
type of.resource to another. For example, the specific levels and types of 
rights and rights holders in common-pool resources documented in Schlager 
and Ostrom's work (1992) do not correspond to particular ownership rights, 
management rights and use rights to land m Vietnam after 
4 The main difference between Hann and Schlager and Ostrom lies in their arguments. 
While Schlager and Ostrom argue that property rights are the relations between people and 
the owned things, Hann looks at property relations as "a network of social relations that 
governs the conduct of people with respect to the use and disposition of things" ( 1998: 7). 
This means that he considers property rights as social relations between people to things 
rather than relations between people and things. In so doing, he critically emphasizes the 
political and economic embeddedness of property relations or, put another way, the 
distribution of rights among people to things in cross"cultural analysis. 
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decollectivization. Secondly, the analysis must also consider the historical 
aspect, because the form of rights and type of rights holders can also differ 
from one time to the next. Another point is that this framework does not 
adequately emphasize what rights are important to different kinds of holders 
and has not yet discussed sufficiently the distribution of rights among 
holders, it might not well explain conflicts among various holders over 
different rights to land. To overcome this weakness, a critical examination 
of the viewpoints of holders over decision-making, distribution and holding 
of rights to land in the socio-economic and political context of the studied 
society is very useful. 
The final point relates to ownership. In the views of the villagers, 
ownership rights in the bundle of rights are split into two levels: ideological 
and practical ownership, as I discuss later. According to Hoang Viet, 
ideological ownership lies in the hands of the state (or the king in history) 
while practical ownership systems such as private ownership, communal 
ownership, and state ownership rest in the hands of various parties like 
individuals, organizations and state institutions (Hoang Viet 1999). In my 
view, ideological ownership is the right to broadly decide key issues in the 
overall management and use of the land. Practical ownership means the 
right to use certain plots of land, enjoy the product of the land, and dispose 
of it. In that sense, practical ownership must follow regulations set up by 
ideological ownership, for example, pay tax, or use the land for certain 
purposes only, or dispose of land in certain ways. Which of these systems of 
.. 
practical ownership is more dominant in a society usually depends on 
particular socio-economic and political conditions. For example, the private 
system of practical ownership is pervasive in developed and industrialized 
countries like Britain, while it is rejected by indigenous peoples in various 
parts of the world (Hann 1998: 2). In Vietnam prior to the 1950s, the 
coexistence of private ownership, communal ownership and state ownership 
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under the ideological ownership of the king had been a major feature for a 
long period oftime.5 
Using such tools, I will next examine what the legislation has said 
about land rights and land rights holders m Vietnam since 
decollectivization. I will then discuss land rights and land rights holders in 
the views of villagers, and point out why and in what ways conflicts among 
different rights holders have taken place on particular types of land rights. 
Land Rights and Land Rights Holders in the Views of State Legislation. 
As previously noted, since decollectivization a new land tenure regime has 
emerged which formulates three types of key rights to land: ownership 
rights, management rights, and use rights. These three types of rights are 
held by various holders. The formulation of such a land tenure regime first 
started in the 1980s, advanced to a Land Law in 1993, and was amended 
three times in the following years. 6 During this period of development, 
beside debates, negotiations, and tensions among different holders of rights 
to land as I later examine, there has also been a discourse among state 
policy makers and advisers about how and in what ways the land tenure 
should be arranged. Among the contending views, the most authoritive one, 
as expressed in the national Land Law, is that agricultural land must be 
owned by the state under the title of the entire people. If the state owns the 
land, it then has decisive power and essential rights over the vital question 
5 In contrast, Truong Huu Quynh (1983, 2 volumes) and Phan Huy Le (1959) argue that, 
for hundreds of years, Vietnam had two regimes of ownership: state ownership and private 
ownership. According to them, village agricultural communal land [c6ng aiJn] was a part 
of the state owned land. The state gave villages the rights and power to directly control and 
allocate land use among villagers within villages. In return, the state collected land tax from 
the village as a whole, not from those individual villagers who directly used communal 
land. To me, these perceptions and uses of the concepts of private and state ownership are 
inadequate and confused. The main difficulty is that they do not define and clarify the 
meaning of ownership, especially the concepts of private ownership, state ownership and 
the related concept of occupation. In fact, their analyses have not yet reflected the 
ideological ownership of the king, or clarified how the ideological ownership differs or can 
be distinguished from the practical ownership systems which operated during this long 
period of history in Vietnam. 
6 The first amendment was done in 1998, the second in 2001, and the latest in 2003 
(effective from the first of July 2004). 
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of how land is to be managed, used, by whom, and for whose benefit. 
According to this view, the state allocates people quyJn sit dt,mg to 
agricultural land, and allows land use rights holders to dispose of these land 
use rights, like exchange, transfer and inherit as I later discuss. In so doing, 
the state can consolidate its position and rights over quyJn sa hicu and quyJn 
quem ly of the land while giving the users, including individuals, family 
households, institutions and organizations, the rights to use it. Accordingly, 
this policy ensures that the state holds a decisive role in decision-making, 
distribution, and holding of key rights to land (Long Giang 1993). 
Other views, however, are expressed among policy makers and 
adivisers. One argues that if land is not only the means of production but 
also a special form of property, then it can be owned by the state, collective, 
or individuals. Accordingly, three systems of land ownership should be 
applied, including state ownership, communal ownership, and private 
ownership, depending on the kind of land. The key point in this view is to 
ensure the people have real ownership of the land, and in that way, it also 
hints at a division of land rights that limits the power and right of the state 
while giving the people more control over decision-making on vital land 
issues (Do Ba 1993; Nguyen Sinh Cue 1993). Still, another view argues that 
three patterns of land ownership should be employed: private ownership, 
state ownership, and mixed ownership. Applying this to agricultural land 
specifically, mixed ownership means the state owns the land, and allocates 
its use rights to users. Agricultural land should therefore be owned, 
managed and used in line with the current state land tenure system 
regulations. As in the former view, however, private ownership should be 
recognized with other types of land (Thanh Son 1993). 
As all the above viewers were state researchers who did studies to 
develop a new land tenure policy, their views have affected the state policy 
on land. For example, in the 1993 Land Law, while quyJn sa hicu ofthe land 
ofthe entire people remained unchanged, a system of communal agricultural 
land was officially recognized, marking the official rebirth of communal 
land, as I examine in-depth in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, a lack of detailed 
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and systematic research, covering aspects such as the values and meanings 
of land to villagers, communities, organizations, and the state at large in the 
dynamic context of Vietnamese society since decollectivization, meant the 
new Land Law needed to be amended several times in a short time. In 1998, 
when the state was about to again amend the Land Law, the debates on land 
ownership continued with the publication of Vdn DJ Sa HiJ:u Ru(mg Ddt 
Trang NJn Kinh Ti Hang H6a NhiJu Thanh Phim 6 Vi?t Nam [The question 
of land ownership in a market multi-sector economy in Viet Nam ], in 1999 
(Hoang Viet 1999). A new argument coming from this work advocates two 
systems of land ownership, as previously noted, legal ownership and 
practical ownership. According to this view, the division of rights to land 
between the state and people should be made in a way in which the state 
totally possesses legal ownership while leaving the society to exercise 
practical ownership. In order to do this, three rights to land need to be 
clarified: right to own, right to occupy, and right to use. Among these, 
ownership right totally belongs to the state, while occupying and use rights 
can be held by both the state and the people. The state thus still holds its 
supreme power and right to land, while the people hold the rights to occupy 
and use it. In addition, the land market needs to be recognized, because, in 
the market economy of multi-sectors under a socialist orientation, the right 
to occupy and right to use certain plots of land are also a form of property 
that can be sold and bought as a normal commodity item. 
Despite many debates, no change has yet been made to the way in 
which the state formulates the three types of rights to land: ownership rights, 
management rights, and use rights. So now we can consider how these three 
types of essential rights to land have been defined, and who can hold them. 
According to the state Land Law, quyJn sa hiJ:u, or ownership rights, 
entails the rights to legally own the land and broadly decide key issues over 
how the land should be managed, used, by whom and for whose benefit in 
the whole country. In the 1993 Land Law, however, quyJn sa hftu was 
simply defined in Article One of Chapter One as land which belongs to the 
entire people, managed by the state, and that the state allocates or rents land 
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use rights to users (Quoc hoi nuoc Cong hoa Xa hoi Chu nghia VietNam 
1995: 6). In 2003, Article Five of Chapter One of the latest amended version 
of Land Law clearly defines that "land belongs to the entire people, the state 
represents the owner (i.e. the entire people) of the land." As the 
representative of the holder of ownership rights, the state has power and 
rights to the following issues over land in Vietnam: 1. Deciding the 
purposes of land use; 2. Regulating the area limit and time span of land use 
rights; 3. Deciding prices of land use rights. As the holder of ownership 
rights and managment rights, the state allocates people land use rights 
through land use rights allocation, land use rights rent, recognises the land 
use rights of different holders, and regulates the rights and duties of land use 
rights holders. The state also has power to adjust resources from land 
through its financial policies, for example, collecting rent, land-use taxes, 
land-income taxes, and land-transfer taxes. 
QuyJn quim ly [management rights] to land relates to the 
administration of the land. The administration of land involves various 
issues. According to Article 13 of Chapter Two of the 1993 Land Law, it 
includes: 1. Survey, measure, evaluate, rank and make administrative maps; 
2. Plan land use; 3 Issue and implement legal documents about management 
and use of land; 4. Allocate, rent and seize land use rights; 5. Register, 
establish and manage cadastral books, land-used contracts, grant certificates 
of land use rights and so forth; 6. Inspect land management and use; and 7. 
Resolve disputes over land use rights, and other wrongdoings in regard to 
land management and land use rights (Quoc hoi nuoc Cong hoa Xa hoi Chu 
nghia VietNam 1995: 11-12).7 
QuyJn sit d~;mg, or use rights, to land are the rights to directly control, 
use the land, and enjoy the product of land use as well to dispose of the land 
use rights. 
The state legislation also clearly defines how the above three types of 
land rights are to be distributed among different holders. Accordingly, the 
7 Article Six of Chapter One of the 2003 amended version of the Land Law presents a more 
detailed definition, however. the meaning of land management, or quy~n quan ly, of the 
state remains the administration of the land. 
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entire people hold quytn siJ' hfru to land.8 This means that all the land in 
Vietnam belongs to the entire people that are represented by the Socialist 
State. The state holds all quytn quim ly to land. As a result, the state at the 
same time holds two types of rights to land: quytn sO' hfru and quytn quan 
ly. In contrast, quytn su d1;1ng are to be diversely held by different holders. 
To put it another way, the land tenure regime regulates that the 
Vietnamese "entire people" own land. The state, as representative of the 
entire people, manages the land and allocates [giao], 9 or rents [cho thw?] 10 
land use rights to the users, either for long-term use [su d~mg !au dai] or for 
a certain period of time [ c6 thoi hc;m] depending on the kind of land. In this 
sense, the state is not only the manager of the land but also the owner of the 
land (Tran Quoc Toan 1993). Land users thus hold land use rights only, not 
ownership rights or management rights of the land. 
Holders of land use rights, 11 according to the 1993 Land Law, were 
simply classified into three types: organizations of different forms, family 
households, and individuals. However, Article Nine of Chapter One of the 
latest amended version ofthe Land Law in 2003 has grouped holders of land 
use rights in Vietnam into seven types. These are: I. Domestic organizations 
[cac t6 chuc trong nuac]; 2. Domestic family households and individuals 
[hQ gia ainh va ca nhan trong nuac]; 3. Residential communities [of 
Vietnam] [c9ng a6ng dan cu]; 12 4. [Domestic] religious institutions [cO' sO' 
ton giao]; 5. Foreign organizations with diplomatic functions [t6 chuc nuac 
8 The conception of entire people's ownership appeared in Vietnam at least since the early 
1960s. The 5th Plenum of Central Party Committee (Session III), July 1962, had already 
mentioned this type of ownership (Chu Van Lam et al. 1992: 19). However, it has only 
been strongly applied to land since the 1980s in the state legislation. 
9 Article Four of Chapter One of the 2003 amended Land Law defines "land allocation" as 
the state allocating land use rights through its administrative decisions to subjects who have 
a demand of use. Land allocation can be of two types, allocation without payment from the 
receivers and allocation with payment from the receivers. 
10 Article Four of Chapter One of the 2003 amended Land Law also defines "land rent" as 
that the state allocates land use rights to subjects who have a demand of use through its 
contracts. In all cases, land rent means the renter must pay the state. 
II The state Land Law says land users. In the 1993 Land Law, holders of land use rights 
did not explicitly include foreign organizations and overseas Vietnamese. In the 2001, and 
especially the 2003 amended versions of the Land Law, these have been explicitly 
articulated. 
12 Community has been recognized as a holder of land use rights only in 2003 after many 
debates among researchers about mountainous community rights to land and natural 
resources, and after the social unrest in 2001 in Tay Nguyen. 
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ngocti c6 chuc nang ngoc;ti giao]; 6. Overseas Vietnamese [nguO'i Vi?t Nama 
nuac ngoai]; and 7. Foreign organizations and individuals who have 
investments in Vietnam [t6 chuc va ca nhdn nuac ngoai tldu tu vao Vi?t 
Nam]. 
The holders of land use rights have different subtypes of right to 
exercise and dispose of their rights, meaning that the holders have various 
rights to land use. Land use rights therefore include numerous rights, not 
only one right, and these rights have evolved through time. According to the 
1988 Land Law, no subrights to land use rights were recognized. But the 
1993 Land Law offered five subrights to holders of land use rights, 
including rights to transfer [chuydn nhu9ng], exchange [chuydn tl6i], rent 
[cho thue], inherit [thua k~], and mortgage [thi chdp]. Ten years later, 
Article 106 of Chapter IV of the 2003 amended version of the Land Law 
added five more subrights to the holders of land use rights: re-rent [cho thue 
lgi] land use rights, grant [tt;lng] land use rights, use land use rights as 
collateral [bao lanh], use land use rights for club capital [gop v6n], and to 
be compensated if land use rights are seized by the state. 
The holdings of land use rights are legally recognized through state 
certificates of land use rights [gidy ch{rng nhrjn quydn sit d~Jng t!dt, or bla 
tlo]. However, the holdings of land use rights are constrained in different 
ways. Firstly, in contrast to residential land, the holdings of agricultural land 
use rights are limited to a fixed time period. In the 1988 Land Law, the 
duration ot holdings ranged from five to 15 years. In the 1993 Land Law, 
this was extended to 20 years for agricultural land for annual crops and 50 
years for land for perennial crops. Accordingly, when the holding of land 
use rights expire, a redistribution must be made to balance the holdings of 
villagers in the rural areas. Secondly, the area of land use rights that one 
holder can hold is limited, and depends on the type of holder and the kind of 
land. In regards to agricultural land for annual crops, the dominant type of 
agricultural land in my studied area, the 1993 Land Law regulated that one 
individual or household could hold a maximum area of two hectares of land 
(a larger area is allowed in Southern Vietnam). In 2003, the amended 
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version of the 1993 Land Law increased the maximum area of one 
household or one individual holding to three hectares. Finally, besides 
rights, holders of land use rights have responsibilities to the state too, among 
them the key ones include: 1. Using the land use rights legally; 2. 
Registering with the state when their land use rights are disposed of; 3. 
Paying land taxes; 4. Protecting the land; and 5. Giving back the land use 
rights when the state issues a decision to seize land use rights, or when the 
duration of holding has expired. 
As noted above, holders of agricultural land use rights are diverse, and 
change from time to time, but the key ones include individual villagers or 
households, communities, organizations, institutions of the state, and the 
state as a whole. A key question that must be raised is what rights among 
this bundle of land rights have been important to villagers and the state as a 
whole, and why? To the state, ownership and management rights are of 
great importance, as they ensure that the state has the capability to decide, at 
macro-level, how the land in Vietnam should be managed and used, by 
whom and for whose benefit. Thus the formulation of the three types of 
rights to land follows the rationale of the state, and has become a thread 
running through the development of a new land tenure regime in 
contemporary Vietnam. As I have previously noted, amendements have 
been made to land use rights through which the state has given more 
subrights and power to the holders. However, no similar changes have been 
made regarding ownership and management rights. Instead, according to 
law and policy during the past ten years, these rights have been consolidated 
in the state. 
Land Rights and Land Rights Holders in the Views of Villagers. 
To many villagers in the Red River delta, my research suggests that 
agricultural land use rights, or quyJn sit: dlfng, are the most important, quyJn 
quim ly held by the state is the second most important, and quyJn s6' htru 
that many villagers view as ideological ownership of the entire people is the 
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least concern. More specifically, in regards to ownership rights of 
agricultural land, in the broadest terms, many villagers who I have talked to 
in the studied villages have shown no contradictory views in comparison to 
what the state land tenure regime has regulated. They seem to be neither 
concerned about nor desire to hold ownership rights to the land after 
decollectivization nor view themselves as the ideological owners of 
agricultural land prior to decollectivization. Many villagers often talk about 
"[agricultural] land of the state" [ddt cita nha nu&c], "[agricultural] land of 
the cooperative" [ddt cua h(Yp tac xa], "[agricultural] land of the people" 
[ddt cita nhdn dan], and "[agricultural] land of the entire people" [ddt cua 
toan dan], to indicate that they are not the holders of quyJn sa hfru to 
agricultural land. To many villagers, ownership rights of the entire people 
today are similar to the ideological ownership of the king in the past. 
Some researchers have argued that because of a long tradition of 
tenancy and landless status, many Southern Vietnamese peasants in the 
Republic of Vietnam had a strong desire to own the land they farm (Bredo 
1968: 83-89). This desire varied, they argued, hardly at all with peasant 
status. In their research, however, the concept of land ownership was not 
made clear, so we do not know exactly what the researchers meant. If they 
perceived the land ownership that their studied peasants desired to hold in a 
normal sense of practical ownership, that is the rights to directly control, 
use, enjoy the product of land use and to dispose of certain land plots, the 
southern peasants' desire for land is similar to their counterparts in the 
contemporary north who want land use rights. Whether my interpretation of 
their ownership conception is correct or not, one methodological question in 
the research could also be raised. If the researchers used questionaires 
asking the local people "do you want to own the land you farm?," or "do 
you want to buy more land if you have money?," I would imagine that their 
replies would of course be "yes." But that "yes" may not really reflect their 
feelings about the issue. 
In China, researchers have noted perceptions of land similar to 
perceptions among villagers I met in the Red River delta. Among Chinese 
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peasants, who have undergone very similar processes of collectivization and 
decollectivization in agriculture that occurred in the past decades: 
[O]nly a minority of the respondents [in eight counties], 2.5 per 
cent, think of themselves as the land owner; the majority, 94.8 
per cent, regard themselves as merely having use rights that have 
been contracted to them. As we can see, the proportion of 
farmers who believe the village collectives or, alternatively, the 
state is the ultimate owner amount to roughtly the same - 46.5 
per cent versus 48.3 per cent (Kung and Liu 1997: 38). 
As I understand, similar to the Vietnamese case, land use rights in 
contemporary China are identical to a practical level of land ownership, 
which contrasts with the ideological ownership of the state, collectives or 
villages. Therefore, like the Red River Delta villagers, many Chinese 
counterparts desire to hold land use rights rather than ownership rights. 
Concerning management rights of agricultural land over the past years, 
villagers in a number of communities in the Red River Delta have 
articulated views both supporting and opposing the views of state policy and 
of local cadres in relation to how agricultural land rights have been and 
should be distributed, held, used and by whom and for whose benefit. Like 
the view of state Land Law, to a number of villagers management rights 
mean the state's administration of the land. In other words, many villagers 
see local authorities, district, province or central agencies as the state [nha 
nu6'c], which holds the management rights of the land that individuals and 
households farm. However, at different times and in different places, the 
management of land has involved lots of wrongdoings, as I will discuss in 
the following Chapters, and these have produced many debates and tensions 
in a number of communities. 
The most contentious issue is land use rights. Many villagers perceive 
land use rights as the rights to directly control and use the land, enjoy the 
product of land use, and dispose of the land use rights. These are the land 
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use rights that the villagers hold for their allotted time. In that sense, land 
use rights are very important, even more important than the ideological 
ownership rights, thus in their own terms, many villagers have struggled for 
land use rights. By holding land use rights, they have rights to not only farm 
and enjoy the products of the land use, but also to decide what value land 
use rights might have at disposal. This means that possessing agricultural 
land use rights that have been regulated by state legislation is equivalent, at 
a practical level, to the land ownership of many land owners in Vietnam 
prior to decollectivization and in other countries, because land use rights 
holders in contemporary Vietnam can directly control and use the land, 
enjoy the product of land use, and dispose of the land. But what they own is 
in various aspects constrained by the state land tenure policy, as previously 
noted. During their holding tenure, agricultural land use rights can only be 
disposed of in five ways according to the 1993 Land Law, and ten ways 
according to the latest amended version of Land Law. In addition, the land 
use rights villagers hold, in many cases, can be seized by the state whenever 
it needs the land for other purposes, and in such circumstances the villagers 
have very few rights to decide on the compensation price for the land use 
rights they have lost or other economic rights embedded in the 
compensation for land use rights and site clearance. 
Another contentious point is who or which institution should hold use 
rights over some specific pieces of land at the local level. The views of the 
state land tenure system, and local cadres specifically, frequently conflict 
with those of villagers. My study shows that these contending views have 
led to lots of debates, negotiations, and tensions in different forms among 
villagers, between villages, between village and commune, between groups 
of villagers and local cadres, and between villagers and institutions of the 
state. The major disagreements revolve around the question of how land use 
rights should be distributed or redistributed, who should hold use rights to 
communal land or a piece of worshipping land, the value of land use rights, 
and what subrights the holders have in regard to usage and disposal of their 
land use rights. Land use rights, alongside management rights have 
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therefore become the de facto subject of conflicts especially among 
villagers, between villagers and local cadres, and between villagers and the 
state land tenure policy as a whole. 
These views of villagers to land are not totally new, but are partly 
rooted in history and have evolved through time. In the Vietnamese feudal 
dynasties, kings often claimed that land, as well as other natural resources, 
belonged to them. But in the villages, communal land and private land were 
often controlled and used by individuals and the village institutions as a 
whole. In that sense, two layers of land ownership existed for a long period 
of feudal history in Vietnam: ideological ownership of kings and practical 
ownership of villagers and other parties. 
In the colonial period, the state land tenure policies also made no big 
changes to land tenure systems. At the village level, land tenure regimes 
remained almost the same as previously, except the Vietnamese rich and 
powerful, and the French, appropriated large areas of agricultural land from 
the poor villagers and the communal land of the village. For a number of 
poor and weak Vietnamese villagers in such a context, therefore, land 
aspirations were part of the motivation for their involvement in the wars to 
oust the French and reunite the country (Kerkvliet 1997: 8). These 
aspirations were satisfied through the radical land reform in the 1950s in the 
northern part of Vietnam, which explains Kerkvliet's observation "Having 
finally again obtained fields of their own through [the 1950s] land reform, 
most families were reluctant, if not opposed, to surrender them to 
cooperative managers, which the state's collectivization required" 
(Kerkvliet 1997: 16). Later on, their quiet, unorganized but everyday 
resistance to collectivization to some extent indicated their struggle to farm 
and hold the land on their own (Kerkvliet 1995a, 1997). 
Decollectivization shifted cooperative-based farming to household-
based production in the 1980s and early 1990s. This finally met many 
villagers' long-term aspirations as the new land tenure regime allows them 
to hold the land use rights, which then gives many villagers the power to 
decide, on their own, how much time, labour, and capital to invest in their 
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agricultural land plots. Also, they can decide themselves, within the family 
boundary, who farms the land and who does not, and in what circumstances 
and in which conditions they want to dispose of their land use rights. In that 
way, the villagers have closer relations with the land they farm in terms of 
holding, controlling, using and decision-making over the land as well as 
their farming output, which are all related closely to their life in terms of 
means of production, subsistence, and a valuable form of property. In short, 
villagers desire to hold land use rights because use rights are identical at the 
practical level to land ownership. This also means that their holdings of land 
use rights since decollectivization look idential to practical ownership of 
individual villagers and the village institutions in the past. Villagers 
recognise the Vietnamese entire people's holding of ownership rights to 
land because such a holding is similar to kings' ideological ownership of 
the land in history. 
If villagers desire to hold land use rights, why do they accept the 
state's periodical redistribution of the land use rights they hold? And besides 
the above state-formulated land rights, are there traditional rights embedded 
in villagers' views and in land conflicts? Many villagers' acceptance of the 
periodical redistribution of land use rights might relate to their idea that 
periodical adjustments can maintain villagers' more-or-less equal access to 
land for farming. In other words, they endorse, or at least do not resist, an 
equitable allocation among holders of agricultural land use rights. But their 
expectation of redistribution at the end of their 20 years of land use rights is 
not that all of their currently used land will be taken away while they are 
given other land. On the contrary, they expect a redistribution which 
allocates a bit of their current land use rights to someone else, or a bit of 
someone else's land use rights being allocated to them, as occurred in many 
rural communities during the redistribution around 1993 in Ha B~c 
province. In other words, they expect to keep using most of the land for 
which they presently hold use rights, plus or minus small areas depending 
on population and other factors. This orientation helps to explain why they 
invest time, labor, and other resources in developing land to which they 
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have use rights. Talking to villagers in Vinh Phuc, Ha Tay and rural Ha N()i 
in recent years, Ben Kerkvliet has obtained similar impressions to my 
observations in B~c Ninh. 13 Although, I must say that I am not quite sure 
whether this view of the villagers documented during my fieldwork will 
remain if the villagers undergo lots of socio-economic changes in the future. 
Villagers' views towards a periodical redistribution of agricultural 
land use rights are quite different from their views towards residential land 
use rights. In this case, despite the state declaring that the holding of 
ownership rights of residential land rests in the hands of the entire people, 
many villagers rarely expect the state to take steps to adjust the allocations 
of their residential land to which they hold use rights so that everyone has 
more or less the same amount of land to use. Actually, the state land tenure 
regime has never put a time limit on holding of residential land use rights.14 
Regarding other land rights, as my discussion in the following 
chapters shows, villagers in some communities claim various rights other 
than, or in contrast to, what the state has regulated. One of these is the right 
of the village community over communal land use rights. While the state 
land tenure system regulates the commune authorities, many villagers think 
that, based on historical precedent, the village should be the holder of 
communal land use rights. In a number of communities, this has led a 
number of villagers to contest for the village's holding of communal land 
use rights. Actually, such claims for community rights over land resources 
are not a particular phenomenon of some Red River delta villagers but have 
been common elsewhere as anthropologists have documented. For example, 
some Vietnamese anthropologists who examined the question of land 
ownership and land use in the highlands in Vietnam clearly demonstrate that 
people in Tay Nguyen (central highlands) had long traditionally shared a 
land tenure regime that was governed on the basis of community and by 
13 Personal communication. 
14 In relation to residential land, the views of many villagers in the Red River delta might 
vary little from those of residential land owners in the Australian Capital Territory, who on 
the one hand recognize the legal ownership of the Australian Capital Territory government 
but on the other hand see their own control, use and disposal of the land through leases as 
another layer of ownership: practical ownership. 
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customary laws. Such a land tenure regime remained with little change 
during the French domination and the Republic of Vietnam. However, since 
the post-American war period, this system has been critically undermined 
because of three massive programs: immigration, the building of 
plantations, and the settlement of shifting cultivators. These programs have 
resulted in indigenous people specifically, and their communities in general, 
losing their land and forest to plantations and new immigrants. 
Consequently, indigenous people have been shifted from being the masters 
of the land and forest to renters of the land use rights on their own land. The 
2001 social unrest that involved thousands of highlanders, Dang Nghiem 
Van argues, was partly a struggle to retrieve their "local ownership of land 
and forest" (Dang Nghiem Van 2002). 
In northern Thailand, Ganjananpan Anan also argues for community 
rights while examining the transformation of the Northern peasant economy 
and the politics of resources management. In order to explain the 
contradictions between the state's view and the local people's perceptions of 
forest and land use, and how conflicts between the two actors have 
occurred, he offers an approach that he labels "community rights." Putting 
heavy emphasis on the local cultural dimension, he argues for the rights of 
local communities to manage and use their local land and forest resources. 
Conflicts over land and forest, he concludes, are not only the reactions of 
local people to the state's encroachment and the commercialization of the 
market economy, but also to strengthen their local communities (Anan 
2000). 
In addition, villagers claim various other rights in regards to their land 
use rights, and the proper behavior of local cadres. All of these are 
examined in the following chapters. 
In short, I argue that, if we look at the contemporary land tenure 
system in Vietnam through the framework of a bundle of rights and a bundle 
of rights holders, many villagers in the Red River Delta do not see 
themselves as holders of ownership rights nor do they compete, or have a 
desire, to hold such rights on land held by the entire people. But they claim 
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the holding of use rights, quydn sit d~ng, to specific areas or plots of land 
for themselves, or for the village community to which they belong, and they 
care about management rights, depending on the kind of land. By holding 
land use rights, the villagers or the village institutions as a whole are able to 
directly control, use, and dispose of these use rights on their own, and for 
themselves. 
To many villagers in the Red River Delta, land use rights have a 
number of different meanings and values, including being a means of 
production and related source of subsistance, and a valuable form of 
property. For many villagers, especially those who farm the land, 
agricultural land has traditionally been seen and is still considered as a vital 
source of subsistence, as some researchers have argued (Gourou 1955; Scott 
1976; and Do Hoai Nam, Le Cao Dam 200 I). Attempts to take away such 
land use rights can result in villagers' resistance. Another key value of 
agricultural land use rights is that they are seen as a form of property, the 
value of which is expressed in a Vietnamese saying: a piece of land a piece 
of gold [tdc ddt tdc vang], or as the supreme good in the views of peasants 
elsewhere, Gregory argues (1997:74). In Vietnam since decollectivization, 
capitalist forms of market have become popular in Vietnamese society, and 
have intruded into people's lives in various ways. In my studied area, the 
effects of modernization, industrialization, urbanization and globalization, 
i.e. the intrusion of "foreignness" like tourism, joint-ventures and foreign 
companies, have also affected the life of local people during the past ten 
years or more. For example, in taking a large area of agricultural land from 
villagers to build industrial zones for joint-ventures, foreign and domestic 
companies have taken away the land use rights of one group of villagers or 
reduced the per capita land of another. 
All of the above factors have in different ways increased the socio-
economic and political values of agricultural land use rights. This 
contradicts with argument proposed by Jonathan Rigg and Sakunee 
Nattapoolwat, who have insisted that in the context of the increasing 
interactions between rural and cities, the emergence of commercialisation 
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and the integration of the local economy into the global, "[l]and, in short, is 
no longer a strategic resource" for the local people (Rigg 1996; Rigg and 
Nattapoolwat 2001: 952). As I understand it, their argument originates from 
a perception of land as a source of income. Therefore, in the context of the 
increasing availability of non-agricultural work, more peasants can engage 
in nonfarming work to get a higher amount of income, making agricultural 
land no longer as essential to villagers as previously. In the Red River delta, 
however, examining the relations and attitudes of villagers towards 
agricultural land my research finds that agricultural land remains vital to 
many villagers in the Red River Delta for other reasons, for example being a 
valuable form of property. 
Villagers 
Before defining the concept of villagers I want to highlight the nature 
of a village in the Red River delta. The term village in the English language 
is a translation of the Vietnamese term lang or than in the Red River delta 
and lowland in the centre, bim in the mountainous areas, and dp in South 
Vietnam. 15 
Villages m Vietnam have long been researched (Kleinen 1999a). 
Similar to what others have argued, I cannot conceptualize the village in 
Vietnam; the diversity is too large. Therefore, I merely highlight some main 
attributes of villages in the Red River delta, which are not necessarily found 
in other parts of the country or beyond Vietnam. 16 According to Phan Dai 
Doan, the villages in the Red River delta and elsewhere in Vietnam have 
15 After decollectivization, lang and than are often used by villagers, state agents and 
scholars. Are they the same, or different, or both? In my view, lang refers more to a 
traditionally residential area while than emphasizes the administrative meaning. Therefore, 
in many cases, one lang is one than. In other cases, lang and than are not identical. 
Sometimes, one big lang includes several than. For example, Dlnh Bang village (also 
commune-xa) in Tir Scm district (B~c Ninh province) contains over ten than. But I also see 
a than today can be set up on the ground of two [prior to the 1950s land reform] lang. 
16 For a detailed examination of historical transformation of village institutions at the 
national level, see Nguyen Quang Ngoc (1996: Lang-thon trong he thong thiet che chinh 
tri-xa hoi nong thon, pp. 68-l 09), and for a similar examination of one village see Truong 
Huyen Chi (200 1, chapter two: Historical transformation of community institutions in Dong 
Yang, pp. 31-72). 
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undergone radical transformations throughout history (2001: 19). To him, 
the village during feudal and colonial periods of time was not only "a 
natural community in which its residents gathered on the ground of blood 
relationship, residential relationship, [and] occupational relationship ... [but 
also] an administrative unit" in the state apparatus (Phan Dai Doan 2001 : 
18-19). Focused on the Red River delta, Tran Tu, a well-known Vietnamese 
ethnologist, argued that, economically, villages in this region during the 
18th and 19th centuries often had three main features: some communal land, 
a modest level of social differentiation, and a small peasant society. In terms 
of cultural and socio-political organization, he clarified various types of 
official and unofficial associations based on age, residential area, 
occupation, gender, and power. In each village, he argued, it was common 
to see a communal house, a Buddhist pagoda, and numerous small shrines. 
Finally, he concluded that village affairs were governed in accordance with 
both the state laws and the village's own customary convention (Tran Tu 
1984). 
In four decades, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the villages in the Red 
River delta underwent many changes (Nguyen Quang Ngoc 1996: 80-81; 
Truong Huyen Chi 2001: 50-63). Under the effects of the 1950s land 
reform, agricultural collectivization, and other cultural and socio-political 
programs of the state, the "new way of life" [nip sdng mai] campaign for 
example, various traditional features and attributes of the village have been 
eroded, or replaced with new values and forms of socialist ideology. For 
example, the body ofthe village elders that used to exist was eliminated, the 
economy of family households was strongly decreased, and especially 
numerous traditional customs like collective festivals, rituals, and collective 
worshipping places comprising shrines, pagodas, and communal houses in 
the villages were destroyed. Despite these changes, however, Nguyen 
Quang N goc ( 1996) and Truong Huyen Chi (200 1) argue the image and role 
of the traditional village remained important in many aspects except for a 
short period of large-scale collectivization (1975-1981) when the village 
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entity greatly lost its legitimacy to intervillage-based and commune-based 
cooperatives. 
Agricultural decollectivization and D6i M6'i on the whole have not 
only developed and diversified the rural economy but also marked the time 
during which various former cultural, political, and socio-economic 
institutions of the traditional village have been reformulated into the present 
life of the villages in different ways (Nguyen Quang Ngoc 1996: 82-94; 
Truong Huyen Chi 2001: 63-72). The family household has retrieved its 
former role in economic production (Chu Van Lam et al. 1992; Chu Van Vu 
1995). There has also been a re-emergence of lineage collective rituals and 
village communal festivals and, consequently, the rebuilding of collective 
worshipping places like communal houses and Buddhist pagodas (Hy Van 
Luong 1993; Nguyen Quang Ngoc 1996; Bo Van boa-Thong tin 1993; 
Endress 2001, 2002). And numerous unofficial social associations of the 
traditional village based on age, occupation, gender, and residential location 
have also reappeared in modified forms. While the state takes the commune 
[xa] as its lowest level of administration, the village administration has been 
re-established and consequently a body of village authorities has come into 
effect, creating another type of local cadres (Nguyen Quang Ngoc 1996: 82-
94). 
Among the contemporary villages, however, variations in population 
size, agricultural land per capita and economics are pronounced. In 144 
villages of my studied district, 22 villages had over 2,000 inhabitants, 63 
villages had between 1,000 and 2,000, and 59 villages contained less than 
1 ,000 inhabitants (UBND huyen Tien Son 1991 b). Agricultural land among 
them also varied, ranging from over 100 to over 500 square metres per 
person. In the villages where people have specialized in non-agricultural 
work, agricultural land per capita is low, about 200 square metres per 
person. In villages where people combine both agricultural and non-
agricultural work, this ratio is about 300-400. For example, it is 351 square 
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metres in D~i L()c village. 17 Meanwhile, in other villages where the 
inhabitants focus more on agricultural production, the land ratio is much 
higher, like in L9c: 538, and in PhU Duong: 584. 
In short, decollectivization in the Red River delta and the innovative 
policies throughout the country at large have not only developed, 
diversified, and differentiated the rural socio-economic picture but also, like 
in China, have revived various traditional customs, practices, and 
institutions into present village life. These have to some extent consolidated 
the role and legitimacy of the village entity in some perspectives. 
In this study, I perceive contemporary villagers as a diverse group of 
ordinary people who live in villages and hold no official positions in the 
local government or party units of state apparatus, and mostly farm. By a 
diverse group, I mean they are different in various aspects like age, gender, 
kinship, wealth, level of education, amount of travel, other sources of 
cultural and socio-political capital, and especially occupation. Differences in 
occupation among the villagers for example, means that while many are 
peasant agriculturalists whose production and consumption are oriented to 
their own families, and who are under some economic and political 
obligations to the power-holders (Spencer 1996: 418), some do non-farming 
work and gain income from non-agricultural sources. Among the peasants, a 
number also engage in non-agricultural work, either temporary or long term, 
for income. In my studied area within former Ha B~c and current B~c Ninh, 
a province that in 1995 contained 2, 706 lowland villages [lang], 198 upland 
villages [ban], and 61 clusters of inhabitants [c~m dan cu] (UBND tinh Ha 
Bac 1995b: 2), a survey of 17 cooperative populations revealed that the 
people who were doing the farming, i.e. the peasants as I call them in this 
study, comprised 96.7 per cent of village populations. 18 Disparities in age, 
gender, level of education, and occupation have led to differences in income 
and wealth among the villagers. However, in the Red River delta I argue 
17 For confidential reasons, the real names of some studied villages and communes have 
been replaced with pseudonyms. 
18 The remainder were made up of retired people (1.4 per cent), retired villagers receiving a 
pension (0.2 per cent), war martyrs and invalids (0.5 per cent), soldiers on service (0.3 per 
cent), and other types of villagers (the rest) (BCD cap GCN va LSBT l992c: 4). 
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that the level of difference in these aspects, especially occupation and 
wealth, varies from village to village, and region to region. In my studied 
area, such differences are more pronounced in some villages that specialize 
in handicraft and trade, while in many villages in which the majority of 
village people engage in agriculture, the extent of differences is less marked. 
Alongside the above differences, the diverse group of villagers also 
shares essential similarities. For example, they are all ordinary people who 
live in the villages, hold no power or official positions in the state apparatus, 
share various interests of the peasant family and village community, and 
especially draw their subsistence from agricultural land farming. In the 
villages in which I did field research, which are introduced in Chapters 
Three and Four, though many villagers have diversified their economic 
activities, agricultural land has increased its value to many villagers since 
decollectivization for different reasons, especially for subsistence (and a 
related source of occupation) and a form of property. Many villagers expect 
that agricultural production will provide at least enough materials for their 
family to live on throughout the year. During the past years, out-migration 
for non-agricultural work has moved some agricultural labour force out of 
the fields. To many villagers, however, the rationale of out-migration is not 
to push all family members to work in the non-agricultural sector. The 
change just means that some family members engage in non-agricultural 
work while the rest remain to work on the farm. While farming provides 
villagers with a source of subsistence, their non-agricultural work or the 
combination of both often brings them a source of cash and savings. In 
addition, the small percentage of non-peasant villagers rarely live separately 
from the peasants; instead they are members of the peasant families and part 
of the village community. Therefore, what non-peasants do and how they 
behave has been conditioned by the interests, customs, and politics of the 
peasants who farm the land and by the village community to which non-
peasants belong. Also, agricultural land use rights since decollectivization 
have become a valuable form of property to many Vietnamese people, as I 
argue throughout this thesis. 
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These similarities among villagers have helped a diverse group of 
people share some of the same views on how agricultural land rights should 
be distributed, held, by whom, for whose benefit and who can decide these 
essential questions. Such views have finally held many villagers together in 
collective action in land conflicts in a number of rural communities since 
decollectivization. The views of villagers taken as a whole towards land are 
dominated by the peasant villagers, who have been directly using the land, 
and have their own interests and objectives in land ownership rights, 
management rights, and use rights. Put another way, while both peasant and 
non-peasant villagers articulate their views towards the decision-making, 
distribution and holding of land rights, the dominant views are the views of 
the peasants. The peasants' views, however, are better articulated, and 
shaped into words and actions, thanks to the support, endorsement and 
leadership of non-peasant villagers, who are in many cases retired people 
and former soldiers. In short, despite the differences in background of the 
villager entity, their similarities have led them to share some of the same 
views towards the questions of decision-making, distribution and holding of 
land rights, which has resulted in collective reaction in land conflicts in a 
number of communities. 
While talking about the village and peasant villagers, I have pondered 
a lot on prolonged and controversial debates in some studies over whether 
villages in Vietnam, especially those I have known in the Red River delta, 
have been closed corporate communities. Like several Vietnamese scholars, 
James Scott sees villages prior to the French conquest as closed corporate 
communities, a ritual and cultural unit as well as an important setting for 
peasant economic life. In such village communities, clear boundaries 
between the village and the outside world were made alongside a restriction 
on land ownership. And to Scott, the structure of such closed corporate 
communities provided the poor, weak, and marginalized peasants moderate 
subsistence through reciprocity with others, usually better off, in the village 
(Scott 1976). Samuel Popkin, on the other hand, supposes that the no-clear-
boundary traditional village was in transition to an open one with private 
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property and open land sales. There were only a few or even no restrictions 
on land ownership, he argues (Popkin 1979). Meanwhile, Kleinen observes 
that "the classical image of a closed, corporate community of the traditional 
Vietnamese village needs serious revision" (Kleinen 1999b: 190) since 
expanding market forces have changed the village societies (Kleinen 1999a: 
27). Looking at a larger scale, Jan Breman has, on the contrary, persuasively 
argued that the village in Asia has never been a closed corporate entity; 
however, his discussion includes little material on the village in Vietnam 
(Breman 1988). 
The more crucial point is whether peasant villagers advocated moral 
economy or were they rational peasants? In support of the former, Moise 
writes: 
In broadest outline, Scott argues that a primary concern of most 
peasants is avoiding the risk of going hungry. Under a principle 
called "safety first", they will prefer a situation offering a low 
but adequate and secure income to one offering the probability of 
higher income but with a risk of falling below subsistence levels 
(Moise 1982: 72). 
The peasants Scott emphasizes are those on low incomes and near the 
line of subsistence, so a small drop in income would threaten their lives. 
They therefore tried to avoid risk; preferred community property to private; 
resisted market economies, cash crops, innovation, and investment; and 
hated selling and buying, even though these would often bring them more 
benefit, due to the very potential risk of falling below the "danger line" 
(1976: 13-55). To Scott, only the better off peasants would commit to the 
market since they could afford a loss if the subsistence economy was 
damaged and could no longer support them sufficiently. However, what 
colonialism and commercialization had undermined was not the subsistence 
need but the "moral economy" institutions that helped villagers on the 
margins of subsistence to get enough. Peasants then lost the waged 
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employment and land access opportunities that were available to them in the 
old days. The landlord, who often gave them land and credit, shaped 
relationships with a new class of villagers in the community, therefore, the 
peasants' traditional patron-client relations were destroyed. These reasons 
help to explain the peasants' political actions. This means that Scott does 
not infer his moral economy, as Keyes wrongly assumes, "entails a model 
... he claims is applicable to most, if not all, pre-capitalist agrarian orders in 
Asia and that continues to have salience as Asian peasants confront the 
radical transformation of their worlds" (Keyes 1983: 756). Indeed, Scott 
argues that his "theory is not abstract and universal at all, but is situational 
and about the peasants who live close to the subsistence margin only" 
(Evans 1986: 6, 1995: 205). 
Popkin opposes most of the moral economy's arguments by arguing 
that the peasants are individual rational actors who aim, and often try, to 
maximize their own individualistic self-interests. In relation to land 
ownership for example, Popkin writes, "[e]ven if they received less 
desirable plots than did the notables, villagers may have preferred 
permanent (private) control of mediocre plots to rotating access to good, 
bad, and average public plots. Such appropriations would reinforce 
preferences for private instead of public resources and investments" (Popkin 
1979: 104-1 05). Although accepting the peasants were poor, and always 
"pre-occupied with the constant threat of falling below the subsistence 
level," Popkin argues that peasants did sometimes have surpluses and took 
innovation and risky investments. The investment could be for both private 
short and long-term purposes, such as investment in children and land. The 
reason why peasants were involved in the markets was not because it was 
the last solution, but because it was a response to new economic 
opportunities, since the market and government penetration could, in certain 
conditions, improve the welfare of lower-class peasants. Therefore, peasants 
do have a market orientation and aim at innovation as well as cash crops. 
Critical of the simplicity of both of these theorists, Hy Van Luong 
persuasively demonstrates that the peasants' revolutionary struggle in N01ih 
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Vietnam needs to be understood in terms of the socio-economic and cultural 
structure of Vietnamese society of the time, motivated by the twin values of 
egalitarianism and hierarchy (Hy Van Luong 1992). 
Meanwhile, Kerkvliet argues that the choice is not simply a question 
of either a moral economy or rational economy line of analysis. Peasants 
can, and often do have, both orientations, depending on what kinds of 
peasants they are. His "everyday politics" (1990) perfectly illustrates these 
points. To Kerkvliet, "politics consists of the debates, conflicts, decisions, 
and cooperation among individuals, groups, and organizations regarding the 
control, allocation, and use of resources and the values and ideas underlying 
these activities" (Kerkvliet 1990: 11). Although pointing out three broad 
types of politics: official, advocacy, and everyday, he emphasizes politics in 
everyday life. 
The key feature of everyday politics, he argues, is an existence of both 
cooperation, like "patron-client relations and other vertical ties" that gather 
people together, and conflict among people in different classes and statuses 
over the use, production, and distribution of resources. Conflict in his 
everyday politics is informed by contending values and resistance. 
Advancing the theory that society is a composite of values, Kerkvliet argues 
that the subordinate people and the superordinate people in . his studied 
village hold contentious norms and ideas over the use, production, and 
distribution of resources. While the superordinate people argue for their 
power and right over property ownership and market values, the subordinate 
people hold the belief that, first, "the people with more should help others 
with less;" and secondly "basic needs should be satisfied." Put another way, 
the subordinate people often claim basic rights: the right to live at a decent 
standard of living (economic security) and the right to be treated like a 
human being (human dignity). Such beliefs are widely held among this 
group of people in the Philippines. The contending values then lead to the 
second aspect of conflict in everyday politics: resistance; but resistance 
against the claims or for their claims often occurs as what is called 
"everyday forms of resistance," which I discuss later in this chapter. 
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. Everyday resistance, however, can be "a source for sustained protest and 
significant change" (1990: 259), and land takeovers by villagers during the 
mid and late 1980s in the Philippines are a clear example of this (1993). 
After the collapse of Marcos's rule, the tumultuous political conditions 
added to by a process of national political democratization, created political 
room for everyday resistance to turn into public protest action: tens of 
thousands of poor landless villagers and workers occupied and intended to 
use a large area of farmland that they did not legally own - actions that they 
rarely dared to do previously. 
Kerkvliet combines everyday politics and dialogic argument about the 
state - society relations in Vietnam to study Red River delta villagers and 
their attitudes, as well as behaviours towards the state programs of 
collectivization, to provide many insights into the nature of villagers in the 
contemporary Red River delta. He argues that in the mid and late 1950s, 
many villagers were prepared to give collective farming a try if it could 
satisfy their needs - particularly subsistence needs, and take them to a higher 
political and economic level than before. In practice, however, collective 
farming could not fulfill either of these needs, which became more and more 
apparent to villagers after a few years of the collectivization effort. Added 
to that was the cooperative cadres' abuse of their power through corruption 
and favoritism. Key to his argument is that ordinary villagers' quiet and 
unorganize_d reactions to collectivization eventually had great effects on the 
state in dismantling agricultural collectivization in Vietnam (Kerkvliet 
1995a, 2001). 
In this study, my theoretical choice on Red River delta villagers' 
attitudes, relations and conflicts over land since decollectivization is to 
incorporate various ideas of the above theories into what I call "villagers' 
views." In broad terms, although villagers' views towards land might differ 
from one kind of land to another, from one time to the next, from one group 
of villagers to another, from place to place, and from culture to culture, 
many villagers share some common views towards the question of how land 
rights should be distributed, held, by whom and for whose benefit, as I 
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previously argued. Their views might also be similar to, or incompatible 
with, the views of local cadres, higher state officials, and the state's land 
tenure policies on the whole. Yet villagers' views contain both moral and 
rational aspects. They are also contextualized by the historical tradition and 
cultural setting in which the villagers live. Policies compatible with the 
villagers' views might bring them incentives for better management and use 
of the land. However, incompatible policies might, in many cases, result in 
adverse public resistance of the villagers. The ways of displaying their 
public resistance have ranged from peaceful gossip and discussion to public 
demonstrations, delay in paying taxes and fees, and even violent protests. 
Villagers' views and the actions they take to express or protect their views, 
in many cases, have had great effects on the state and state policy making, 
particularly the local cadres' attitudes and behaviors towards the villagers. 
The State and Local Cadres 
Concepts of "the state" and "local cadres" are also frequently used in 
this study. So what is the state? The literature in social sciences has thus far 
given different definitions of the state (Migdal 1994: 11). In this study, the 
general concept of "state" in Vietnam is used to narrowly refer to local 
cadres, "officials and institutions that make, implement, and enforce rules 
that are intended to apply across the entire society and its various parts" 
(Kerkvliet 2001: 240). 19 However, in an anthropological study the state 
entity needs to be broken down to distinguish its vertical multilevels and 
various horizontal institutions for analysis. Vertically, the organization of 
the socialist state in Vietnam is divided into four levels: the centre, 
province, district, and commune. The commune is then further divided into 
19 In contrast, Nagengast offers a broader definition of the state. According to him, "the 
state is not just a set of institutions staffed by bureaucrats who serve public interest. It also 
incorporates cultural and political forms, representations, discourse, practices and activities, 
and specific technologies and organizations of power that, taken together, help to define 
public interest, establish meaning, and define and naturalize available social identities 
(Nagengast 1994: 116). 
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two sublevels: commune and village.20 Horizontally, each ofthese levels of 
the state consists of various institutions of the party, goverment, the armed 
forces and mass organizations.21 At the local level, generally speaking, the 
popular image of the state that the majority of villagers encounter everyday 
is local cadres. Beyond the village and commune cadres are officials and 
other institutions at the district, province, and central levels. In addition, the 
state tenure policy, in the form of land laws and under-law regulations, is 
also a part of the state which explicitly articulates the state's views on the 
question of land tenure arrangements. 
In the Vietnamese language, "cadre" is expressed as can b(J, a 
common term that many people use to generally refer to one group of 
personnel who work for the state, hold essential positions and receive 
payment from the state. But what is a local cadre [can b(J aja phuong]? Are 
there different types of local cadres? And what are their relationships to 
villagers and the state at large? 
In an article, Michael Mau has defined a cadre as "any one who holds 
a formal position of leadership in an organization, i.e. a military officer, 
party secretary, or combat leader in a guerrilla war" (1969: 282). Looking 
specifically at the local cadres, Pham Quang Minh has simply defined them 
as "either members of people's councils or executive committees" (2002: 2). 
Accordingly, he presents the state's figure of 300,000 local cadres working 
in 10,400 local administrative units throughout the country. In one province, 
Hai Duong, with 1,660 square kilometres of land and 1,650,000 inhabitants, 
local cadres number 7,946 comprising 5,169 members of People's Councils, 
and 1,777 members ofExecutive Committees (2002: 2). 
Presenting a fuller classification, Nguyen Minh Nien has distinguished 
local cadres as follows: for party cadres, local cadres are from secretary of 
20 I want to emphasize that the village is not an official level of the contemporary state 
apparatus in Vietnam. Instead, it is a part of local government. Nevertheless, village cadres 
enjoy a salary from the state, and work for the state, and actually have decisive power over 
the governing of village communal resources and affairs. 
21 In theory, mass organizations are of the masses, i.e. the society. In practice, however, 
mass organizations in Vietnam are mostly run by the state and for the state. Therefore, they 
are parts of the state though one might say they are also part of the society too. The 
agricultural cooperative during the period of agricultural collectivization is another 
institution that makes up the state. 
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party cell upwards; for authority cadres, local cadres are from village head 
upwards; for mass organization cadres, local cadres are from members of 
commune executives upwards; and for cooperative cadres, local cadres are 
from head of production brigade upwards. According to Nien, ten essential 
positions [chuc V¥ quan tr9ng] of local cadres include Secretary of 
Commune Party Organization, President of Commune People's Committee, 
Manager of large-scale agricultural cooperative, Head of Commune Party 
Organization's Personnel Committee, Head of Commune Police, Head of 
Commune Army Services, and Heads of Commune Mass Organizations. 
Three key positions [ chuc V¥ chit ch6t] of local cadres are Secretary of 
Commune Party Organization, President of Commune People's Committee, 
and Manager oflarge-scale agricultural cooperative (1991: 469). 
The main difficulty in classifying local cadres in the above ways, 
however, is that the researchers have failed to give a full and general 
definition of a local cadre. In addition, some do not reflect recent changes in 
types of local cadres. For example, Nguyen Minh Nien mentioned the 
Manager of large-scale agricultural cooperative as one type of local cadre, 
but this kind of local cadre has disappeared since decollectivization. 
Meanwhile Pham Quang Minh has failed to include a new key type of local 
cadre: the village head and his assistants, who have appeared since 
decollectivization. In this study, therefore, I define local cadres as those who 
have position and power in decision-making in local government and 
receive payment from the budget of the state, or cooperatives. Accordingly, 
at the commune level, local cadres are the key cadres of the commune [xa], 
precinct [phuang] and district capital [thi trdn], including Secretary and 
Vice-Secretaries of the Commune Party Organization, Chairperson and 
Vice-Chairpersons of the Commune People's Council, President and Vice-
Presidents of the Commune People's Committee, President and Vice-
Presidents of Commune Mass Organizations, and Heads of specialized 
positions, such as cadastral cadre, financial cadre. At the village level, local 
cadres include the villagehead, party cell's secretary, cooperative manager, 
and their key subordinates. 
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I argue that local cadres are not a unified group but are differentiated 
in various perspectives, including their former occupation, current position, 
talent, morality, gender, kinship and residential location. Take the village 
head position for example. Among 144 village heads in Tien San district in 
1991, only one was female, 112 had party membership, 45 had graduated 
from high school, 78 had completed secondary school, and 21 had only 
completed primary school (UBND huyen Tien Son 1991b). Also, among 
these 144 village heads, 33 simultaneously held the position of cooperative 
manager, 12 held the position of party cell secretary, and nine had 
membership in the Commune Party Organization (UBND huyen Tien Son 
1991b). 
Although this study categorizes local cadres, who also live in the 
villages, as one of various institutions of the larger state entity, whether or 
not local cadres are a part of a specific village community must be examined 
case by case. At the village level, all the cadres are residents of the village 
and share a blood relationship with a number of villagers in the community. 
Therefore, they have close relationship and interaction with the villagers of 
the community to which they belong. In contrast, at the commune level the 
situation differs to some extent. In the Red River delta and beyond, the 
commune in most cases comprises several villages. (In some cases, one 
commune is one village, like Dinh Bang village-commune as previously 
noted.) The commune cadres, therefore, rarely all come from any single 
village in the commune but from all the villages, albeit in some cases one 
village might have more people working in the commune as commune 
cadres than the others. Consequently, whether commune cadres share 
residential location and blood relationships with the villagers of a specific 
village must be examined in relation to individual cadres. In relation to one 
village, some commune cadres might share such relationships but to others 
they might not. Thus, generally speaking, in comparison with village cadres, 
commune cadres have a more distant relationship with the villagers. 
In this research, as later you will see, in most cases, commune cadres 
have become the subject of protest more often than village cadres. In most 
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vigorous protests, those cadres either of the village or commune who share 
residential and blood relationships with villagers are expected to help the 
villagers of their village community. If they do not, or are unwilling to help 
their community villagers, they can be the key objects of protest for some 
villagers. 
Conflicts 
A large portion of this study discusses conflicts among different 
parties over land resources in the Red River delta villages since 
decollectivization. The conception of conflict, as used in this study, is a 
translation of mau thudn in the Vietnamese language. Conflict is debate, 
negotiation, disagreement, tension and violence in different forms and to 
various extents among the different parties involved in decision-making, 
distribution, and holding of rights to agricultural land. Conflict in most of 
the cases in this work are examined and presented as processes, which are 
applied either to a specific case study or a combination of case studies as a 
whole. In so doing, I want to examine the causes, nature and modes of 
expression of conflicts as authors of Land Conflicts in Southeast Asia have 
done (Magallances and Hollick 1998), and aim to discover how and in what 
ways conflicts developed, were resolved, as well as to uncover the 
participation, leadership and resistance tactics found in these conflicts. 
A key feature of conflicts over land is the resistance between parties, 
which may be one group of villagers and another (i.e. among villagers) or, 
more frequently, a group of villagers and a certain local cadre, group of 
local cadres, officials, or programs of the state in relation to land resources 
(i.e. between villagers and the state). So what forms might this resistance 
take? What is the nature of this resistance? The literature on peasant 
resistance in Southeast Asia and China has thus far documented several 
forms of resistance. One ofthem is a well-known theory of resistance of the 
poor, weak, and marginalized people against the rich, powerful elites and 
the state in a specific social context, known as everyday forms of peasant 
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resistance, developed by James Scott, Ben Kerkvliet, and others. Everyday 
forms of resistance, writes Scott are: 
[T]he prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and 
those who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents, and interest 
from them. Most of the forms this struggle takes stop well short 
of collective outright defiance. Here I have in mind the ordinary 
weapons of relatively powerless groups: footdragging, 
dissimulation, false-compliance, pilfering, feined ignorance, 
slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth. These Brechtian forms of 
class struggle have certain features in common. They require 
little or no co-ordination or planning; they often represent a form 
of individual self-help; and they typically avoid any direct 
symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms (Scott 
1986: 6). 
Another form is the "popular" and "rightful resistance" of the 
contemporary Chinese villagers that O'Brien and his colleague have 
proposed in several studies. They argue that the state economic reforms in 
China have also been accompanied by the resistance of a number of 
villagers to different institutions of the state, such as local cadres and 
policies in the countryside. Popular resistance, as they write, is conducted 
by three types of villagers: complaint villagers, recalcitrants, and most 
commonly, policy-based resisters (Li and O'Brien 1996) - or rightful 
resisters (O'Brien 1996). 
Rightful resistance is a form of popular contention that (I) 
operates near the boundary of an authorized channel, (2) 
employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb 
political or economic power, and (3) hinges on locating and 
exploiting divisions among the powerful. In particular, rightful 
resistance entails the innovative use of laws, policies, and other 
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officially promoted values to defy "disloyal" political and 
economic elites; it is a kind of partially sanctioned resistance that 
uses influential advocates and recognized principles to apply 
pressure on those in power who have failed to live up to some 
professed ideal or who have not implemented some beneficial 
measure (O'Brien 1996: 33). 
The resistance of my studied villagers is public resistance. Unlike the 
everyday forms of resistance, which often occur in the form of small, hidden 
reactions that do not challenge local elites and the state, and are limited to 
peaceful actions, public resistance ranges from peaceful reactions like 
gossip, debate and questioning to blunt and confrontational reactions. It 
occurs publicly both within and outside official and legal channels, and 
within and outside local communities where the protesting villagers reside. 
Generally speaking, public resistance first occurs at the local level in the 
form of gossip, debate, questioning, and negotiation through official 
channels in order to achieve demands and wants. When these are not met or 
not treated in a way which satisfies the protesting villagers, they then 
proceed towards higher levels of the state to seek resolution, investigation, 
and explanation. In this arena, if problems or queries are again not met or 
satisfied, the protesting villagers in some cases will then return to their 
village communities and continue to resist in blunt and confontational ways 
and, of course, do not limit their resistance to official and legal channels. 
Blunt and confrontational reactions might also occur during the period in 
which the protesting villagers are seeking a settlement from the higher state, 
depending on the specific resolution of the issues. 
In many cases, public resistance occurs in a collective form. It 
therefore can be organised and planned in terms of leadership and tactics of 
resistance such as who, what, how, where and when to resist. Like rightful 
resistance, state laws and policies, alongside traditional values, are also cited 
to endorse and strenghten public resistance. The key cause of public 
resistance is crucial differences of views among the different parties 
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involved. The contending views can occur among villagers, but mostly in 
this study they occur between villagers and certain groups of local cadres, 
officials, and programs of the state in relation to land resources and local 
cadres. Put another way, the public resistance of a number of villagers, as 
visible in conflicts over land resources, is not aimed at fighting against the 
state and state policies. It is not like the revolutionary resistance against the 
colonial state to regain the country's independence, or the struggle against 
the army of the Republic of Vietnam and Amerian troops to unify the 
nation. Instead, public resistance is initiated because of the contending 
views of some villagers towards the conduct and/or behavior of a certain 
local cadre, group of local cadres, or some aspects in the implementation of 
certain programs and policies of the state in communities. Therefore, as 
disagreement over the issues is resolved, resistance disappears. This 
explains why the consecutive conflicts over land resources in the studied 
area over the past ten years have finally resulted in no great harm to the 
state. Even in cases in which resistance occurred to a serious extent and on a 
large scale, like the social unrest in Thai Binh province (1997) for example, 
the public resistance of some villagers was soon resolved when higher state 
officials tackled the problems properly. 
Like everyday, popular, and rightful forms of resistance, public 
resistance in the end creates dynamics for change. In regards to the state, 
public resistance can affect the behaviour and conduct of state policy and 
policy making at different levels, such as leading to a better regime of land 
management and use, a more rational policy for land use rights 
compensation at national level, and elimilating bad local cadres and 
reducing their corruption and manipulation of official power in their 
behaviour towards villagers in local communities. This does not mean, 
however, to romantize the power and effects of public resistance in every 
single and specific event in all issues. In a number of circumstances, we see 
the dual effects resulting from the ways in which local cadres and the state 
on the whole use authorized power and the state legislation to protect their 
views and position. This means that local cadres and the state at large do 
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not, and will not always, meet the demands and wants of protesting villagers 
to cope with public resistance. In some cases, the state even punishes a 
small number of public resisters so as to resolve or relieve conflicts. The 
rationale for the latter originates from the fact that some public resisters 
work outside official and legal channels to conduct blunt and 
confrontational actions. These acts are, in the view of the state legislation, a 
breach of state laws, therefore they must be punished accordingly. But in the 
end, the number of different acts of public resistance in a number of 
communities have to various extents created the dynamics forcing the state 
to change. 
II. Fieldwork and Thesis Structure 
With a background in history, I enrolled in my Ph.D program in 
anthropology at the Australian National University on 4 July 2000. The first 
12 months of my program were devoted to systematic and intensive reading 
of materials on broad themes relating to history, methodology and theory in 
anthropology and related subjects, and especially regarding my doctoral 
research topic of "The changing patterns of land tenure and peasant attitudes 
in a northern Vietnamese village." 
The next four and a half months were my stay in Vietnam to 
investigate pertinent documents and materials and to select a site for future 
field work. During this period of time, I visited various academic 
institutions in Ha N<)i to explore their materials, including the Vietnam 
National Library, National Library for Social Sciences and Humanities, 
Library of Hanoi National University, Library of National University of 
Economics. I also consulted the small libraries of the Institute of Sociology, 
Institute of Economics, Institute of Historical Studies, and Institute of 
Ethnology belonging to the National Centre for Social Sciences and 
Humanities, and Archives number one and two. In addition, I chose one 
village in B~c Ninh province as my field site, and stayed in the village for 
six weeks for a preliminary investigation. 
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After my return to Australia, I spent three months finalising my 
research proposal, and presented it to a seminar in the university. On 24th 
February 2002, I again left Australia for my fieldwork in the chosen village. 
At the time, I had a clear idea in mind that I was going to investigate the 
1950s land reform, agricultural collectivization, and decollectivization to 
examine how the land tenure system had changed throughout the past five 
decades in one village. More importantly, while looking at a history of the 
changing patterns of land tenure, I wanted to explore peasant attitudes 
towards land and changes in the land tenure system in one village from 
several perspectives. Prior to my field work, I also formulated an 
assumption to test whether changes in the land tenure system might lead to a 
change in peasant relations and attitudes towards land, or might create 
conflict between the two, or even both, at the local level. To investigate all 
these, I outlined three sets of broad research questions, which I further 
developed into nine sets of smaller inquiries to guide me in the field. 
Finally, I elaborated the nine sets of questions into over 200 simple 
questions for conversation with different types of informants, like ordinary 
villagers, local cadres and officials at the higher levels of the state. 
Having arrived in the village, I decided to share food and 
accommodation with one village head family, which comprises a good wife, 
one teenage son and a mature daughter. Right from the first weeks in the 
village, however, I recognized that few informants were not willing to 
answer my questions on various issues on land reform and collectivization. 
One old man who used to be an activist in land reform in the 1950s even 
avoided my questions by asking me back "why do you want to research that, 
for what? Why don't you research current issues of the agricultural 
economy?" Others, instead of talking with me about collectivization, guided 
me to the daily politics of the current land tenure problems in the village and 
neighbouring communities by telling me about land encroachment, land 
selling and allocation, and land compensation. They also complained about 
local cadre corruption and misbehavior. Some villagers from neighbouring 
communites also persuaded me to research similar issues in their villages. 
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Finally, in consultation with members of my supervisory panel, I 
decided to more closely examine land issues since decollectivization in 
relation to villagers, local cadres and higher authorities, and widened my 
fieldsite to include more villages in the same district. I have partially 
shortened the time span of my research focus because the villagers wanted 
to talk with me about this period. Indeed, I really wanted to hear what the 
villagers themselves liked to say rather than trying to obtain the information 
that I wanted to know. I widened the field site as I wanted to cover several 
interesting issues in my thesis that one village, in my case, was not able to 
provide. Later on, I was happy about. these choices as my fieldwork 
proceeded well. 
While based in one village, I could visit all the villages of the district, 
and even went further for broader observation. Thanks to good preparation, 
added to by my experiences of former fieldwork in villages of Hili Duong 
(1997), B~c Ninh (1998), and in suburb of Ha N9i (1999), I met no 
difficulty in interacting with various types of informant. To the women, I 
talked in the house, sometimes even in the kitchen when they were 
preparing foods for their family members or for animals. I sometimes also 
followed them to the fields and asked questions while they were doing 
farming work. To talk with the old men, who often impressed me with their 
deep thinking and rich experiences in many aspects of life, I enjoyed 
moments of interaction in the house with tea and cigarrettes. While to local 
cadres, I talked both at home and in their offices. Another group of my 
informants were officials in various offices in districts and provinces, 
especially those working. in Cadastral, Agricultural, and Inspectation 
Departments. 
Throughout my stay in the field, I was able to regularly contact 
members of my supervisory panel via electronic mail. I have sent them three 
substantial reports that summarised my research findings. Their useful 
comments and suggestions, in response, helped me to identify various issues 
and aspects that my field work needed to further explore. Based on the 
research findings, I gradually developed several major issues as tentative 
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topics of dissertation chapters. From these, I then tried to work out some key 
threads that run through the chapters. 
The first primary source of data in this study originates from my own 
interviews and observations in the studied villages. The second source 
comes from locally written documents, including reports of local authorities, 
letters of denunciation and petitions that the villagers have written in the 
course of disputes about land and local cadres. Indeed, this data source 
helped me to view my research from different angles. Another source 
emerged during the last six weeks of my field work from my investigation 
of documents and archival data in offices and Archival Centres in districts 
and provinces, to which my studied villages belonged in the past and/or 
currently belong. The final source includes publications like newspapers, 
journal articles and books that I collected before, d.uring and after my 
fieldwork. All have not only provided me with insights into the topic in the 
studied villages but have also created a broader context for analysis. 
Since my return to Australia, on 24 February 2003, based on these 
sources of data, greatly aided by the summaries of the three field reports 
mentioned earlier, I have structured six Chapters for my dissertation. 
Chapter One is the introduction, where I offer a new way to analyse the 
attitudes, relations and conflicts over land in the dynamic context of the Red 
River delta since decollectivization, flag central arguments, and critically 
debate various concepts that are used in the thesis. I also briefly describe my 
field work as well as the methodology. Chapter Two is devoted to 
examining the process of decollectivization and different roads to local 
conflicts. The main aim of this Chapter is to set the stage and present the 
context of research before deepening into some case studies where I 
elaborate the arguments under the guiding theoretical framework previously 
presented in Chapter One. Chapter Three examines the process of land use 
rights compensation and site clearing, particularly illustrating the 
contending views of different parties involved as the dynamics of reaction. 
Chapter Four is designed to tackle the daily politics of communal land. 
Chapter Five targets the problem of local cadre corruption and villagers' 
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resistance to this. To conclude, Chapter Six synthesizes the arguments 
previously presented in Chapter One, which have been elaborated in 
Chapters Two, Three, Four, and Five. It also highlights some major issues 
which emerged from my study such as the views-investing approach, 
villagers' views, the problem of local cadres, the question of private 
property in land, future prospects of land issues in Vietnam, and topics for 
future research. 
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Chapter Two: Agricultural Decollectivization and Different 
Roads to Conflicts 
I. Introduction 
The process of decollectivization, a new land tenure regime, and the 
on-going process of industrialization and modernization have created both 
incentives and disincentives to Red River delta villagers in agricultural 
production. Among these, the most well-known positive impact is that 
decollectivization and the new land tenure regime have given villagers more 
power and rights to agricultural production, especially land decision-making 
and holding, which has finally produced a great boom in agricultural output, 
and partially contributed in moving Vietnam from a foodstuff-importing 
country to one which ranks the world's second largest rice exporter. On the 
other hand, like in China (Li and O'Brien 1996; O'Brien 1996), these 
developments have also produced conflicts. However, the existing literature, 
either in Vietnamese or English, provides very little insight into these 
problems. In this thesis, various types of data I present will illuminate the 
following points: that for over ten years, from the late 1980s to at least 2002 
when I did my field research, contending views and conflicts over decision-
making, distribution and holding of land rights (and related problem of local 
cadres) emerged in a number of rural communities. They are a consequence 
of decollectivization, development of the new land tenure regime, 
modernization and industrialization programs, population growth, and the 
effects ofurbanization, marketization and globalization. 
In this Chapter, I first overview the process of agricultural 
decollectivization, especially the distribution and redistribution of 
agricultural land use rights at the district and provincial levels. Secondly, I 
analyse why, in what ways and to what extent, contending views and 
conflicts over land management rights and use rights have occurred among 
various parties in the dynamic context of Vietnamese society since 
decollectivization. Throughout this Chapter, I argue that besides their 
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positive impact, these processes and the new land tenure system have also 
created conflicts in different forms, to different extents, between a number 
of villagers in some rural communities and the local authorities and the state 
land tenure regime at large because of the contending views over the 
question of how agricultural land rights should be distributed, held, 
managed, used, by whom and for whose benefit. Before examining the 
subject, I need to highlight the administrative changes in the territory of the 
province and district where my fieldwork was conducted. 
Ha Bile is a province that was established in 1962 by merging two 
smaller provinces, Bile Ninh and Bile Giang. In that year, Ha B~c had 14 
districts and two provincial capital towns, with a total area of 421,633 
square kilometres and a population of 1,000,305 (Ban Chap hanh Dang bo 
tinh Bac Ninh 2002: 96-97). In 1997, Ha Bic was redivided into its two 
former provinces. 
B~c Ninh has five districts and one provincial capital town, with 
796.25 square kilometres of land and 925,997 inhabitants (TU Bac Ninh 
1998: 1). Tien Son, which was set up on the ground oftwo small districts, 
Tir Son and Tien Du, in 1962, was one of the districts in Ha B~c province. 
In 1993, Tien Son district contained 26 communes [xa] and one district 
capital town [thi trdn], and had 16,448 hectares of land, 212,000 inhabitants, 
and 49,500 households. Its agricultural land amounted to 11 ,530 hectares, 
made up of 10,916 hectares of farmland [adt canh tt:ic], 521 hectares of 
waterland [adt m(jt nu&c], and 250 hectares of forest land [ddt rt.lng]. In all, 
the district had 45 agricultural cooperatives [hQP tile xa nang nghi?p], 
including 17 commune-based cooperatives, nine intervillage-based 
cooperatives, and 19 village-based cooperatives (HU Tien Son 1993b: 1 ). 
The district economy by 1993 was still dominated by agriculture, as 
villagers in two-thirds ofthe district's communes took rice farming as their 
main economic activity. In the communes with a little handicraft work or 
trading business, 60.2 per cent of villagers' incomes originated from 
farming, 21.6 per cent from animal husbandry, 10.2 per cent from sidelines, 
and eight per cent from business services. In nine communes with 
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substantial handicraft works, villagers' incomes from handicraft amounted 
to 79.5 per cent of the total, farming work accounted for only 11.5 per cent, 
animal husbandry for six per cent, and business services for three per cent 
(HU Tien Son 1993b: 8). 
In 1999, two years after the seperation of Ha BAc, TH~n Son was 
redivided into the two old districts: Tir Son and Tien Du. The villages where 
I carried out fieldwork for this dissertation administratively belong to the 
district ofTir Son. By 2001, Tir Son had a total area of6,140.15 hectares of 
land, including 4,234.62 hectares of agricultural land [ddt nang nghi?p] 
(68.47 per cent), 4.30 hectares of forest land [ddt rt.lng] (0.07 per cent), 
1,158.84 hectares of specialized-used land [ddt chuyen ditng] (18.87 per 
cent), 567.44 hectares ofrural and urban residential land [ddt khu ddn cuda 
thj va nang th6n] (9.26 per cent), and 174.95 hectares of unused land [ddt 
chua sir d~ng] (2.85 per cent).1 The district's population amounted to 
114,825 inhabitants, made up of 11,144 persons living in the rural villages 
and 3,081 persons living in the district capital town (Phong Dia chinh huyen 
Tu Son 2001: 1). 
I must also remind the reader that when the term Ha BAc is used in the 
text, I use it to refer to the large province of Ha BAc (1962-1997). The 
notion of BAc Ninh province is often used to refer to the current province of 
BAc Ninh. Similarly, at the district level, Tien Son is used to indicate the 
large district of Tien Son (1962-1999). In contrast, Tir Son refers to what 
today is called Tir Son district of BAc Ninh province. 
II. Agricultural Decollectivization 
In the view of socialist ideology, collectivization was a strategic plan 
in agricultural development in the 20th century. In the northern half of 
Vietnam, collectivization in low-land agriculture took place from the late 
1950s to the late 1970s in different forms of cooperatives, including 
agricultural cooperatives [hQP tac xa nang nghi?p], handicraft cooperatives 
1 The unused land was mainly located on several small-and-low bare mountains in the 
district. 
48 
[hQ'p tac xa thu c6ng nghi?p], buying-selling cooperatives [h9P tac xa mua 
ban], and credit cooperatives [hQ'p tac xii tin d~ng]. Agricultural 
cooperatives evolved from small-scale ones in the late 1950s to large-scale 
cooperatives in the early 1960s and especially in the 1970s. In the small-
scale cooperatives, which were formed from several tens or over one 
hundred households in one or two hamlets of a village, most of the essential 
means of production of peasant households, including agricultural land, 
cows, buffallos, ploughs, harrows and so forth were gathered for collective 
production. Although cooperative members did the farming work 
collectively, owners of these means of production still maintained their 
ownership, and also enjoyed a certain amount of interest from such 
ownership. From the early 1960s, the state development movement of large-
scale cooperatives advanced collectivization to a higher extent and larger 
scale. In agricultural large-scale cooperatives, the cooperatives became 
owners of all means of production that had previously been owned by 
private family households in small-scale cooperatives except for a five-
percent area of land for family economy. Agricultural production in large-
scale cooperatives, which often included villagers from one or several 
villages and even the whole commune, was divided into different steps, each 
in charged of a relevant brigade. Cooperative members worked m 
accordance with the cooperative plans and received working points m 
return. 
From the late 1970s, the process of agricultural decollectivization 
started nationwide and proceeded till the early 1990s. The process of 
decollectivization in agriculture is, indeed, a return from the collective 
production that was based on cooperative models to a private production 
that relies on private family households. One of the most essential tasks in 
this transformation was to distribute agricultural land use rights to villagers, 
mostly peasants, to use on their own. Although this process started in the 
early 1980s, agricultural land use rights were only distributed to villagers in 
practice in 1988 in accordance with Resolution number 1 0 of the Central 
Committee Secretariat, and redistributed again around 1993 when further 
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innovations were conducted in agriculture, especially because of the launch 
of a new Land Law in 1993. 
In Ha Bile, in the 1988 distribution of agricultural land use rights, 
agricultural land of the low-land villages was at large divided into four 
portions, which in this study I call four types of agricultural land, the use 
rights of each was distributed differently in terms of aim of use, terms of 
use, and recipient. The first type maintaimed its former name of 
"agricultural land for family economy" [ddt kinh ti gia dinh], which was 
distinct from the cooperative economy during the collectivization period,2 
and theoretically amounted to 10 per cent of the total agricultural land area 
of each community or commune (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1988a). Previously, 
the agricultural land for family economy had represented only five per cent 
of the total, and was often refered to by many villagers as "the five per cent 
land" [ddt nam phdn tram]. In 1988, the agricultural land for family 
economy was allocated equally to all inhabitants of cooperative member 
households, including those who had died as war martyrs, for a term of use 
of five years. In practice, the implementation of this policy was manipulated 
in a number of cooperatives. For example, prior to 1988, a number of 
families in some communes had already turned their five per cent plots into 
residential land. Some others elsewhere, including some PhU Duang 
villagers, had exchanged their five per cent plots with the management 
board of the cooperative for residential land (HU Tien Son 1992: 8). In Phil 
Duang village, the exchange rate (of five per cent plots for residential land 
between some villagers and cooperative management board) was one square 
metre of five per cent land for 2.5 square metres of waterland.3 This meant 
that in some cooperatives where the former five per cent land for family 
economy had been kept intact, i.e. unallocated because it had been sold, 
2 Like in China and other socialist countries, as agricultural cooperative did not put all 
agricultural land of its members into the hands of the cooperative for control and use, but 
left a small portion for members to farm on their own. In Vietnam, this portion of land 
theoretically amounted to five percent of the total agricultural land area of each cooperative 
during the period of large-scale cooperatives. In one sense, therefore, the cooperative 
members still maintained their family economy while engaging in the economy of the 
cooperative. 
3 This waterland area had been allowed by local authorities to tum into residential land that 
villagers hold use rights for no time limit. 
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exchanged, or transferred to residential land, another portion of ten per cent 
was distributed as agricultural land for family economy. Consequently, the 
area of agricultural land for family economy in a number of localities 
accounted for a higher percentage than was regulated by the higher state 
policy (BCD giao dat lam kinh te gia dinh 1988: 6). 
The second type of agricultural land was water land [ddt m(lt nubc], 
including streams, ponds, and lakes. The use rights of this land were often 
allocated or auctioned to some villagers to use, and sometime they were 
even left fallow in some communities (TU Ha Bac 1989: 3). The third type 
of agricultural land was called "the first-round agricultural land" [ddt w3ng 
m9t], meaning the land that its use rights were allocated to villagers in the 
first round for "primary-subsistence needs" [nhu cdu Iuong thl!c C(J ban]. 
Therefore, the use rights of this land were relatively equally distributed to 
all agricultural inhabitants of the cooperative member households, and even 
to other kinds of villagers, including soldiers on service, retired persons, and 
some state staff members who had registration [h9 khdu] in the community, 
with a term of use of between 10 to 15 years. In most cases, members of 
private-farming households [h9 ca thJ] were not taken into account for land 
use rights distribution. 
The last type of agricultural land named "the second-round 
agricultural land" [ddt vong hai]. Its use rights were theoretically allocated 
or auctioned to the good tillers, or those who could use them best, or needed 
them most for cash crops [san xudt hang h6a]. The rationale for this land 
use rights distribution in the eyes of the state was, in contrast to the "the 
first-round agricultural land," to give land use rights to those who could use 
them best. The area of this land varied from more or less than ten per cent of 
the total area of agricultural land of a community. The use rights of the 
fourth type of land were again distributed in different ways depending on 
the village or commune. In Ha Bile, only 297 cooperatives (31 per cent of 
the total number of the province's agricultural cooperatives at the time) 
allocated such land use rights to households who had the ability to use them 
best [c6 kha nang san xudt], and often collected 15 to 20 per cent higher 
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land-use tax than the tillers paid for the first-round agricultural land. In 
many other communes, such land use rights were distributed equally to the 
cooperative's adult labourers [lao d9ng], i.e. males between 18 and 60, and 
females 18 to 55 years of age, except for those who owed a debt to the 
cooperative [ nr; d9ng sim phdm] received none or a smaller share depending 
on the cooperative and amount owed (TU Ha Bac 1989: 2). This meant that 
the distribution of use rights on the second-round agricultural land in 1988 
did not totally follow the aim of Resolution number 10, expressed in its 
slogan of"doing what you are best at" [ai gioi nghJ gi lam nghJ dy] (TU Ha 
Bac 1989: 5), i.e. those villagers who could do non-agricultural work well 
should move to that and leave their share of agricultural land use rights to 
those in the community who could use them best. 
A redistribution of agricultural land use rights took place nationwide 
during three years, from 1992 to 1994, as a consequense of further changes 
in the agricultural economy at large, and in the state land tenure regime. The 
change in the latter was marked by the launch of the 1993 Land Law, which 
clearly divided the whole land area of the country into six broad types: I. 
Agricultural land [ddt nang nghi?p]; 2. Forest land [ddt liim nghi?p]; 3. 
Rural residential land [ddt khu dan cu nang than]; 4. Urban land [ddt do 
thi]; 5. Specialized-use land [ddt chuyen dung]; and 6. Unuse land [ddt chua 
sic d~ng].4 Under this new Law, the state land tenure policies differ from 
one type of land (i.e. land use rights) to another in terms of management and 
use (Quoc hoi nuoc Cong hoa Xa hoi Chu nghia VietNam 1995: 1 0). In Ha 
B~c province, the redistribution of agricultural land use rights in accordance 
with the new Land Law began in 1992, one year before the new Land Law 
came into effect, and continued until! 1993. This redistribution of 
4 The latest amended version of Land Law, passed by the National Assembly on 26th 
December 2003, has reclassified all the land in Vietnam into three broad groups: 
agricultural land [nh6m ddt nong nghi?p], non-agricultural land [nh6m ddt phi nang 
nghi?p], and unused land [nh6m ddt chua su d¥ng]. According to Article 13 of Chapter One 
of the Law, agricultural land comprises eight types: I. Land for annual crops [ddt tr6ng cay 
hang niim], 2. Land for perennial crops [ddt tr6ng cay !au niim], 3. Forest land for 
production [ddt rung scm xudt], 4. Forest land for protection [ddt rz'rng phong hp], 5. Forest 
land for special use [ddt rung d(ic d1mg], 6. Land for aquaculture [ddt nuoi tr6ng thuy san], 
7. Land for salt production [ddt lam mu6i], and 8. Other types of agricultural land under the 
regulation of the Government. Non-agricultural land includes I 0 types; and the last group 
of unused land includes all types ofland that have not been classified in terms of use. 
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agricultural land use rights throughout the lowland villages of the province 
was actually just an adjustment of what had been distributed in 1988. This 
can be seen through the following example of agricultural land use rights 
redistribution in Tien Son district. 
In the redistribution, the agricultural land of Tien Son continued to be 
classified as the four types that I have previously discussed. The 
redistribution of use rights really only occurred to one type of agricultural 
land: "the first-round agricultural land" (the largest portion of agricultural 
land). In terms of recipients, besides the war martyrs, the majority of alive 
beneficiaries of free land use rights had to be agricultural persons [khdu 
nang nghi?p] who at the same time were members of agricultural 
cooperative households. A small number of other types of local inhabitants, 
including retired people, local workers, and teachers were not able to attain 
free allocation, but in many cases they could pay for it. 
Like the distribution in 1988, members of private-farming households 
in Tien Son, i.e. the peasants who were agricultural inhabitants but not-
cooperative members, received no land use rights. However, by the time of 
redistribution, agricultural land per capita of the private-farming households 
was often higher than of cooperative household members. This disparity 
provoked the question of whether or not the agricultural land use rights of 
private-farming households should be left intact or redistributed like the 
large-scale cooperative cadres in some cases had done at the onset of its 
unification. In some places, the local authorities required private-farming 
households to give [nhuang but] some agricultural land use rights to their 
relatives who were cooperative members (BCD cap GCN va LSBT 1992a: 
11 ). But my field research in PhU Duong discovered the villagers' 
discussion on this issue did not follow this pattern. By 1992, Phil Duong 
had nine private-farming households. A few females who had been born 
into private-farming families but had moved to cooperative member 
households for marriage before the redistribution, were not eligible for 
agricultural land use rights allocation because the cadres argued that their 
ration of land use rights belonged to their family's agricultural land area that 
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had been privately farmed. Although they complained and reacted in 
different ways, by 2002, no concession had been made by the local 
authorities. 
In Ha B~c, the methods of land use rights redistribution and land use 
rights receivers remained the same as in the original distribution in 1988, 
except that in 1993 many non-agricultural persons had to pay a certain sum 
of money for land use rights allocation. A small number of households who 
had no change in demography, either in number of household members or 
their age, therefore continued to hold the land use rights that they had been 
allocated in 1988. Others had to surrender some land use rights, while a 
number of others gained more due to the change in the number of household 
members or their age. As will be noted later, the age of land use rights 
receivers was often counted to ensure equality of allocation. In the broader 
area of Ha B~c province, 29 per cent of households continued to hold the 
agricultural land use rights that they had received in 1988, 34 per cent 
households had to give up some of their use rights and 37 per cent 
households received more land use rights (BCD cap GCN va LSBT 1993: 
3). 
Regarding the other three types of agricultural land: "the agricultural 
land for family economy," "the second-round agricultural land," and "water 
land," no redistribution of use rights occurred around 1993. But there were 
other changes. In regards to "the agricultural land for family economy," 
though its use rights remained unallocated in practice, the term of its use 
rights was lengthened to 20 years, and was theoretically given a land use 
rights certificate that in the Vietnamese language has often been known as 
"certificate for land use rights [holding]" [gidy ch{mg nh4n quyin su d1,1ng 
adt], or more commonly "red book" [s6 do] (HU Tien Son 1993a: 8).5 The 
whole area of "the second-round agricultural land," which amounted to 
about 11-12 per cent of Tien Son agricultural land area, was changed to adt 
5 In fact, by 1993 in a number of communes in other districts of Ha Bite province, the local 
authorities had not yet increased the area of ddt kinh ti gia dinh from five to ten per cent as 
decided in Resolution number 337/NQ of the Provincial People's Council (BCD cap GCN 
va LSBT 1992a: 12). 
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c6ng ich [agricultural land for collective interest], the type of land that is 
used to provide finances for collective aims of the locality (later for 
commune authorities). I will examine this type of land in more detail in the 
following Chapters, especially in Chapter Four. The use rights of water land 
currently remain unallocated. In this research, I will refer to these two types 
of agricultural land, "the agricultural land for collective interest" and "water 
land" as "communal land" [ddt c6ng], because the use rights of these are 
collectively held, and their output is to be used for collective interest. 
Notions of communal land, its management and use, will be further 
explained in Chapter Four. 
As noted above, the redistribution of agricultural land use rights at 
both the district and provincial levels, where my studied villages 
administratively belonged and belong, started one year before the issue of 
the 1993 Land Law and Decree number 64 of the central government on 
land use rights redistribution.6 By August 1993, the redistribution of 
agricultural land use rights in Ha BAc had almost been accomplished. By 
that time, 1 ,005 cooperatives throughout the province (96. 7 per cent of total 
agricultural cooperatives) had redistributed the use rights on 110,502 
hectares of agricultural land to 1,885,083 villagers. As a result, each 
household on average had the use rights of 2,560 square metres of 
agricultural land; each agricultural person attained the use rights of 586 
square metres (BCD cap GCN va LSBT 1993: 2). In Tien Son district 
specifically, each household gained the use rights of 2,122 square metres of 
agricultural land, and each agricultural person received the use rights of 424 
square metres. If the use rights of "the agricultural land for collective 
interest" were allocated, each receiver would have had use rights on 500 
square metres (HU Tien Son 1993b: 9). 
In both distribution and redistribution, the principal of equality in land 
use rights allocation among the receivers in the community was one of the 
most important points that was critically implemented. This was a matter of 
6 In the first place, land use rights were allocated for five to 15 years of use. When the 1993 
Land Law and Decree number 64/CP came into effect, this term of use was altered to 20 
years for annually cultivated land in accordance with the new land tenure policy. 
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great concern to both the villagers and authorities. To attain this equality, 
both land use rights and land use rights receivers had to be considered from 
different perspectives. Regarding the land use rights, three main variables: 
quality, quantity, and location of the land needed to be clarified. As a result, 
the ranking of agricultural land needed to be done to clari1y what rank one 
area of land was. This step can also be seen as the basis for the state 
authorities to collect land-use taxes. Equality in relation to land use rights 
receivers took account of numbers and occupation of people [khdu] or age 
[lao a9ng] or both, depending on the village (TU Ha Bac 1989: 5). As a 
consequence, the majority of the village population were allocated 
agricultural land use rights to farm. 7 
However, the rationale of agricultural land use rights allocation in 
many communities meant that not all viiiagers received the same area of 
land. In Dl;li L9c (Tu Son district) for example, among the agricultural 
villagers, each male-agricultural person between 18 to 60 years old, and 
female-agricultural person between 18 to 55 years old attained the use rights 
of 1.6 sao (576 square metres);8 the over 55-year-old-female-agricultural 
villagers, over 60-year-old-male-agricultural villagers, and I 0-to-17-year-
old-agricultural villagers received the use rights of 10 thubc (240 square 
metres); agricultural children below the age of 10 received the use rights of 
seven thubc (168 square metres). Equality in land use rights allocation in all 
cases also related to social justice. As a result, those who had sacrificed for 
the country, such as war martyrs and invalids often attained priority and 
received agricultural land use rights of good quality and location. 
7 In my view, the division of agricultural land into four types was decided by the central 
authorities, not by the local ones. Similarly, the methods of land use rights allocation based 
on person and occupation and age to ensure equality (although many villagers were keen on 
equal distribution of land use rights) were over all developed by central agents, then pilot 
tested in some areas before wider application. But in most of the cases, the decision to use 
one of the two methods, or both at the same time, in land use rights distribution and 
redistribution lay in the hands of local committees of land use rights allocation of the 
commune, village, and hamlet, or were even publicly discussed in meetings between 
villagers and land use rights allocation committees at these levels. 
8 ln the Red River delta, one mdu comprises 10 sao and equals to 3600 square metres. One 
sao comprises 15 thtrac and equals to 360 square metres. One thuac equals 24 square 
metres. 
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Alongside its positive outcomes, the critical implementation of 
equality in distribution and redistribution of agricultural land use rights also 
Jed to the problem of the fragmentation of the holdings of agricultural land 
use rights among the local people. In Ha B~c, in 1993, the average 
household had 14.3 plots [thua], and some had 30, or even 50 plots 
throughout various fields of the village (BCD cap GCN va LSBT 1993: 2). 
In Tien Son district, in 1993, the average household had 10 to 13, and some 
even had 20 plots (HU Tien Son 1993b: 9). In the context of low 
agricultural land per capita, this fragmentation meant that the land use rights 
of one household were dispersed throughout many fields, making the 
villagers' agricultural production less efficient because of difficulties using 
modem machines and techniques in production and/or the more time needed 
to travel from one plot to another. This problem of agricultural land use 
rights fragmentation particularly concerned the state authorities and 
analysts. As a result, in 1998, the Bureau of Land Management [T6ng qtc 
Quim ly Ru{Jng adt] commenced a national program to resolve this problem. 
Authorities of B~c Ninh province began trying to solve the 
fragmentation problem in 1997. They used three methods. The first was to 
mobilise villagers to exchange whole areas of their first-round agricultural 
land that they had received in the redistribution among households. 
Throughout the province, this method was applied in 144 villages of 32 
communes, and consequently reduced the average number of plots per 
household to 7.6. The second way was to exchange a portion of the area of 
the first-round agricultural land among households. This pattern was 
implemented in 244 villages in 69 communes, but it had a Jess satisfactory 
outcome because the average number of plots per household remained 
above ten. The third way was to allow villagers themselves to decide who, 
how, and in what ways they exchanged their fields. This method was 
followed in 12 villages in ten communes, however, according to official 
reports that I have collected, no outcome has been notified thus far (BCD 
chuyen doi ruong dat va cap GCNQSDD nong nghiep 1999: 5-6). 
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The compilation of land-taxes books [so' b9 thuJ] and the granting of 
certificates to the holders of agricultural land use rights are also a new 
improvement to the land tenure policy since decollectivization. By 1993, 
throughout Ha B&c, agricultural land-taxes books had already been given to 
34 7,828 households (78 per cent of the total agricultural households) (BCD 
cap GCN va LSBT 1993: 2-3). Also by this year, 470 agricultural 
cooperatives (45 per cent of the total number) in the province had issued 
land use rights certificates for 46,351 hectares of agricultural land, which 
had been allocated to 186,410 households (42 per cent of total agricultural 
households) (BCD cap GCN va LSBT 1993: 2). The process of granting of 
certificates to the holders of agricultural land use rights continued in the 
following years. By 1999, in the new province of Biic Ninh, 62,789 
households (28.5 per cent of total household number), in 49 communes and 
precincts of the province (39 per cent of the total), had received certificates 
for residential land use rights, with an area of 1,778 hectares (approximately 
36.9 per cent of total residential land area). A total of 174,036 households 
(90 per cent) in 110 communes (92 per cent) had attained certificates for 
allocated agricultural land use rights, with an area of 37,588 hectares (86.21 
per cent) (SOC tinh Bac Ninh 1999: 2). In 2002, however, the process of 
granting of certificates to the holders of agricultural land use rights had not 
yet been completed in a number of villages due to problems of illegal land 
encroachment, misranking, and local cadre corruption. 
III. Different Roads to Conflicts 
My research has identified four broad types of causes leading to land-
based conflicts after decollectivization. In this thesis I call them four 
"roads" to conflicts. The first road is villagers' claims to land use rights; the 
second is associated with various patterns of land law violation; the third 
relates to land use rights compensation; and overlapping the above three is 
the fourth cause, the problem of corruption, which I separate from others for 
analysis. 
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Claims to Land Use Rights 
Claims to land use rights by villagers clearly shows how and in what 
way villagers, local cadres, and the state land tenure policy differ over the 
question of how land use rights should be distributed, held, used, by whom 
and for whose benefit. Villagers' claims to land use rights occurred in 
various forms during the process of agricultural decollectivization 
throughout the country, including claims to use rights on old land territory, 
old agricultural land, and old worshipping land (Kerkvliet 1995b: 72-80; 
Tong cue Quan ly Ruong dat 1992a: 2-3 and 13-15; Tran Due 1992: 7-10). 
Since the early 1990s, under the new Land Law, the use rights of communal 
land have been moved from the village to be managed and held by the 
commune. Villagers' claims in many cases also relate to the village 
communal land and their output. In Ha B~c province, villagers' claims to 
land use rights were diverse, and related to different kinds of land, but the 
most dominant were associated with claims to the use rights on old 
agricultural land and old worshipping land.9 
Claims by villagers to the use rights of their old worshipping land in 
Tii~n Son district between 1987 and 1997 led to eight complicated and hot 
spots (HU Tien Son 1997a: 1 ). Among them, the case of Lung Giang 
village, where villagers collectively reclaimed the old site of their village 
communal house, is the most documented instance by the authorities (TU 
Ha Bac 1993; To khao sat nghien cuu giai quyet cac diem nong 1993; and 
HU Tien Son 1997 a). In the early 1990s, Lung Giang was one of the 
villages of Van Tuong commune in Tien Son district. The village is located 
in the "cultural land" of Quan Hp folk songs, which is known to many 
Vietnamese in the area and a number of foreigners thanks to its H(Ji Lim 
[Lim Festival]. At that time, the village had 4,200 inhabitants in 700 
households. The majority of Lung Giang villagers were involved in 
9 By worshipping land I mean as area of specialised land that is used for a place of worship 
such as a communal house, pagoda, shrine and so forth. Although it is not agricultural land, 
since decollectivization villagers have claimed use rights on worshipping land alongside 
other claims to agricultural land use rights. 
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agricultural production; some did both trading and farm work. The village 
also had one Elderly Association and one party cell of 65 members. 
In 1947, during the French Resistance War, Lung Giang communal 
house was totally destroyed. In 1957, the District Administrative Committee 
[Uy ban Hanh chinh huy?n] allocated the land area where Lung Giang 
communal house had been located to its offices to use. In 1991, in the 
context of a rebirth of traditional festivals and worshipping practices in the 
area, the village Elderly Association started demanding the return of 1, 731 
square metres of land, the old ground of Lilng Giang village communal 
house, which had been used by several state institutions. Under the 
leadership of the village Elderly Association, which gained more power as 
the village party cell also issued its Resolution to support the villagers to 
reclaim the land use rights (HU Tien Son 1997a: 1 ), many Lung Giang 
villagers, especially the elderly, strongly collectively lobbied for the return 
of their old land use rights to rebuild the village communal house. In the 
first place, their claims took peaceful forms, like sending letters and visiting 
offices of the district authorities to express their appeals. However, the 
authorities rejected their claims. 
Later on, Lung Giang villagers took stronger action by gathering in 
their hundreds and going to different offices of district authorities, with the 
slogan: "toan dan Lung Giang quyit aoi lqi adt ainh" [all the people of 
Lung Giang determinedly reclaim the land use rights of the communal 
house] (TV Ha Bac 1993: 5). On 30 March 1992, for example, nearly 300 
villagers, mostly elderly in Lung Giang village, went to the District People's 
Committee to reclaim the old land use rights for communal house building 
(TV Ha Bac 1993: 3). They also went further, to the provincial authorities 
and central offices in Ha NQi, and even occupied the land as well as starting 
the construction of the communal house. In order to achieve funding for the 
construction, 22 same age groups [hoi a6ng nh?n] in the village population, 
with a total of 500 members, were set up. Each member lent a sum of 
money to the village. This is not to mention various other financial sources 
drawn on, donations for example. Such strong and determined actions by the 
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villagers in claiming their worshipping land use rights resulted in the 
involvement of various central state institutions to resolve the issue, 
including the Office of Council of Ministers (Van phong Hoi dong Bo 
truong 1992), Ministry of Culture, Information and Sports (Bo Van hoa 
Thong tin va The thao 1992), Bureau of Land Management (Tong cue Quan 
ly Ruong dat 1992b ), Institute of History (Vi en Su hoc 1992a), alongside 
authorities from province to commune. Finally, their claims succeeded. In 
2002, when I visited the village, a large and beautiful communal house had 
already been built on its old ground. 
The most widespread claim for old land use rights was in the form of 
villagers collectively requesting the return of old agricultural land use rights 
of their village that had been taken away for another village to use. During 
agricultural collectivization in Vietnam, many village-based cooperatives 
were merged to form larger ones that often coincided with several villages, 
called intervillage-based cooperatives [h9'p tac xa lien than], and even the 
whole commune, named commune-based cooperatives [h9p tac xa tocm xa]. 
In a number of cases, the per capita agricultural land of the former village-
based cooperatives differred from one to another. Therefore, after the 
unification, per capita agricultural land of course differed from one group of 
cooperative members to another. To eliminate this large disparity, or in 
other words, to balance agricultural land per capita among cooperative 
members of the large-scale cooperatives, cooperative cadres in many cases 
reallocated fields within the new production structure. As a result, by 
joining in the large-scale cooperative, a number of villagers, or the village 
as a whole, lost part of their agricultural land, while others gained some. 
On a broader level, nationwide, villagers' claims to old agricultural 
land use rights after decollectivization occurred both individually and 
collectively, and varied from region to region. In the southern half of the 
country, individual villagers frequently demanded the return of their old 
agricultural land use rights that had been taken for other villagers to use in 
the years following the 1975 historic victory. In contrast, in the northern 
half, groups of villagers who often belonged to one village collectively 
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asked for the return of their old village agricultural land that had been 
allocated to another group in a large-scale cooperative who belonged to 
another village. In 1992, the Bureau of Land Management revealed nearly 
1,000 cases of this later pattern of agricultural land use rights claim, which 
often occurred in a collective, organized, and critical manner with a large 
number of participants (Tong cue Quan ly Ruong dat 1992a). In Ha Bile, in 
1992, 40 cases occurred, among which 36 had been solved by 1992 (BCD 
cap CGN va LSBT 1992c: 7). Later, 30 more cases occurred throughout the 
province (SDC tinh Ha Bac 1995b: 6). In Tien Scm, by 1988, the district 
contained 40 cooperatives in total, including 18 commune-based 
cooperatives, and 22 other intervillage-based ones. Collective claims to old 
agricultural land use rights of their village, which finally led to agricultural 
land use rights disputes between the claimants and defenders, occurred in 11 
cooperatives, comprising ten commune-based cooperatives and one 
intervillage- based one (To Cong tac 1988: 1 ). 
In response to villagers' claims regarding their old agricultural land 
use rights, together with other types of land use rights claims, national state 
agencies (BCHTW 1988), provincial offices (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1988b, 
1992a), and district authorities (UBND huyen Tien Son 1988), issued 
directives for resolving the problem. A basic view that ran through these 
directives emphasized that all land belongs to the entire people, is managed 
by the state, and is used by the people. In one sense, this means that it is 
illegal for the villagers to reclaim land use rights which they do not hold. In 
the case ofTien Scm, the District Party Organization clarified by directing: 
[A]ny unit or individual that uses the name of a production 
brigade, hamlet, or village to reclaim old [agricultural] land [use 
rights] which belong to the cooperative's holdings is illegal. [ ... ] 
Anyone who purposefully disputes the [agricultural] land [use 
rights], violates the Land Law, will be seriously punished by the 
Commune People's Committee and other offices of the district in 
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accordance to the current state laws (UBND huyen Tien Son 
1988: 1-2). 
From the point of view of the government and Communist Party 
authorities, most of the agricultural land use rights of the cooperatives had 
to retain the same status and area [giir nguyen hi?n trgng] as the land area 
each village farmed at the time of use rights distribution and redistribution. 
Agricultural land use rights could only be considered for subdividing among 
villages, or between villages, in the case of reorganization of large-scale 
cooperatives [t6 chuc lgi h(lp tac xa] into smaller ones. Such a 
reorganization of cooperatives, however, could only be done in cases where 
a large-scale cooperative had over 800 hectares of agricultural land, long-
term weak management, had many times tried to maintain the large-scale 
cooperative without positive change, and the majority of its cadres, party 
members, as well as cooperative members, thought it necessary to 
reorganize. Villagers' claims regarding old agricultural land use rights could 
also be considered in cases in which the per capita agricultural land among 
villages of the large-scale cooperative was seriously imbalanced. In both 
circumstances, the District People's Committee had to democratically 
discuss with the commune authorities and cooperative members whether to 
divide the land use rights, or to return the agricultural land use rights to the 
old holders (TU Ha Bac 1989: 13). 
In the view of many villagers, however, as I argue throughout this 
dissertation, the agricultural land use rights of one village should be used for 
and by its villagers. To many ofthem, the rationale of per capita agricultural 
land should be based only on the land use rights that their village holds, not 
compared with others! In other words, how many agricultural land use 
rights one could attain for farming depends on the area of agricultural land 
of the village to which one belongs. The taking of one village's land use 
rights for another to use is, therefore, not reasonable. As a result, a number 
of villagers started demanding the return of their former agricultural land 
use rights. Describing the situation in Tien Son, the District Party 
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Organization pointed out that villagers' claims for their old agricultural land 
use rights happened "sometimes quietly [ngdm ngdm], sometimes publicly, 
fiercely and heatedly [cong khai, quyh li¢t va n6ng bong], mainly in the 
years from 1989 to 1991" (HU Tien Son 1993b: 9). In some villages, the 
villagers even claimed back their old agricultural land use rights shortly 
after they had been taken, i.e. years before the distribution of agricultural 
land use rights in 1988. However, in the context of high collectivization at 
the time, their claims attracted no positive feedback. 
With such views, people in a number of villages made their own way 
through the state land tenure policy and its views on the resolution of 
agricultural land use rights claims to propose the reorganization of large-
scale cooperatives into the former ones, which often coincided with the 
village territory, as a strategy to successfully reclaim the old agricultural 
land use rights. In so doing, they could satisfY two desires at the same time: 
to reorganize the cooperative on the basis of village territory, and to retrieve 
the old agricultural land use rights of the village. In any subdivision of 
large-scale cooperative into smaller ones, the agricultural land use rights and 
other forms of collective property must be divided up. The most reasonable 
division of agricultural land use rights, in the view of most claimants, was to 
return the agricultural land use rights to its former village, as they were prior 
to the development of large-scale cooperatives. 
Such collective, determined, and even prolonged struggles of villagers 
for the return of old agricultural land use rights, either directly or through 
cooperative separation, succeeded in many cases. As a result, a number of 
large-scale cooperatives were separated into smaller ones, often based on 
the village territory. As a result, the number of cooperatives increased 
during the few years of agricultural land use rights distribution and 
redistribution. At the provincial level, in 1987, Ha B~c' s agricultural 
cooperatives numbered 856, however, this increased to 902 in 1988, and 
940 in 1989 (and over 1,000 in 1993). Within two years, 75 new 
cooperatives had been newly established just because of such subdivision 
(TU Ha Bac 1989: 8). In the following years, 1992-1993, when agricultural 
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land use rights continued to be redistributed among the villagers for a 
longer-term of use, villagers' claims to old agricultural land use rights and 
demands to split large-scale cooperatives into smaller ones continued in 
some places (TU Ha Bac 1992a: 3). 
At the level of Tien San district, villagers in a number of villages also 
succeeded in reclaiming their former areas of agricultural land for their 
villages. The clearest examples include the cases of PMt Tich and Tri 
Phuang commune-sized cooperatives. In Ph~t Tfch, the commune-based 
cooperative was created in 1976 by merging two village-sized ones: Ph~t 
Tfch and c6 Phu. 10 Prior to the integration, PMt Tfch village-sized 
cooperative had 220 mdu and eight sew of farmland [ddt canh tac] (79,392 
square metres). After the 1976 merger, however, the commune-based 
cooperative cadres took 31 ,296 square metres of farmland of Ph~t Tich 
village, which amounted to 39.4 per cent of its total farmland area, for 
villagers of former c6 Phu village-based cooperative to use in order to 
balance the agricultural land per capita. This soon created reactions from 
villagers of the former Ph~t Tich village-based cooperative. From 1982 they 
publicly started demanding the commune-based cooperative be redivided 
into the former village-based ones, and reclaiming the 31 ,296 square metres 
of farmland that had been taken. 
The claim to divide the cooperative and for a return of the taken 
farmland continued from 1982 to 1988, under the leadership of the village 
party cell. During the years from 1984 to 1988, Ph~t Tfch village party cell 
met nine times [h9p chin lo/] to discuss their claims, making six Resolutions 
[Nghf quyit] to propose [dJ nghi] to the commune authorities and 
commune-based cooperative cadres that the cooperative be separated, and 
Ph~t Tfch's farmland use rights be returned. The cooperative cadres, and 
commune as well as higher authorities, however, did not agree to the request 
of the PMt Tich party cell. Thus, in May 1988, PMt Tfch villagers moved to 
occupy their old area of farmland and allocated the farmland use rights 
among them for rice cultivation. By July 1988, the Commune Party 
10 The commune and village have the same name. 
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Organization and People's Committee, "with the assistance of the district," 
tried to help c6 Phu villagers to reoccupy that area of farmland, but were 
unsuccessful, because Ph~t Tich villagers reacted strongly [phan Ung quyit 
li¢t] (To Cong tac 1988: 2). 
Similarly, another case relates to Tri Phuong commune-based 
cooperative that had been formed from two village-based cooperatives: 
Nghia Dung and Dung Vi, in 1976. After the unification, 89 mdu, one siw, 
and five thuac of farmland (320,880 square metres) of the former Dung Vi 
village-based cooperative was taken for the cooperative members from the 
former Nghia Dung village-based cooperative. The main aim of this was 
also to reduce the disparity in per capita agricultural land among members 
of the commune-based cooperative. From 1985, however, members of 
former Dung Vi village-based cooperative started requesting a division of 
the commune-based cooperative into the former village-based ones so as to 
retrieve their old area of 320,880 square metres of farmland to which they 
had held use rights. 
In March 1988, when the distribution of agricultural land use rights 
came nearer, Dung Vi villagers again demanded the return of their taken 
farmland use rights. When this was not approved, they asked to exchange 25 
mdu and seven sao of river-bank land use rights [ddt bai], which could 
neither be used for a full year nor for rice cultivation, for 27 mdu and five 
sao of inside-the-dyke farmland use rights [ddt d6ng] that could be used for 
rice farming. This would mean that the Dung Vi villagers would farm 27 
mdu and five siw ddt d6ng that Nghia Dung villagers were farming, and 
vice versa. While the cooperative cadres and commune authorities were still 
considering their request, Dung Vi villagers moved to occupy this area of 
farmland and allocated its use rights among themselves for rice farming. To 
resolve this action, the Commune Party Organization and People's 
Committee issued a decision to confiscate "the disputed farmland" and 
allocate its use rights equally to 12 production brigades of the commune-
based cooperative for farming. However, the outcome was not positive 
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because Diing Vi villagers reacted strongly when the plan was being 
implemented (To Cong tac 1988: 2). 
To understand the rationale for villagers' grievances over land use 
rights, the data that I have indicates a number of different factors. The 
Bureau of Land Management, a former central institution of land 
management in Vietnam, shifted the blame to the state as a whole. It argued 
that, firstly, the state land tenure policy lacked agreement and clearness; 
secondly, the state authorities had been weak in the management of land; 
thirdly, local cadres had committed wrongdoings and abused their official 
positions for private gain in the process of governing agricultural land; and 
lastly, it alleged the ineffective resolution of land use rights claims by 
authorities resulting in conflicts with villagers (Tong cue Quan ly Ruong dat 
1992a: 5-6). 
Data from Ha Bdc and Tien Son authorities gives a more detailed 
picture. The provincial authorities argued that villagers' claims to their old 
land use rights, which led the disputes, originated firstly from the local 
government, particularly the local cadres who had loosened their 
management [huang long quim ly], and committed wrongdoings and 
corruption for private gain. This reduced the agricultural land area at the 
local level, and consequently created suspicion and adverse reactions from 
the villagers. Secondly, they blamed the villagers, who during the period of 
collectivization, just focused on the working points, and cared little about 
the agricultural land use rights and working productivity. After 
decollectivization, however, villagers began to care very much about the 
land use rights. In addition to these two points were the influences of 
extreme localism [ tu tu6ng Cl,lC bQ ilia phuang] - an issue embedded in the 
minds of a group of villagers, the villagers' poor understanding of the state 
legal system [kern hi~u biit phap lut;lt], and the problem of opportunists and 
bad elements, like some ex-cadres who had been punished, or those of 
moral decay and changed nature [thoai h6a biin chdt], who had incited [xui 
gi'l,lc] other villagers to claim the old land use rights (UBND tinh Ha Bac 
1990a: 10-13). Tien Son district Party Organization presented a further 
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crucial factor, the villagers' urgent need [buc xuc] of agricultural land use 
rights for farming. This increasing need stemmed from the fact that during 
the years of D6i Mbi, a number of state staff members and soldiers retired, 
and consequently the population in the countryside increased (HU Tien Son 
1993b: 9). 
All the factors presented above are reasonable, but they only partially 
explain the problem, and have not yet touched on the root cause of the issue. 
The number one reason for the villagers' claims for their old agricultural 
land use rights related to their perception that they or their villages are 
holders of the taken agricultural land use rights. This means that many 
claimants often saw these rights as belonging to themselves or their village 
institutions. The use rights, thus, must be held by, used by, and used for the 
inhabitants of village where the agricultural land use rights (and 
worshipping land use rights too) originally belonged. In such a view, the 
taking of agricultural land use rights from a group of villagers, or the village 
as a whole, to give to other parties and institutions to use with no 
compensation or agreement, would provoke reactions from the land use 
rights losers. To this are then added numerous reasons for the villagers' 
claims to their old agricultural land use rights, including those that different 
levels of state authorities have suggested. Particularly, since 
decollectivization, under the impact of the market economy, modernization 
and industrialization, and urbanization, land use rights have become a 
valuable form of property because they can be exchanged just like other 
goods. Also, in the context of increasing demand for land use rights and 
decreased supply, values of land use rights have been increasing. 
All these factors provoked the villagers' claims, and consolidated the 
struggle to retrieve their old agricultural land use rights. Villagers' claims to 
their old agricultural land use rights critically happened during the years of 
distribution and redistribution because this was a key point in time. I think 
the distribution and redistribution of agricultural land use rights to the 
villagers for long-term use is in fact a privatisation of the agricultural land 
use rights. After this privatization, almost all of the agricultural land use 
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rights in the communities would no longer be held by the cooperative or the 
village as a whole, but by individual villagers or family households and 
legally verified by a land use rights certificate of the state. Once the 
privatization of agricultural land use rights was completed and consolidated 
by legal land use rights certificates, the villagers' claims to their old 
agricultural land use rights would have much weaker legal and moral 
grounds making it difficult, if not impossible for the claimants to succeed. 
Various Patterns of Land Law Violation 
Violations of the state Land Laws in regard to the management and 
use of agricultural land use rights since decollectivization have occurred in 
various forms, including unauthorised allocation, illegal sale, illegal buying, 
illegal exchange of land use rights, illegal encroachment, and wrong usage. 
Among these, the most problematic pattern relates to communal land [adt 
cong] in the form of unauthorised allocation and illegal selling of use rights 
by the local cadres, and illegal encroachment by various kinds of local 
people. Such actions have become one of the key dynamics for conflicts 
over land in a number of rural communities. 
Communal land only reappeared in the villages of the central and 
northern regions of Vietnam after decollectivization, but its use rights soon 
became a key target of various patterns of violation of the state land tenure 
policy, causing discontent in a number of rural communities from the late 
1980s to at least the late 1990s. At Ha B~c provincial level, in the 1988 
distribution of agricultural land use rights, the Provincial Party Organization 
revealed 10,000 violations, mainly in the form of unauthorized allocation 
and illegal selling of use rights on the second-round agricultural land, one of 
the key sources of communal land after 1993 (TU Ha Bac 1989: 8). In 1989, 
Ha Blic Chamber of Agriculture [S& Nang nghi?p] conducted investigations 
into a number of key communes [xa trr,mg aiJm] in two districts, and 
discovered further 1,174 cases of land law violations, including 848 cases of 
illegal encroachment (72.23 per cent), 183 cases of unauthorized allocation 
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of use rights (15.58 per cent), and 143 cases of illegal selling of use rights 
(12.18 per cent) (SNN Ha Bac 1989b: 5). From 1989 to mid October 1993, 
cadastral inspectors of the province continued to discover 4,443 cases of 
violation of state land laws in an area of 113 hectares of land, comprising 
2,358 cases of unauthorised allocation of use rights (53.07 per cent), 1, 747 
cases of illegal encroachment (39.32 per cent), and other violations (7.61 
per cent) (SDC tinh Ha Bac 1995a: 1 ). 
In the following years, these patterns of land law violation continued 
to increase in scale and intensity at the local level. By 1993, Ha B~c 
provincial authorities had to set up 11 teams of inter-agency inspectors 
[doan thanh tra lien nganh] to examine the governing of agricultural land, 
especially agricultural communal land in the rural communities. 11 In 1994, 
the Provincial Party Organization continued to highlight problems with 
management and use of communal land use rights because ofthe number of 
wrongdoings and amount of corruption involved. The authorities did not 
publish statistics but they qualitatively noted that in many localities, local 
cadres misused communal land by selling, allocating, and auctioning its use 
rights to the villagers for long-term use in order to attain funding for the 
construction of local infrastructure (TU Ha Bac 1994b: 7). In 1995, 
investigations conducted in 135 communes (39 per cent of the total 
communes in the province at the time) of 1 0 districts repeatedly highlighted 
an increasing number of land law breaches, with 10,445 cases, in an area of 
223.3 hectares. Among these, unauthorised allocation of use rights 
accounted for 2,893 cases (27.6 per cent), involving 141.5 hectares; illegal 
encroachment of use rights mainly for residency amounted to 1,927 cases 
(18 per cent), involving 64,606 hectares; and other breaches like illegal 
selling and exchange of land use rights comprised the rest (54.4 per cent). 
These statistics are in fact far lower than the real figures, and do not mention 
ll Early in 1993, the Council of Ministers issued Directive number 77 which ordered the 
lower state authorities to find urgent solutions to stop the illegal allocation, selling, buying, 
and exchanging of land use rights. This move of Ha B~c authorities was to implement this 
Directive. 
70 
violations in relation to other types of land on which state companies, army 
units, and other institutions held the use rights (SDC tinh Ha Bac l995a: 2). 
In Tien San district, my various sources of data also show the same 
picture of various patterns of communal land violation. In 1995, the District 
Party Organization revealed that violations continued commonly in all 
communes of the district, in the form of unauthorised allocation of use 
rights, illegal buying and selling of use rights, wrong use, and illegal 
encroachment of use rights (HU Tien Son 1993b: 9). Therefore, such cases 
became a heated issue in the district territory (UBND huyen Tien Son 
1995a: 2). 
As indicated through various official reports, either made by the 
district or provincial authorities, on land violation at the local level, a large 
percentage of violations have in fact been conducted by local cadres. This 
continued from at least the late 1980s to the late 1990s, when the governing 
of the land and development of the state land law reached a higher level. 
However, throughout the 1990s, the breaches of state land laws by a number 
of local cadres was often hidden in the name of the locale [ilia phu:ong] and 
for the building of local infrastructure, which in its tum, has been seen as 
one part of broader modernization and industrialization programs in the 
countryside. As was noted earlier, since decollectivization, the state has 
been carrying out industrialization and modernization programs in the rural 
areas. The content of this contemporary modernization and industrialization 
in the rural areas has been thus far best explained in Th11c trgng cang nghi?p 
h6a, hi?n agi h6a nang nghi¢p, nang than Vi?t Nam Nam [The Real 
Situation of Industrialization and Modernization in Vietnam's Rural 
Agriculture] (Le Manh Hung, Nguyen Sinh Cue, Hoang Vinh Le 1998: 58-
79). According to the authors of this book, modernization and 
industrialization in Vietnam's rural areas mean 1. Mechanizing agriculture 
[ca gi6i h6a nang nghi¢p]; 2. Improving irrigation systems [thuy lr;i h6a]; 3. 
Increasing the application of chemicals in agriculture [h6a h9c h6a]; 4. 
Developing industry, services, and transforming the agro-economic 
Structure [phat tritn cang nghi¢p, djch V¥ VCt chuytn arJi CO' cdu kinh fi nang 
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nghi?p]; 5. Enhancing the organization and management of rural agriculture 
[nang cao t6 chuc va quem ly nang nghi?p, nang th6n]; and 6. Building up 
local infrastructure [xay dt,mg co· sa hq tdng]. 
The main aim of building up local infrastructure has been to meet 
major daily needs, such as "electricity, roads, schools, clinics, post office -
cultural house, market and martyr's cemetery" at the village and commune 
levels (Nguyen Sinh Cue 2002: 21 -22; Le Manh Hung, Nguyen Sinh Cue, 
Hoang Vinh Le 1998: 73-76). The construction of local infrastruture has in 
fact involved the state and people working together, and the Commune 
People's Committee, who was directly in charge of implementing the 
campaign, drew funds from a variety of sources, including state financial 
investment, villagers' contributions, and communal land. By 2002, a 
prominent economist highlighted that "The concrete results achieved in the 
building of electricity, roads, schools, clinics and so forth in the rural areas, 
from the hill lands, off-shore islands to the deltas, have changed the face of 
the countryside" (Nguyen Sinh Cue 2002: 21). The Central Party 
Committee, on the other hand, pointed out in its Directive, issued in 1998, 
that the construction of local infrastructure had aroused critical internal 
conflicts among the villagers, as well as between a number of villagers and 
local authorities. 
In Ha BAc province, prior to decollectivization, local infrastructure 
was poor and mainly constructed by agricultural cooperatives. After the 
early 1990s, particularly in 1996, the former Ha BAc provincial authorities 
remarkably pressed the local authorities to infrastructure building (Doan 
Cong tac tinh Bac Ninh 1997: 5; Nguyen Huu Tien 1998: 25). By 1998, in 
BAc Ninh, all communes had implemented four targets: electricity, schools, 
roads and clinics to various extents. As a result, most main roads within 
village and commune are now constructed by bricks, asphalt, and even 
concrete; most communes have firmly built schools; all communes have 
electricity to use; and many clinics have been newly built (Nguyen Huu 
Tien 1998: 25). 
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The capital resources for the construction of local infrastructure in B~c 
Ninh have come from three major sources: the capital investment of the 
higher state, the contribution of villagers, either in kind or cash, and the self 
raised capital of the local authorities. However, since capital investment of 
the state was small while the living standards of local people were poor, the 
key source of funding for local infrastructure construction has been drawn 
from the way in which the local authorities auctioned for long-term use, 
and even sold, communal land use rights (Doan Cong tac tinh Bac Ninh 
1997: 4-5; Nguyen Huu Tien 1998: 26), and from the way in which the local 
authorities collected money from some locals for the transformation of some 
agricultural land use rights to residential land use rights. The aim of so 
doing seems fine to many locals including ordinary villagers, party 
members, and cadres. During the process of allocating and selling land use 
rights and use of the resulting money in the construction of local 
infrastructure, however, various problems arose in close relation to a 
number of local cadres. I will illustrate this further in Chapter Four and part 
of Chapter Five. 
In short, land law breaches by individual villagers and especially the 
local cadres have occurred in different forms in a number of communities 
since decollectivization. These violations occurred mostly in relation to 
communal land use rights, because other subtypes of agricultural land use 
rights had already been distributed to individual villagers to use. Most of 
common were violations involving the transformation of a large area of 
communal land into residential land for private use. The use rights of 
communal land have also become the target of illegal encroachment. Thus, 
alongside the taking of agricultural land use rights for industry, land law 
violations have led to a big decrease in agricultural land area in the 
province. During only two years, 1989 and 1990, the collection of 
agricultural land taxes showed a decline of 4,220 hectares of agricultural 
land, while the Provincial People's Committee, who has the authority to 
allocate and transform land use rights, allowed a transformation of only 
112.87 hectares of agricultural land to other kinds of land. The district and 
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commune authorities then failed to explain why and how the rest had 
disappeared (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1990a: 9). 
Though there have been various patterns of land law breaches at the 
local level, district and provincial authorities have had little effect on either 
stopping or preventing the violations from happening. Ha B~c Chamber of 
Agriculture revealed that the settlement of land law violations had been 
inefficient and lacked seriousness, therefore failing to prevent further 
violations (SNN Ha Bac 1989b: 9). For example, concerning 10,445 cases 
of land law breaches detected in 1995, the main penalties were to fine [phQt] 
and/or warn [canh cao] the violators, and to seize some areas of land (SDC 
tinh Ha Bac 1995a: 4). In general, only 8.66 per cent of cases of 
unauthorised allocation and illegal encroachment detected in 1995 were 
punished [xu ly]; meanwhile, Ha B~c provincial authorities stated that these 
violations were on the increase (SDC tinh Ha Bac 1 995a: 1 1 ). 
Consequently, while these land law violations benefited a small number of 
people, including both local cadres and ordinary villagers, and though they 
partially contributed to the building of local infrastructure, they have 
damaged the land resources of the community as a whole, especially 
violating the villagers' views on how the communal land use rights should 
be managed, held, distributed, used, by whom and for whose benefit. Thus, 
they have caused public resistance, particularly in cases when the violations 
reached a high level and occurred alongside other problems. 
Land Use Rights Compensation 
Another aspect of the on-going processes of industrialization and 
modernization in the rural areas is the development of rural industry. In the 
rural agriculture areas, there exist different kinds of industry, and of course 
therefore different ways are needed to develop them. One of these ways is to 
build up industrial zones. To attain this strategy, a large area of agricultural 
land has been taken for industrial zone building. Land use rights 
compensation for such purposes since the early 1990s in Vietnam has 
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occurred in numerous ways, depending on the kind of land and the purposes 
for which it is required. Among them, however, programs of compensation 
for agricultural land use rights taken for industrial zone building is the most 
massive, and have had both positive and negative impacts on the life of 
those villagers in rural communities whose agricultural land use rights have 
been taken. Like in China, 12 one negative aspect of the impact is that the 
taking of agricultural land use rights in Vietnam has become a source of 
conflicts, mainly because of the discordant views over the process of 
compensation and site clearance held by the villagers who have land use 
rights and the state who holds the land ownership rights and management 
rights. 
In Vietnam, the history of industrial zones began only in 1991 when 
the government first built Khu Chi Xudt [Export Processing Zones], 
meaning that its production is all for export. Since 1994, the newly-built 
industrial zones have been called Khu C6ng Nghi?p, because their 
production is not only for export but also for domestic consumption. 13 The 
process of industrial zone building, however, speeded up, particularly from 
1997 when the central government aimed to boost industrial zone building 
in the agricultural rural areas throughout the country. Before 1997, Vietnam 
had 48 large industrial zones (Vu Quan ly Kien true Quy hoach 1998: 9). 
The new regulations the government issued in 1997 gave much more 
favorable treatment and encouraged entreprenuers to rent land use rights and 
invest in the industrial zones. Also, the types of industrial zones diversified. 
In a number of provinces, industrial zones were set up under the plan and 
management of different levels of state administrative authority, from the 
central government and the province to the district and commune. 
Located inside the triangle of key economic regions: Ha N(li, L;;mg 
San and Quang Ninh, and close to N(li Bai International Airport, B~c Ninh 
appears to have a rich potential for industrial development. Thus, the 
12 In China, Xiaolin Guo's research shows that land use rights appropriation has also been 
one of the main causes for rural conflicts in the past decade (Guo 2001). 
13 Recently, a new model has been developed, called Khu Cong Ngh¢ Cao [High 
Technology Zone]. 
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provincial authorities are very much focused on industrial zone development 
and consider it as a "breakthrough" in the processes of modernization and 
industrialization in the home province. 14 This is also seen as an important 
step in the transformation of its agricultural economy to an industrial one by 
2015. Thus, industrial zone building is one of the priorities in economic 
development in this area. To attract capital investment, the provincial 
authorities have spread out the "red carpet" to receive investors. 15 
By 2002, according to the Provincial Party Organization, Biic Ninh 
had 18 industrial zones. The total area of land of all types for which 
compensation has been paid for these 18 industrial zones amounts to 288.3 
hectares. However, the area that has been planned for all 18 industrial zones 
is much larger. Two industrial zones alone, Tien San and Qu~ Vo, plan to 
accupy 300 hectares of land each. If the entrepreneurs need more land use 
rights in the future, the area of these two industrial zones can be increased to 
600 hectares each. By May 2002, 18 entrepreneurs were renting 73 hectares 
of land in Tien San industrial zone, and a similar number of entreprenuers 
rented 80 hectares of land in Qu~ Vo industrial zone. The rest ranges from 
five to 30 hectares per industrial zone (TU Bac Ninh 2002). Generally 
speaking, by the end of 2000, there were ten central entreprises, three 
foreign-invested entreprises, 28 local entreprises, and 198 private 
entreprises working in the province's industrial zones (Thanh Huyen 2002: 
39). 
In short, the processes of agricultural land use rights compensation and 
site clearing for the building of industrial zones have in many cases created 
conflicts between the villagers and the state for various reasons including: 
How and in what way should the land use rights compensation be carried 
out? Who, between the holders of ownership rights and management rights 
(i.e. the state) and the holders of use rights (i.e. villagers and other parties), 
has the power to decide the land use rights values? Who should participate 
14 Brio Bdc Ninh 2002. "Phat tri€n cac khu cong nghi~p- btr&c di)t pha trong S\1' nghi~p cong 
nghi~p h6a." S6 541, ngay 24/8/200 I. 
15 Baa Bdc Ninh 2002. "Bllc Ninh tnii thi\m do don cac nha dau tu." S6 717, ngay 
9/10/2002. 
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in the decision-making? Conflicts over such issues are deeply rooted in the 
different views of the state land tenure regime and villagers in relation to 
decision-making, distribution and holding of ownership rights, management 
rights, and use rights. In Chapter Three, I examine one case study to 
illustrate not only how, why, and in what ways land use rights compensation 
and site clearing have produced conflicts, but also to illuminate the 
competing views of different parties involved, alongside other dimensions 
that affect the minds of the protesting villagers. 
Corruption 
In Vietnam, corruption is a problem that can be recognized in both 
feudal and colonial history. 16 Under the Socialist State, corruption continues 
to be found in various forms, and involves different types of people in the 
state and society, including those who work in the state apparatus, 
businessmen who work in the free market, and the ordinary people. Since 
D6i M6i, corruption has increased, to the extent that it is seen as a national 
disaster, an internal enemy (Thanh Tam 2002). And as the Central Party 
stated in its Resolution of the XI Congress, corruption has become "a huge 
danger that threatens the survival of our regime."17 Corruption of all types 
resulted in the people's discontent and protests in many areas of society, 
which has finally partially contributed to the campaigns of the state to curb 
corruption (Kerkvliet 1995b and c, 1997, and 2001 ). 
In Ha B~c, the Provincial People's Committee has pointed out: 
Although corruption varied among levels of authority, areas and 
sectors [of the state and society], in general, it occurred to a 
concerning level in three major areas: the management and use 
16For concepts of corruption, see my discussion in Chapter Five. 
17 Van Ki?n Dqi hr)i Dang i:/qi bidu toan qu6c tim thu· XI. Ha N<?i: Nxb. Chinh tri Qu6c gia, 
2001: 76. (Requoted in Phan Than 2002). 
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of land, construction of infrastructure, and the governing of 
finance-budget (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1992d). 
As I understand it, although the problem of corruption occurred in 
various areas and sectors of the state and society, corruption committed by 
the local cadres contributed the most to producing local conflicts. Various 
sources of data that I have examined indicate that local cadre corruption has 
had numerous consequences on the state and society. As noted in one 
document, local cadre corruption, along with other types, has created 
discontent and protests from the masses, resulted in social injustice, reduced 
the trust of the people in the leadership of the Communist Party and in the 
governing of the Socialist State. During the 1 990s, the limited number of 
cases that the authorities investigated shows that corruption in the province 
caused a huge loss of different types of material property of the state and the 
people, including tens of billion VND, hundreds of tonnes of paddy and 
other materials, and most significantly, hundreds of hectares of land. The 
Joss of this land due to corruption does not mean that the land has 
disappeared, instead in various forms it has been transformed from public 
and communal land, the use rights of which are held by the local authorities 
or organizations, to residential land, the use rights of which are held by 
individuals and households. 
During 1990-1992, for example, the state campaigns on anti-
corruption at the district and provincial levels discovered various small 
cases. In 1993, in only four investigations, the Provincial People's 
Committee discovered an unauthorized allocation of I 01,853 square metres 
of land, and illegal selling of 68,706 square metres of land by cooperative 
and commune cadres (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1994a). In the same year, a report 
compiled by the Provincial Party Organization pointed out various other 
small cases. For example, in one commune, the Commune Party 
Organization issued a resolution directing the illegal selling of land use 
rights on 27,166 square metres of land to 40 households for house building. 
In two other communes, the village and commune cadres illegally sold 
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30,274 square metres of land (TU Ha Bac I994a: 5 and 7). In the following 
years, more investigations revealed further corruption relating to land. In 
1995, the Provincial People's Committee investigated 179 cases and 
revealed a loss of II 0.3 hectares of land (UBND tinh Ha Bac I995a: 2-3). 
During I997-I998, the Provincial People's Committee investigated 135 
cases and discovered a loss of 73.73 hectares of land (BCD chong tham 
nhung tinh Bac Ninh 1999: 3). In I999, the Provincial People's Committee 
inspected 8I cases and revealed a loss of 22.2I hectares of land (BCD 
chong tham nhung tinh Bac Ninh 2000b: 2). This is not to mention the 
various cases of state land law violation previously noted, where the 
authorities did not say that corruption was involved but I imagine it would 
be hard to exclude. 
In reaction to the problem of local cadre corruption and corruption at 
large, both the state and villagers have voiced their protests in different 
ways. From the state side, various anti-corruption campaigns have been 
implemented at the centre, province, to district, and even commune and 
village levels since 1990 (the higher state's campaigns also targeted other 
types of corruption) (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1990b ). 18 In Ha B~c and its lower 
administrative levels, my synthesis of various reports and documents on 
anti-corruption campaigns of the state offices from 1990 to 2002 highlight 
their critical attitudes and determined actions to curb corruption. The 
provincial state stated that anti-corruption campaigns must be seen as long-
term, consecutive, constant and complicated struggles to be fully carried out 
in both the state and society, from leaders to officials, cadres and staff 
members (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1990b ). The provincial state also stated that 
the campaigns ought to be implemented as a continuance of another 
campaign called "The mobilization to clean and enhance the fighting ability 
18 Since 1992-1993 when the central state took a stronger move in fighting corruption, 
Steering Committees on anti-corruption [Ban Chi ag.o ch6ng tham nhUng] have been 
established within the state administration from the provincial to the commune, and even 
the village level to command the struggle against corruption. By early 1994, 319 
communes, precincts and district capitals of the total of 335 in the whole province had 
implemented anti-corruption campaigns. And besides that, similar Steering Committees on 
anti-corruption were set up to coordinate all mass associations, including Women 
Association, War Veteran Association, Youth Union, Farmers' Association in the struggle 
against corruption (TU Ha Bac 1994a). 
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of the party organization and state apparatus, to clean the social relations," 
later connected to another campaign, entitled "The mobilization to clean and 
enhance the fighting ability of cadres, officials and party members, and 
strenghten the relationship between the people and party," which was 
closely attached to the fight against smuggling. 
Combating corruption needed to be done alongside a review of legal 
documents and policies in force in the province to ensure that the state 
policies and legal systems did not create opportunities for corruption to 
occur. Consequently, in 1993 and 1994, the Provincial Chamber of Justice 
[So Tu phap] reviewed 442 legal documents [van him phap lw;lt] that had 
been implemented in the province (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1994b ). The 
provincial authorities particularly emphasized the responsibility of the head 
of offices [thu trucrng] within the state structure to fight against corruption, 
and to ensure that leadership role was the key to make the campaigns more 
fruitful. The spirit of the campaigns also stressed that curbing corruption 
had to focus on a number of key cases [ tr9ng aidm ], especially in places 
where there had been lots of petitions and denunciations. The campaigns 
confirmed the usefulness of the mass media and relying on the people to 
fight against corruption, and also ensured that punishment be applied to 
anyone who commited corruption whatever position he or she might hold. 
From the side of the villagers, their public resistance mainly targeted 
local cadres. As subjects who do not only share their residential location and 
communal resources, but also have close socio-political relations with local 
cadres in the rural communities, various patterns of villagers' public 
resistance were articulated, and they were even stronger and more critical 
than the state actions in a number of cases. In Chapter Five, I study the 
problem of local cadre corruption and the resulting conflicts through a case 
study for more insight into the topic. Throughout the case study, I examine 
how and in what way the local cadre corruption occurred, related to the land 
and other issues, and finally created villagers' public resistance. In 
particular, I show how and in what ways villagers perceived and resisted the 
problem of local cadre corruption, and their use of corruption as a means to 
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voice their discontent and protest against other issues in relation to land and 
local cadres. 
The Resulting Conflicts 
My analyses of the processes of agricultural decollectivization, 
modernization and industrialization, and different paths to resultant conflicts 
have indicated tensions in a number of rural communities during a period 
from the late 1980s to the early 2000s at least. These tensions have emerged 
among and between different institutions in the locale: tensions between 
village and village, between village and commune, village and state 
organization, with the most pronounced being between some groups of 
villagers and the local cadres because of land use rights disputes, local cadre 
corruption and their misbehaviour towards the villagers. These tensions 
originated from various issues, however, the problems of land and local 
cadres have been the key. From another perspective, tensions among these 
parties do not only originate from local problems but also stem from the 
mismatch between the views of a number of villagers and the state land 
tenure policy at large. 
In the late 1990s, generalizing local conflicts in Bile Ninh, the 
Provincial Party Organization observed: "During recent years, because of 
many objective and subjective reasons, the situation of peasants and 
countryside is generating complicated problems that affect [local] security" 
(TU Bac Ninh 1998: 1 ). In order to deal with the situation, the authorities 
examined the issue for insights, including an investigation of the Provincial 
Party Organization into the problem of "hot spots," and "the situation of 
resolving of internal conflicts among villagers to ensure order and security 
in Bile Ninh countryside from 1987 to 1997" (TU Bac Ninh 1998; Uy ban 
Kiem tra TU Bac Ninh 1999). At a lower level, Tien Son District Party 
Organization and People's Committee have also scrutinized the hot issues in 
its area, including villagers' petitions and denunciations (HU Tien Son 
1997a; UBND huyen Tien Son 1998a). 
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In the broadest terms, conflicts have been identified by two key 
signals: villagers' petitions and acts of denunciation in the state offices, and 
their confrontational actions in the home communities. Regarding the first 
aspect of conflicts, the state authorities at different levels have noted an 
increase in the number of villagers' petitions and acts of denouncement 
related to land and local cadres since decollectivization. In Tien San, from 
1991 to 1997, the district authorities received 2,180 petitions and 
denunciations related to 2,313 different cases (UBND huyen Tien Son 
1998a: 6-7). The number of petitioners and denouncers who acted as a group 
increased, amounting to 52 teams [doan]. Among the 3,055 letters received, 
2,277 were petitions (74.53 per cent), 561 were denunciations (18.36 per 
cent), and 217 were questions requiring answers (7.10 per cent). In terms of 
the content, 1,863 letters (70 per cent) related to land issues, 355 letters (13 
per cent) were associated with other economic issues, 146 letters (5 per 
cent) focused on social policies, and 311 letters (12 per cent) concentrated 
on other matters. These letters petitioned and denounced 28 Presidents of 
Commune People's Committees and Secretaries of Commune Party 
Organizations (1 0.89 per cent of the letters), three Vice-Presidents of 
Commune People's Committees, and 226 others (87.92 per cent) (UBND 
huyen Tien Son 1998a: 7). In the later years, from 1998 to 2002, the key 
target of the villagers' petitions and denunciations continued to be land and 
local cadres (UBND huyen Tien Son 1998b; Thanh tra huyen Tu Son 2002a 
and b). 
The villagers' petitions and denunciations did not stop at the level of 
district authorities but in many cases often moved further up to the 
provincial authorities and even to the central organs of the state in Hit N(>i 
because the villagers considered their complaints were not being handled 
properly by the district authorities, or because the authorities failed to settle 
the issues in ways in which the petitioners and denouncers wanted. In the 
contemporary administrative and legal systems of the Vietnamese state, in 
order to petition, denounce, or protest against local cadres, or issues related 
to land and other communal resources, villagers have to follow the 
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administrative procedures that proceed from the commune, to district, and 
stop at the province level. This means that only in a case in which the 
commune authorities cannot settle the villagers' petition and denunciation, 
or lack the power to deal with them, will the case be sent to the district. 
Similarly, if the district authorities also fail to deal with them, then the 
provincial authorities will take over the job. All local issues in most of the 
cases are not a job task the central authorities in Ha N()i to directly resolve. 
But my various sources of data, including official repmts of the state, 
revealed that villagers often by-passed the authorised line to voice their 
wants to the higher authorities. By 1989, the Provincial Chamber of 
Agriculture had already revealed this situation, noting that the villagers' 
petitions and denunciations in relation to matters of land and local cadres in 
rural communities were increasingly by-passing the authorised line to the 
province and centre (SNN Ha Bac 1998b: 7). In only a short period of time, 
from 1988 to 1990, this Chamber alone received 1,288 letters, comprising 
810 petitioning letters, 227 denouncing letters, 218letters related to land use 
rights disputes, and 33 questioning letters requiring answers. The content of 
· these letters, as noted by the authorities, mainly focused on three key issues: 
firstly the problem of commune authorities who illegally sold land use rights 
for money; secondly denunciation of the authorities of village, commune, 
and district who unauthorisedly allocated land use rights to the villagers, 
especially to the wrong persons; and lastly, land use rights disputes among 
villagers, and between villages (UBND tinh Ha Bac 1990a: 9). 
The Cadastral Chamber [SO' Dja chinh] of the province is another 
provincial office which villagers often visited for land issues. In 1996 alone, 
Ha B~c Cadastral Chamber received 244 letters (SDC tinh Ha Bac 1996: 6). 
Similarly, the Provincial People's Committee also became an institution 
villagers came to petition and denounce problems of land and local cadres. 
In 1997, this institution received 311 letters related to land issues (UBND 
tinh Bac Ninh 1997: 4). Looking further at the national level, in his paper on 
the problem of citizens' petitions and denunciations nationwide, one 
researcher writes: "In the past years, especially since 1997 to now, the 
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situation of citizens' petitions and denunciations is an increased tendency, 
and is extremely complex" (Nguyen Tien Binh 2002: 22). 
A more critical aspect of conflicts during this period appears to be the 
villagers' confrontational actions occurring in their home villages. Villagers' 
reactions throughout the province have in many cases led to tensions in the 
communities, and the state has often called them "complicated cases and hot 
spots" (To khao sat nghien cuu giai quyet cac diem nong 1993). A hot spot 
[didm nang], according to the central authorities, is "the place where conflict 
or dispute occurs critically, and attracts a relatively large amount of 
participation of the masses, [which finally] leads to social unrest" (To khao 
sat nghien cuu giai quyet cac diem nong 1993: 2). 19 During a 10-year 
period, from 1987 to 1997, 148 cases of conflict occurred throughout the 
rural countryside of Ha Bile, with the level of conflict varying from case to 
case. Among these 148 cases, 83 were complex, and 27 cases became hot 
spots, including 7 cases in which the authorities had to use force to resolve 
the problem (TUBac Ninh 1998: 1). The reasons for the complications and 
hot spots stemmed from different origins, as I have broadly highlighted 
earlier. In regards to the 83 complicated cases in Ha Bile province from 
1987 to 1997, 48 cases arose because of land use rights disputes (57 .8 per 
cent), 27 cases were due to local cadre corruption (32.53 per cent), and the 
rest (9.67 per cent) resulted from other problems (TUBac Ninh 1998: 2). 
In Tien Son, conflicts also occurred. A report of the District Party 
Organization that examined the problem of hot spots in its territory from 
1987 to 1997 noted that: 
From 1988 to now [1997], the order and security [of the district] 
has been generating many complicated occurrences, the situation 
of [land use rights] dispute, petition [and denunciation] have 
19 Tran Hong Chau presents a more critical definition of hot spot in Journal of Communism 
as: "a place where petitions [and confrontational actions] are conducted with a participation 
of numerous parties because of complicated reasons, [and] difficult resolution, [in which], 
the internal conflict reaches critical level, tensely occurring, [therefore] creates instability of 
community life, leads to disorder, [and] invalidity [v6 hi?u h6a] of leadership, [and] 
governing of the socio-political institutions and local authorities." (Tran Hong Chau 1999: 
48). 
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occurred in numerous spots of many communes in the district 
territory (HU Tien Son 1997 a: 1 ). 
Also during this ten-year period of time, 1987-1997, 40 complicated 
cases and hot spots were identified in 17 of 26 communes in Tien Son 
district. Among them, nine cases (22.5 per cent) were due to villagers' 
demands for the subdivision of cooperatives, eight cases (20 per cent) 
happened because of villagers' claims to worshipping land use rights, 11 
cases (27.5 per cent) occurred as a result of villagers' claims to their old 
agricultural land use rights, eight cases (20 per cent) took place because 
villagers petitioned and denounced local cadres, and four cases (10 per cent) 
occurred due to other reasons. Among these 40 cases, nine cases (22.5 per 
cent) led to hot spots (HU Tien Son 1997a: 1). All the cases that were seen 
as both complicated cases and hot spots, examined in Chapters Three, Four, 
and Five, occurred after 1998. 
In short, such conflicts stemmed from different issues, among which 
the villagers' claims to land use rights, various patterns of land law 
violations, land use rights compensation, and the problem of local cadre 
corruption and their misbehaviour to villagers are key (the issue of cadre 
misbehaviour will be illustrated in following Chapters). These conflicts 
were often complex, involving various groups of people and institutions 
such as the ordinary villagers, cadres, party members, and higher state 
officials. 
IV. Conclusion 
The process of agricultural decollectivization and the development of 
a new land tenure system, which followed, have provided a legal framework 
for the question of how and in what way land rights in Vietnam are 
distributed, held, and used. In relation to agricultural land, four types have 
been identified in the lowland villages of Bile Ninh (and former Ha Bile) 
province. The use rights of each type differs a little in theory at least in 
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terms of holding, use-term, and use-aim. Decollectivization and the 
resulting development of a new land tenure regime in Vietnam, as often 
argued by some Vietnamese researchers, have made the villagers the 
masters of agricultural land, thus giving them incentives in agricultural 
production. 
Besides these positive aspects, we have also witnessed conflicts due to 
the agricultural decollectivization, the new land tenure regime, and 
modernization and industrialization programs in the countryside. During the 
process of agricultural decollectvization, as my research has showed, 
villagers' claims to their old land use rights have been one of the major 
sources of tension at the local level. Various patterns of state land law 
violation from the late 1980s to the late 1990s have also been issues that 
resulted in conflicts. During the final years of the 20 century, as villagers' 
reactions to the problem of land use rights and numerous violations of 
communal land use rights diminished, a new source of tension in a number 
of local communities arose due to the contradiction of views between 
villagers and the state over the question of land use rights compensation and 
site clearing. Intersecting the above types, and running through this period 
of over ten years, is the problem of local cadre corruption, and in a number 
of cases, their misbehaviour towards the villagers. All these have been 
different roads to conflicts over land among various parties and institutions 
at the local level and even beyond. Although conflicts in some villages 
differed in terms of extent and the way in which they came about, villagers' 
petitions and acts of denunciation in state offices as well as their 
confrontational actions in home villages have best highlighted their 
commom features. 
Conflicts over land and related issues in the Red River delta villages 
since decollectivization are cases in which researchers might be able to see 
how different parties articulate their views towards land, providing a good 
arena to comprehend various attitudes to and relationships with land. I do 
not say that we might not be able to see the different views of various 
parties, including the ones of the villagers, over the question of how the land 
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rights should be distributed, held, and used, and the role of different parties 
including the villagers, local cadres, and the state at large in this process. 
However, I argue by analysing these conflicts and watching different 
parties' perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour, we can examine their views 
more comprehensively. Through the process of decollectivization, in which 
the agricultural land use rights have been distributed and redistributed under 
a critical principle of equality, and via the different types of land use rights 
disputes, land law violations, and resulting conflicts, we can also see what 
agricultural land use rights mean to villagers. 
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Chapter Three: Land Use Rights Compensation and 
Dynamics of Villagers' Public Resistance: The Case ofD~i 
Lqc Village 
I. Introduction 
In the context of industrialization and modernization in the rural areas, 
as previously outlined in Chapter Two, in 2001 Tu San district authorities 
planned to build a representative industrial zone [khu cong nghi¢p tlidn 
hinh], which is the site for eight enterprises, in f)~i L()c village. 1 The area of 
agricultural land appropriated for this industrial zone amounted to, 
according to the plan of the district authorities, 27.3 hectares, on which 
agricultural land use rights were allocated to 359 peasant households for a 
use term of 20 years from 1993. However, the process of land use rights 
compensation and site clearing produced vigorous conflict between the land 
use rights selling villagers (who I hereafter sometimes refer to as land 
selling villagers) and members of the Committee for land use rights 
compensation and site clearing (hereafter referred to as the Committee). So 
why did conflict occur? How did it emerge, develop, and get resolved? Who 
participated in the conflict, who did not, and why? What were the involved 
parties' objectives, actions, and voices in conflict and in resolving conflict? 
What means did the protesting villagers use to achieve their aims in 
conflict? What were the dynamics of conflict? How and in what ways did 
such dynamics relate to cultural, historical and moral values, and 
consequently strengthen the public resistance of the land use rights selling 
villagers? 
In order to answer these questions, first I examine the process of 
conflict over land use rights compensation and site clearing between the 
1 For confidential reasons, the real names of some studied villages and communes have 
been replaced with pseudonyms. Accordingly, all documents and newspaper articles that 
identifY these studied villages and communes are not fully displayed in this and following 
Chapters. 
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Committee and land use rights holders in B;;ti L()c village. Then, I explore 
and analyse various dynamics of the public resistance of the land use rights 
selling villagers. This is one case study in which I show how and in what 
ways a number of land selling villagers shared some common views over 
the question of how land use rights compensation should be done. I also 
elaborate how and in what ways their views contended with the views of 
other parties involved, such as the Committee, higher officials, and others, 
and how such contending views became the dynamics of conflict over land 
use rights compensation and site clearing. I argue that the public resistance 
of the land use rights selling villagers first arose out of their struggles for 
economic rights in the compensation of land use rights. Later on, it moved 
beyond the economic domain to involve moral issues relating to the problem 
of cadres. I argue this conflict also went beyond the local level because the 
contending views between the holders of land use rights and the holder of 
ownership rights and management rights, together with the public resistance 
of the protesting villagers, in the end forced the state to change its land 
tenure policies. 
II. Conflict Process 
The Quiet Time 
Located about 20 kilometres from the centre of Ha N()i, B;;ti L()c is one 
of six villages that make up a commune in Tir Son district of B~c Ninh 
province. According to statistics of the local government, in November 
2001, the village contained 2,829 inhabitants (among them 1,632 were 
labourers, i.e. of working age), who lived in 636 households and belonged 
to 27 lineages [h9 ]. Inhabitants of the village as a whole owned 127 storeys-
houses, 549 TVs, 296 motorbikes, 66 telephones, 12 tractors, and raised 11 
buffaloes, 45 cows, 1 ,806 pigs, 1 0,31 0 chickens, and 1,178 geese and ducks. 
Although B;;ti L()c economy is developed and diversified, agricultural 
production remains a major occupation for many villagers. During the past 
92 
years, many D~i L()c villagers have intensified their agricultural production 
by cultivating various kinds of vegetables and herbs alongside rice for 
selling in the district capital markets and also in Ha N()i. Therefore, 
agricultural production brings many villagers not only rice to eat but also a 
source of daily and seasonal cash. In such a context, agricultural land is not 
only a source of subsistence but also a form of accumulation to many 
villagers. In the 1950s land reform, per capita agricultural land in the village 
was 792 square metres; this ratio was dramatically reduced to 351 square 
metres in the 1993 agricultural land use rights redistribution, lower than the 
average per capita agricultural land of Red River delta villagers.2 My 
observations reveal that while many middle-aged males, females, and 
sometimes children, mostly do the farming work, a number of young 
women and men, daily or long-term, migrate to surrounding villages, Ha 
N()i, or elsewhere, for non-agricultural work, and this often earns their 
families additional cash and savings. This is similar to other villages in the 
area, meaning that the village's present socio-economy does not show any 
dominant features that distinguish D~i L()c from others in terms of 
economy, wealth, or social differentiation. 
In order to implement the program of land use rights compensation 
and site clearing to build up a representative industrial zone, a Committee 
for compensation and site clearing was set up in accordance with a Decision 
issued by the President of Tu Son District People's Committee. This 
Committee comprised 20 people: nine cadres from the commune to which 
D~i L()c belongs, six D~i L()c village cadres, and five district officials and 
entreprenuers. The nine commune cadres in the Committee were: President 
of Commune People's Committee (Head ofthe Committee), Vice-President 
of Commune People's Committee, Vice-secretary of Commune Party 
Organization, President of Fatherland Front, Chairman of Peasant 
2 Among the peasant villagers, per capita agricultural land differs from one to another. In 
the 1993 redistribution in the village, two methods were used to ensure equality in land use 
rights access. As was previously noted in Chapter Two, each male agricultural person 
between 18 and 60 years old, and female agricultural person between 18 and 55 received 
l.6 siw; over 55 - year - old - female agricultural villagers, over 60 -year - old - male 
agricultural villagers, and I 0- to- 17- year- old agricultural villagers received I 0 thu·6·c; 
agricultural children below 10 years old received 7 thu&c. 
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Association, Cadastral Cadre, Administrator of the Commune People's 
Committee, Financial Cadre, and Inspection Cadre. The six B1;1i L()c village 
cadres in the Committee comprised the village head, village party cell 
secretary, village policeman, village cultural cadre, and two village 
cooperative cadres. For most of the time, the village and commune cadres in 
the Committee were in charge of working directly with villagers in B1;1i L()c 
who were selling their land use rights on matters related to compensation 
and site clearing. When the public resistance of the land selling villagers 
escalated and moved beyond the local level, other members of the 
Committee and then other state officials at different levels also became 
involved in the conflict. This conflict over land use rights compensation and 
site clearing mainly occurred between the protesting villagers, most of 
whom were the holders of land use rights, and the members of Commitee, 
especially the village and commune cadres. Therefore, local cadres in this 
specific conflict refer to those village and commune cadres who were 
members of the Committee. 
Prior to the implementation of the compensation program for the 
industrial zone, 359 households whose agricultural land use rights were to 
be taken were advised about the district authorities' plan to build an 
industrial zone in B1;1i L<)c village, and were also lectured about the various 
advantages. This would bring the locality, for example transforming the 
local socio-economic structure from a backward economy solely based on 
agriculture to a more modem and diverse one. The villagers of these 
households were also asked for their agreement to this plan. Many villagers 
told the Committee that: "we support the industrial zone and we support the 
industrialization and modernization of the state." But there were a lot of 
discussions among those villagers over key questions as to how the 
compensation program should be implemented. What would be a reasonable 
price for compensation [gia aJn bU h()"p ly] for their land use rights, and 
what other aspects should the Committee, which many villagers saw as the 
state, consider to decide on a reasonable price? Who should enjoy the 
subsidy money which had been proposed and why? What should the 
94 
entrepreneurs do after they had taken the agricultural land use rights of the 
peasant villagers for industrial production? Such questions concerned many 
land selling villagers, and created considerable debate, negotiation, and 
finally conflicts. All these questions focused on three key issues: a 
reasonable price for compensation of land use rights, enjoyment of subsidy 
money, and entrepreneurs' labour employment of land use rights selling 
villagers in the future when a number of villagers would have no or little 
land for farming. 
At two official meetings in October 2001 and in January 2002 between 
the Committee's local cadres and D~i L()c land use rights selling villagers, 
the Head of the Committee officially announced what the villagers would 
receive for selling their agricultural land use rights, and how much the 
village and commune as a whole would benefit. First, in terms of a price, the 
Committee decided that the land use rights compensation price for the 
industrial zone would be similar to the compensation price for land use 
rights in the second round compensation for the construction of the national 
highway number 1 A in 2001: 16,164,000 VND per siw. Secondly, regarding 
the subsidy money, the eight entrepreneurs who were renting the land use 
rights from the district authorities who had bought the land use rights would 
pay a subsidy of 10,000 VND per square metre of land to D~i L()c village, 
and another similar amount to the commune of which D~i L()c is a part, both 
subsidies to be used for local infrastructure construction. However, the 359 
households whose land use rights were to be taken would receive no 
subsidy. Finally, concerning labour use, each of the eight entrepreneurs 
would employ ten workers per hectare of land appropriated from the land-
selling households when their industrial production came into effect. 
However, right from the first meeting, on 7th October 2001, the land 
use rights selling villagers did not agree with the Committee on any of the 
three issues. At the second meeting on 28th January 2002, they continued to 
disagree, especially with the compensation price. Many land selling 
villagers argued that the compensation offered was too low, and asked the 
Committee to require the higher state bodies to consider a higher price, 
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otherwise they would not sell their land use rights. Alternatively, the land 
use rights selling villagers could be beneficiaries of the subsidy money that 
entrepreneurs were granting to the village and commune. In addition, the 
land selling villagers wanted to meet with the eight entrepreneurs to sign 
contracts regarding the employment of part of their labour force, as 
promised, in the future when the factories were in operation. 
The Committee, on the one hand encouraged the land-selling villagers 
to accept the compensation money, and also promised to settle the questions 
that they were raising about labour employment and a more reasonable 
price. On the other hand, as villagers later told me, the Committee reported 
to the higher authorities that the villagers [dan], i.e. the land selling 
villagers, agreed 100 per cent, and proceeded to the next step of paying the 
compensation and subsidy money. In the meantime, the Committee's local 
cadres stopped the irrigation systems in the village which watered the area 
in contention to prevent the land selling villagers from farming a new rice 
harvest. As the Committee continued their plan of compensation and site 
clearing, it daily announced on the village public radio that the province was 
ordering the seizure of land use rights [l?nh thu h6i adt cua tinh ], and asked 
the land use rights selling villagers to accept the compensation, otherwise 
this money would be sent to the state treasury [kho bqc nhG nu6-c] and the 
Committee would clear the site. 
Many land use rights selling villagers started to worry, and told each 
other to take the compensation money, demand a more reasonable price of 
compensation, or enjoy the subsidy money instead, and discuss the labour 
contract later. From the 9th to the 1Oth of February 2002, the last days of the 
Vietnamese lunar year, the Committee arranged for the eight entrepreneurs 
to pay the compensation directly to the land use rights sellers, this money 
being seen as part of the former's investment in the industrial zone. Then, 
the Committee prepared to clear the site for the industrial zone construction. 
However, while 349 of the 359 households took the compensation money, 
10 households determinedly rejected such an irrational compensation policy 
and did not receive any compensation money. 
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Public Protest 
When the lunar New Year had passed, the resistance of many land-
selling villagers escalated from debate to public protests. Many of them 
gathered in the village public space to talk about the story of compensation 
[chuy?n adn bu]. A number of them also individually went to question the 
village head, village party cell's secretary and other village cadres who were 
members of the Committee about the compensation policy, especially the 
compensation price, subsidy money, and labour employment, which the 
cadres had previously promised to settle. Days passed, however, many land 
selling villagers still received nothing additional. Some of them therefore 
felt that the cadres had lied to them about the compensation and became 
angry, and a few even started to scold the village cadres. 
In response to the increasing public protest, a number of members of 
the Committee still acted as if the land use rights compensation program had 
almost finished after the February 2002 payment. The next step for the 
Committee was to clear the site for the factory building. Some other 
members of the Committee tried to persuade £>:;1i L(>c land use rights selling 
villagers to support industrialization and modernization of the home district. 
In the village, however, representatives of mass organizations, the 
authorities, and the party had a meeting and decided to allocate to the land 
use rights sellers 3,000 of the 10, 000 VND subsidy per square metre ofland 
that the eight entrepreneurs had promised to the village. However, no 
confirmation of a signed labour contract from the eight entrepreneurs or 
further subsidy money to make a more reasonable price of compensation 
was granted. 
Many of the land-selling villagers continued to resist, although the 
extra amount of money had been given. They continued to demand the full 
amount of 1 0, 000 VND per square metre at least, and wanted to meet with 
the entrepreneurs to sign a contract on labour use. In order to put more 
pressure on the Committee, many land use rights selling villagers started to 
mobilize their primary and secondary school children, who wore red scarves 
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and walked around the village, beating drums and shouting slogans 
"Overthrow corruption! Overthrow the corrupt gang!" [Da aiw tham nhung! 
Da aiw b9n tham nhung!] for several days, exactly as Phu Duong villagers 
had done a couple of years previously to protest against local corrupt cadres, 
which I examine in subsequent Chapters.3 Later, in late March, the land use 
rights selling villagers gathered in their tens, even hundreds, in the 
commune headquarters, and then in the district headquarters late every 
afternoon for over 10 days to voice their discontent and demand what they 
wanted. Finally, some protesting villagers lost their patience and scolded the 
head of the Committee for taking their agricultural land use rights. In the 
village, some land selling villagers even circulated leaflets like poems to 
denounce local cadre wrongdoings and to criticise cadre misbehaviour 
towards the villagers. 
More days passed, and many land selling villagers sensed that the 
Committee could not resolve their proposals; therefore they moved to higher 
levels of state authority to protest and to lodge proposals for a more rational 
compensation policy. Twice a month, they went in tens and even over a 
hundred, to various different offices of the state in the province and in Ha 
NQi, like the People's Committee, General Department of State Inspection, 
and People Meeting Office of Central Party's General Secretary Committee. 
For the central authorities in Hanoi, however, it was not their function to 
directly settle such detailed problems of a locality; therefore, D1;1i L<?c land 
selling villagers were sent back to the Provincial authorities for resolution. 
At the provincial level, the land selling villagers were asked to turn back to 
the district authorities, and finally at the district level, they were required 
not to bypass the authorised level [vzr(Yt cdp] for proposals and petitions, and 
told they should go back to their home village to work with the Committee. 
At this stage, some cadres and officials of the Committee got angry 
with the land use rights selling villagers because of their scolding, petitions, 
and proposals, and started to blame a number of land selling villagers. For 
example, a key D1;1i L<?c cadre in the village told some females whose 
3 This is an example of the villagers using the problem of local cadre corruption as an 
excuse for their demands on other issues, as I analyse in-depth in Chapter Five. 
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agricultural land use rights were acquired for the industrial zone that "it is 
not your land, women, so how can you sell it?" and he avoided meeting with 
the land selling villagers to talk about land use rights compensation issues. 
One commune cadre confirmed to the land selling villagers that "one more 
cent is impossible!" and he scolded some land selling villagers as "black 
people [i.e. ordinary people] who know little so how can they petition" the 
Committee? He vividly compared what they were doing to "an ant 
petitioning a sweet-potato." Also, he declared, "I will carry out the program 
without the people!" Similarly a district official of the Committee told land 
use rights selling villagers: "the entrepreneurs determine who will get the 
subsidy!" 
The Committee's actions and behaviours noted above did not reduce 
disagreements with the land selling villagers, neither could they prevent 
these villagers from petitioning and demanding a compensation policy 
which was more rational to their way of thinking. Instead, such actions 
created more protests and tensions, not only among those who had accepted 
compensation but also some other villagers who had not sold their land use 
rights for the industrial zone. Many villagers felt that their land use rights 
were not only appropriated under conditions they did not agree with, but 
also that the local cadres had behaved in wrong and bad ways. It was very 
odd for some villagers to see that their own village cadres had no 
willingness to help them; neither did these cadres want to stand on their 
side, or at least take a neutral position. Instead, they all worked with the 
Committee to carry out the compensation policy and clear the site. 
Therefore, the struggle of the land use rights selling villagers not only 
targeted a more reasonable policy for land compensation as it first appeared, 
but also wanted to 'beat' these cadres for being more than strangers to their 
own villagers. 
A number of villagers whose land use rights were not threatened also 
jumped into the arena because of the odd things they witnessed. Working 
together with some land selling they formed a large group which found a 
way to point out to the public and higher authorities various wrongdoings of 
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village and commune cadres over previous years. For example, a number of 
villagers looked back to the cadre corruption in previous land compensation 
programs for the construction of the national highway, village secondary 
and primary schools, and the receiving of over 20 bicycles as bribes from a 
district company based on the commune territory. The protesting villagers 
also pointed out that the Committee had given compensation for more land 
area than was allowed by the higher authorities in order to enjoy the 
compensation money and even to speculate in land use rights. In addition, 
many recalled the commune cadres' misbehaviour towards Dc;ti L9c 
villagers in a previous dispute over village identity and an old grave which 
they believed to be a sign of the Ly dynasty (I will further discuss this later). 
After a few months, and despite many visits back and forth to all 
levels of authority: district, province, and in Ha N()i, to articulate their 
disagreements, appeal for a more rational compensation policy, and petition 
wrongdoings of members of the Committee, the land use rights selling 
villagers received nothing more than the above mentioned amount of 
subsidy money that the village cadres had allocated. Therefore, the land-
selling villagers continued to resist and did not allow the Committee to clear 
the site for the industrial zone construction. 
To deal with this situation, the district authorities sent teams of 
inspectors to look into the viilagers' accusations. At first, one team of 
district inspectors discovered nothing, leading a key commune cadre of the 
Committee to pleasurably tell the protesting villagers "there was not one 
extra piece of land compensated." However, the villagers did not trust the 
team of inspectors. The second time, another team of district inspectors 
discovered that a little extra area of land had been compensated. Again, the 
protesting villagers did not accept such a conclusion, as they maintained that 
a larger area of the village communal land had been illegally compensated. 
Finally, a third team concluded that one village cadre of the Committee 
seemed to have corruptly acquired [co ddu hi?u tham nhfing] millions of 
VND by "lending the village communal land" [gt(i ru(mg cong] to his 11 
relatives and friends in order to get compensation money. In addition, the 
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team pointed out that an area of over 5,000 square metres of communal land 
of the village had been illegally compensated. 
Public resistance of a number of D~i L()c villagers reached its peak in 
May 2002, when many land selling villagers saw the National Assembly 
Election as a great chance to press the Committee to meet their demands for 
adequate compensation. Otherwise, they threatened not to vote. The 
provincial authorities, therefore, had to promise that the demands of the land 
selling villagers would be resolved after Election Day, and that a 
representative group of land selling villagers would be set up to discuss this 
with the authorities. Many land selling villagers, however, did not see much 
hope in this move, thus they continued to resist in their own ways. 
To organise the National Assembly Election, a voting unit [t6 bdu cu] 
was established in D~i L()c village, and most members of the voting team 
were the village cadres of the Committee for land use rights compensation 
and site clearing for the industrial zone. On voting day, a number of voters 
[cit: tri] discovered a discrepancy in comparison with the last election, 
because the voting team did not stamp "voted" [aa bdu] on the back of 
voting cards to verify the villagers' votes. This was a clear breach of the 
National Assembly Election Law. To make sure, one villager went to a 
neighbouring village to double check, and another called the national hotline 
1080 to further check the rules. When both confirmed that the D~i L()c 
voting team had violated the National Assembly Election Law, they told 
each other to delay their votes till the very end. At the very last moment on 
election day, a number of villagers went to vote, while a number of people 
who had voted also came back to question why the voting team had not 
stamped "voted" on the back of their voting cards. The voting team could 
not explain why, but said that if any villager wanted a stamp they could give 
them one now. Taking this chance, over 500 villagers, many of whom came 
from land-selling households, kept the ballot box for three days in the 
village communal house. As a result, the voting team could not count the 
votes. This resistant act later requested the involvement of various local 
cadres, policemen, and officials to resolve the issue. Finally, the National 
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Voting Council decided to cancel the vote in D~i L<)c because of the voting 
team's "heavy violations" of the National Assembly Election Law, and it 
directed the local authorities to set up a new team of voting cadres to 
reorganize the vote in the village two days later, and to punish the 
wrongdoers.4 
After all this, except for the additional amount of subsidy money given 
by the local cadres, the land selling villagers still failed to achieve a higher 
compensation price for their land use rights. They could neither enjoy the 
whole sum of subsidy money nor meet the eight entrepreneurs to sign a 
labour employment contract. Many land selling villagers lost confidence in 
obtaining a better resolution from higher levels of authority, including the 
centre. Thus, the only thing the land-selling villagers could do was not 
allowing the Committee to clear the site. One 57-year old woman threatened 
she would "stay at home to keep the land, dead or alive we must keep the 
land [a· nha dJ giu ddt, sbng chit ci1ng phiti giu tdy ddt]. We will fight to the 
end if the state clears the site by all means." However, by the end of October 
2002, policemen had arrested some protesting villagers because of their 
public unrest and provocative actions, and then the site was successfully 
cleared for the industrial zone construction. 
Participation, Struggle Tactics and Leadership 
Who participated in these events, who did not? What tactics did the 
protesting villagers use to claim what they wanted? And who led the way? 
Leaving aside other issues, the conflict in the village was a controversial 
contest between land use rights selling villagers and the Committee over 
land use rights compensation policies. However, as noted above 
participation in the conflict widened as it developed over time. Discontent 
and resistance involved more non-land sellers as the dispute moved beyond 
a struggle for economic interest in the land compensation and site-clearing 
program to moral values. 
4 Brio SU:c kh6e & Dili sdng, thring 612002. 
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There were different kinds of participation. Some participants were 
involved in oral debates within official and legal channels rather than the 
illegally confrontational protests. In the public arena, the clearest and most 
dominant image of participation was a large number of middle-aged women 
and elderly persons of both genders. Many women took charge of the job of 
interacting directly with the village and commune cadres in the Committee 
on matters of agreement and disagreement, and the rights and wrongs of the 
land compensation policies; and this happened from the beginning to the 
end. A number of children were involved in the first period when the public 
protest occurred within the village and commune compound. They were 
mobilised by the adults in their family to do things that the adults could not 
do. Later on, as the land-selling villagers went further up the authorized line 
to higher levels of authority to make their voices heard and to send their 
petitions and proposals, more middle-aged men participated and played a 
key role. 
A number of informants told me that the use of women, elderly and 
children was their tactics for struggle, because women could talk better 
about the land, shout louder in public and scold cadres better. The elderly 
were also seen as a better force to interact with, or press, cadres because 
cadres would have to respond to them respectfully. Women were also better 
confronting male cadres and officials because the likelihood of a physical 
fight or violence is less. Confrontation between men and male cadres and 
officials are more likely to end in violence of some degree. More 
importantly, cadres and the police find it much more difficult to interact 
with, and to threaten or capture, women, the elderly and children. But I 
could also see that the women and the elderly often worried more than 
others when their major productive means were taken away under 
conditions they did not agree with. They might have had a clearer feeling of 
the potential risk of being without, or with a reduced source of, family 
subsistence and occupation the agricultural land provided, since they are the 
ones who have often been doing the farming work and taking care of the 
family budget, particularly in D{li L(>c. 
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As the villagers' public resistance moved beyond the struggle for mere 
economic interest to discontent and protest over moral values, a number of 
non-land selling villagers participated since they had witnessed the 
cumulative bad treatment their cadres had handed out to their village 
fellows. Another reason was that some villagers did not think that the higher 
authorities' resolution of the wrongdoings that cadres committed was fair 
enough. In one case, for example, an extra area of land eligible for 
compensation was discovered. The cadres lied to the protesting villagers and 
said that it was the land of a neighbouring commune. However, many 
villagers demonstrated that land belonged to their village. Finally, the 
provincial authorities seized the extra land and gave it to the commune 
authorities for management. Such incidents drew the attention and 
participation of more villagers, and gathered them together to fight for 
economic rights in the land compensation dispute, and to fight against the 
cadres' wrongdoings and misbehaviour. 
Behind the mass movement described above, the leadership of the 
protest lay in the hands of a few elderly men5 who all lived in the village but 
were regarded as a rural elite. As the conflict widened, more participants 
became involved, and a couple of non-land selling men also became leaders 
of the protest. Before the discontent and protests occurred and were voiced 
in public, some of these men had already started studying the Land Law, 
Decree number 22 [Nghj djnh s6 22] on land use rights compensation, and 
the Denunciation and Petition Code [Lw;it Khitu nr;d va T6 cao] to 
understand more about the legal systems on land tenure regime and related 
issues that they were pursuing and dealing with. Their role was really 
important in terms of guiding and directing the participants on how and 
what to do and say, and where and when to go. They - the leaders, also 
knew how to act within official and legal channels so as not to violate the 
Denunciation and Petition Code while fighting against the wrongdoers or 
articulating their proposals to different levels of authority. 
5 By "elderly men," I refer to people who are in their 50s, 60s, 70s and older, often called 
cac C!f in the community. 
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In short, there were different kinds of participants in the conflict. The 
dominant presence of women in the public protests was more than a tactic of 
the protesting villagers' struggle, as some articulated. Their dominant 
presence hints at women's great concern for the loss of their agricultural 
land use rights and the sources of subsistence and occupation for their 
family members. Thus, they protested for more money and for a 
confirmation of labour employment in the hope of securing the subsistence 
and occupation of the family. A number of elderly and other villagers also 
saw how some of their local cadres behaved towards their village fellows in 
ways that they did not agree with, and found it a good chance to take 
revenge on these cadres who had not supported them in an earlier struggle 
for village identity, as I will discuss later in this Chapter. 
III. Dynamics of Resistance 
My above description of the conflict over compensation for 
agricultural land use rights and site clearing for an industrial zone has 
shown the perceptions and rationale of the land selling villagers towards the 
question of how the state policies on land compensation should be. In the 
conflict, first, many land selling villagers clearly stated that they were 
struggling for economic rights over the land compensation that they 
supposed they deserved. This economic dimension was clearly shown in the 
matters they raised, through the words they articulated, and particularly, via 
the determined actions they took. The economic dimension covers a 
number of factors, including their claim for a more reasonable amount of 
land use rights compensation, their claim for a commitment of labour 
employment, their fears of the loss of subsistence and occupation, the 
attraction of a cash windfall, their self profit, and suspicion of the 
Committee's collusion with entrepreneurs in land use rights speculation, 
which were either implicit or obviously articulated. 
Secondly, as the struggle went on, the great discontent of the 
protesting villagers and their vigorous protests moved beyond the initial 
105 
economic matters to the moral values that the protesting villagers called vdn 
d~ can b(j [the problem of cadres]. This means the protesting villagers' 
resistance also targeted a number of local cadres for a variety of reasons. 
Many protesting villagers considered that some local cadres, especially their 
own village ones, instead of behaving the way villagers assumed they 
should, became corrupted, misbehaved towards a number of villagers, were 
distant, and did not help the villagers or care about what they wanted. They 
carried out what the state required them to do at the expense of the villagers. 
And land compensation is not the only example of this. 
In the following section, first, I analyse the economic dimension of the 
villagers' public resistance, then its moral dimension. Secondly, I present 
the contending views between the protesting villagers and the Committee as 
well as other institutions of the state over the same issues, and point out how 
and in what ways the aspects of the conflict beyond the local level affected 
the central state and its land tenure policy. 
Claim to a More Reasonable Price for Land Use Rights Compensation 
The most important aspect of the economic dimension is the land 
selling villagers' claim for a more reasonable amount of land use rights 
compensation. So what did the land selling villagers consider to be a 
reasonable price? As I pointed out above, land use rights had been taken 
from villagers in B<;ti L()c a number of times before the industrial project, for 
example building of national highway 1 A. This occurred twice, first in 1997 
with a compensation price of9,000,000 VND per sao, and secondly in 2001 
with a price of 16,164,000 VND per sao, plus 3000 VND subsidy money 
per square metre of land taken. However, these events did not produce as 
much public resistance as the compensation program for the industrial zone 
in 2002, which occurred one year after the second round for the national 
highway. 
The initial compensation price for the land acquired for the industrial 
zone was 16,164,000 VND per sao with all of the subsidy offered by the 
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eight entrepreneurs going to the village and commune as a whole and none 
to the land-selling villagers. In addition, the reason for taking the land use 
rights differed from the previous instance. These two factors created strong 
discontent and resistance from the land-selling villagers. 
Many land selling villagers compared the compensation price with the 
income that the agricultural land had brought them in recent years, and 
recognized it was only equal to the income they would achieve in about 
three years of farming, far below their demands for compensation for the 11 
years of land use rights they had left. Actually, alongside wet rice growing, 
many D~i L()c villagers had been intensifYing their use of one or two slw of 
agricultural land, usually one-third or one half of a household's total 
agricultural land area, by growing various kinds of vegetables and herbs to 
sell in the district market and in Ha N()i. While rice growing gives villagers 
rice to eat, the farming of vegetables and herbs brings them a source of cash, 
daily and seasonally. Many land selling villagers estimated that vegetable 
and herb growing roughly earned them about 15,000 VND in cash per sew 
per day, over five million VND per year in total. Thus, the price of 
16,164,000 VND per sao for compensation was equal to three years of 
farming only, and this did not satisfY the land sellers right from the 
beginning of the program. Although many land selling villagers said that 
they supported the industrial zone, as they supported the modernization and 
industrialization programs of the state, most did not agree with such a low 
price, and proposed that they would only agree to sell their land use rights 
when the state considered a higher price, otherwise the entrepreneurs' 
subsidy must belong to them.6 
Besides the income villagers gained from the land as analysed above, 
the second aspect of calculating a reasonable price is the rationale for taking 
the land. To support their claim for a more reasonable price, many land 
6 Generally speaking, the compensation price offered by the state for land use rights is 
several times lower than the real market price in the local transfer of land use rights, 
particularly in the case of residential land. For instance, the level of compensation the state 
offered for residential land use rights for the national highway number lA within Ha NQi 
territory was equal to only 18 per cent of the estimated price of land use rights traded in the 
locality (Pham Mong Hoa, Lam Mai Lan 2000: 125). 
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selling villagers argued that the compensation price could not be simply 
applied for all areas and all types of land use rights within a province as 
large as the one regulated by the current policies. It must be made case by 
case. In particular, they stressed the difference in the rationale for taking the 
land use rights. Obtaining land use rights for a public purpose, to build 
schools or roads for instance, must be differentiated from doing so for the 
private economic aims of certain groups, the entrepreneurs for example. To 
many land selling villagers, the entrepreneurs, just like their family 
households, are part of the broader national economy; yet they both want 
land use rights to make a profit or a living for themselves rather than for the 
nation's benefit as a whole. One male villager said: 
The taking of land for the national highway last time was for the 
nation's benefit, we thus accepted the given price even though it 
was lower than the market price because we sacrificed for the 
country. But this taking is for the entrepreneurs to use. If the 
compensation price remains the same, it means we have to 
sacrifice our land for the entrepreneurs. We do not accept that! 
Sympathetically, another knowledgeable villager, a 65-year-old male 
whose land use rights had not been appropriated for this industrial zone, 
particularly underlined that the state has to take into account the interest of 
three parties in land use rights compensation: the interest of villagers who 
hold the agricultural land use rights, of entrepreneurs, and of the state. In 
practice, he continued, the interest of the villagers had not been paid enough 
attention, which is why the land-selling villagers resisted. He also indicated 
that the land as to be taken for 50 years, which meant a long-term reduction 
of agricultural land area for the village as the whole. In the next distribution, 
the per capita agricultural land in the village would be decreased quite a lot! 
Some land use rights selling villagers made even stronger arguments 
for their role and rights over the land they had been farming for years. One 
57-year-old female villager, who sold her family land use rights, analysed 
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agricultural land use rights, many land selling villagers felt that the value of 
such rights had increased. 
As a more reasonable price was impossible to gain because cadres and 
officials of the Committee usually just referred land selling villagers to state 
policies on the land tenure system and land use rights compensation, many 
land selling villagers proposed the following simple option: add a monetary 
subsidy to the land use rights compensation price. This would mean that the 
land sellers would enjoy the subsidy money rather than the village or the 
commune as a whole. These villagers argued that they had lost the 
agricultural land use rights, not the village or the commune. They thought it 
was strange that while one party loses land use rights, others benefit from 
the subsidy money, particularly since the land use rights compensation price 
was too low in the situation at the time. Many of them referred to Decree 
number 22 that states that for agricultural peasants, besides the land use 
rights compensation money, the parties to which the state allocates or rents 
the land use rights have a responsibility to subsidize the land selling 
villagers for their change in occupation, and if new employment 
opportunities arise, the recipients of the land use rights have to favour the 
land use rights selling villagers (Thu tuong Chinh phu 1998). Relying on 
this Decree, many land selling villagers in f>~i LQc tried to gain the right to 
enjoy the subsidy money that the entrepreneurs granted the village and 
commune, since they calculated that these two put together would make a 
reasonable price for land use rights compensation. 
Claim for a Commitment to Labour Employment 
The second aspect of the economic dimension in the view of the land 
selling villagers related to their claim for employment when the industrial 
production came into effect. The land-selling villagers wanted to meet with 
the eight entrepreneurs to confirm their labour employment. As I noted 
earlier in this Chapter, alongside the 16, 164,000VND per sew, and subsidy 
money, the eight entrepreneurs promised to employ ten local labourers for 
every hectare of land they acquired from the villagers. However, this oral 
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commitment from the entrepreneurs conveyed through the Committee did 
not convince the land-selling villagers that the promise would be kept. They 
had already learnt a lesson from a number of villagers in nearby villages 
who had sold their agricultural land use rights for another industrial zone a 
couple of years previously. The entrepreneurs promised the land selling 
villagers the same thing. However, later, when the entrepreneurs employed 
local workers, many land selling villagers' children could not meet the 
entrepreneur's employment standards, though they had to pay fees for five 
months' job training. Thus, D~i L()c land selling villagers wanted to meet 
with the eight entrepreneurs to make sure that the latter would use labour 
from the land selling households in the future as promised. 
Fears of the Loss of Subsistence and Occupation 
The third aspect of the economic dimension is the land selling 
villagers' fears of the loss of subsistence and occupation, which was 
implicitly articulated to the Committee and other state institutions. My 
research in D~i L()c endorses James Scott's argument over the importance of 
subsistence in peasants' lives and the potential for peasant resistance when it 
is taken (Scott 1976). However, I emphasize that this is only one factor - a 
hidden one, of the many factors that contributed to the generation of conflict 
over land use rights compensation in the village. 
To illustrate how this kind of implicit fear affected the minds of a 
number of land selling villagers in their objectives and actions, I think it is 
essential to emphasize again here the basic role of agricultural land use 
rights in their economic lives. As I have previously analysed in Chapter 
One, agricultural land in many of the Red River delta villages that I came 
across during my fieldwork in 2002 plays an important role in the family 
economy of those who farm it. Agricultural land use rights are important to 
villagers since they bring them an annual basic and stable source of 
sustenance, which the villagers can live on throughout the year no matter 
how much other income they might earn. Agricultural land use rights also 
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provide an occupation for certain kinds of labour force, particularly the 
middle-aged, the elderly, and some children. In comparison with the non-
agricultural work available in the region and elsewhere, farming usually 
brings the peasant villagers less in terms of income but they do not have to 
work for others [lam thue], and they do not have to migrate out of, or far 
from, the village. Although out-migration for non-agricultural work 
increased after decollectivization, not every villager can find such non-
agricultural work. Thus, many peasant villagers who lose their agricultural 
land use rights feel threatened and uncomfortable about what the family will 
eat and what some members of the family will do in the future. Therefore 
the loss of most or all of the area of agricultural land to which the protesting 
villagers held use rights also contributed to the land selling villagers' public 
resistance. 
In D{li L()c, after three rounds of land use rights compensation, 11 
households had lost all their allocated agricultural land use rights except the 
10 per cent agricultural land for the family economy, while over 100 
households had lost about 90-95 percent. For such peasant villagers, fears 
about subsistence and future occupation security would be greater than for 
the villagers who still had enough land to farm. In fact, even though they 
had been compensated with an amount of money, a number of peasant 
villagers felt unstable and unconvinced at being without, or with too little, 
agricultural land. For them, a common way to deal with the compensation 
money was to deposit it in the bank for monthly interest. However, the 
interest villagers earn cannot bring them the same stable income as the 
agricultural land did. It is true that a number of villagers in D{li L()c, and in 
other villages as well, want and wanted to sell their agricultural land use 
rights to the entrepreneurs, but I think that many do not want to, or dare not, 
sell all or most of the agricultural land area they have been allocated the 
land use rights for. Instead, they want to sell only a given area to get some 
cash for house building or a motorbike or something costly, but such a sale 
should not damage the subsistence and the source of occupation that the 
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agricultural land brings to their families. In conversations with me, a 
number of villagers said "we would die I+ k~tvin~mo land to farm. L w ,' .~- "'-
Several informants told me that if the industrial zone had taken a piece 
of agricultural land from each family like the national highway had, the land 
selling villagers would not have resisted so strongly, even with the price 
given. They pointed out that the land use rights compensation for the 
highway did not create public resistance, not only because the compensation 
and site clearing were better implemented but also due to the fact that the 
highway goes in a straight line through the fields, thus it took a piece of 
agricultural land from each family. The agricultural land appropriated for 
the industrial zone was a much larger area, and for many it was too much. 
Talking to one of the Committee's village cadres after his removal 
from office because of the voting affair, I was very surprised when he 
provided me with a totally different account of why villagers protested 
against the compensation program so strongly. He no longer accused the 
land-selling villagers of not understanding the state laws and regulations, of 
wrong actions, or of irrational claims. Instead, he said the land use rights 
acquisition for the industrial zone was really "a revolution" [m9t cu9c each 
mqng] for a number of families, because it changed them from being landed 
peasant villagers [ ngu&i nang dan c6 ru9ng] to landless peasant villagers 
[ ngu&i nang dan kh6ng c6 ru9ng] who might have to become wage 
labourers [ngu&i di lam thue], or rent land to farm [di thue ru9ng]. In fact, 
by the end of 2002, I had already witnessed a number of B~i L()c villagers 
renting agricultural land use rights from villagers in the neighbouring 
village 7 for 80-100 kilograms of paddy per six months. 
These concerns of the land selling villagers about their subsistance and 
work security after the loss of their land use rights therefore consolidated 
their claims for a more reasonable compensation price and especially for a 
commitement from the eight entrepreneurs to use them as part of their 
labour force in the future. These fears of the B~i L()c land selling villagers 
7 In this village, many villagers specialise in making rice-wine, cakes, noodles and other 
products from rice to sell. Thus, a number of villagers rent out a part or all of their 
agricultural land to others to use. 
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were very real and closely related to their everyday lives, as consequences 
of such agricultural land use rights appropriation have been shortly observed 
elsewhere. For example, in My Dinh - a commune of Ha N9i capital - where 
the state seized 220 of a total of 340 hectares of agricultural land for over 40 
projects in four years, 1999 - 2003, a journalist writes: "walking around the 
villages ofNhan My and Phu My, anywhere we go we all see a situation in 
which strong and young villagers below the age of 40, sit at home watching 
TV or around bars."8 In the words of one woman in this commune: 
Many [land selling]9 villagers who are under 40 years of age now 
watch TV at home all the day because after the state seized [their 
agricultural] land [use rights] they do not know what to do. The 
peasant villagers from before to now are mostly familiar with 
farming work, [their] level of education is also low, therefore it 
is difficult [for them] to apply for a job. We are ready to give 
[agricultural] land funds for the development of the city, but in 
return, the state has to also be concerned about jobs for us, the 
peasants, after agricultural land [use rights] seizure. 1 0 
Similarly, since a central city, Da N~ng, has been developed into a 
national level city, over 52,000 households among which many are peasants 
have been resettled for urbanization. This urbanization has then created 
"streets of peasants" [phJ nha nang] or a situation of "peasants living in 
box houses" [nang dan s6ng trong nha hQp ]. 11 As a result, many of them 
worry about their work in new residential locations in the context of having 
no agricultural land to fann. 12 
8 Baa Lao D9ng 2003. "Xa My Dinh: Khi ru()ng bien thanh nha." Ngay 29110/2003, at 
www .laodong.corn. vn. 
9 Various words I insert in square brackets here or elsewhere are to clarifY the informants' 
meaning, not to shift their meaning to support my arguments. 
10 Baa Lao D9ng 2003. "Dinh gia d~t phiii sat v6i gia mua ban thl!c te." Ngay 15/09/2003, 
at www.laodong.com.vn. 
II Baa Dgi Doi.m kit 2003. "Xung quanh v~ d~ giai toa d~n bU va tai djnh cu a Da N&ng: 5 
v;,1n h() dan va bfm di~m btrc xuc." Ngay 15/8/2003; Baa Lao D9ng 2003. "Ph6 nha n6ng." 
Ngay 05/07/2003. 
12 VNExpress. net 2003. "Da Nfing va n6i lo h(lu giai toa." Ngay 10/12/2003. 
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rights compensation was impossible to achieve, they started to argue 
convincingly and determinedly. that such a subsidy should be given to the 
land use rights sellers, not the village or commune. As many argued, the 
village and commune did not sell any land use rights, therefore did not lose 
anything, so how come the village and commune could be the beneficiaries 
of such a subsidy. It is not rare, however, from time to time elsewhere, to 
see villagers considering the interests of the village as a whole in 
comparison with, for example, outsiders, a neighbouring village or the state 
as a whole. In subsequent Chapters, I discuss more about this. 
Suspicion of the Committee's Collusion in Land Speculation 
Finally, having seen the attitudes, actions and behaviour of the 
Committee conducting the land use rights compensation, a number of 
protesting villagers suspected that the Committee were in collusion with the 
entrepreneurs and were speculating in land use rights. For example, what 
the Committee told the land-selling villagers changed over time. In the first 
meeting, the Committee announced that the eight entrepreneurs would pay a 
subsidy of 20,000 VND per square metre, of which half was for the village, 
and the other half for the commune, both for local infrastructure 
construction. But when the land selling villagers demanded to enjoy this 
monetary subsidy, the Committee told them that the eight entrepreneurs 
were no longer able to give 10,000 VND per square metre of land to the 
commune because they did not have enough money. In addition, when the 
land-selling villagers demanded to meet with the eight entrepreneurs to sign 
a contract on labour use, the Committee, especially the village cadres in the 
Committee, did not help them. Instead they tried to prevent such a meeting. 
In the end, there were no entrepreneurs for the land-selling villagers to meet. 
Besides that, a number of the protesting villagers argued that the main 
aim of the Committee and the eight entrepreneurs in appropriating an extra 
area of the village communal land was not only to enjoy the compensation 
and subsidy money on that land area, but more importantly to speculate in 
land use rights after the appropriation. A number of the protesting villagers 
116 
indicated that the Committee and the entrepreneurs had borrowed money 
from the bank to pay compensation for land use rights. However, once land 
use rights had been successfully acquired, their value would increase many 
times because they had been changed from agricultural land to land for 
industrial and trading uses. The Committee and entrepreneurs could then 
sell the land use rights for trading purposes for an amount of money that 
was many times higher than the compensation and subsidy sum they had 
paid the villagers, village and commune as the whole. Finally, a number of 
protesting villagers sensed that the Committee, entrepreneurs, and higher 
officials were working together to push through the land use rights 
compensation and site clearing program. 
All the above emphasize the scepticism of the protesting villagers that 
the Committee and entrepreneurs were taking advantage of the industrial 
zone building to acquire more of the villagers' farmland than was allowed 
for offices, kiosk building and other trading purposes to sell in the future at 
a higher price, particularly since in this case, the land area acquired was 
located in a very good trading location. Actually, a number of the protesting 
villagers said that if they did not struggle for a more reasonable price and 
resist the Committee's wrongdoings, these cadres and officials would do the 
same again next time, which meant more land would be compensated under 
an irrational policy, and more wrongdoings of the cadres and officials would 
be committed. 
Violations of Moral Behaviour 
As the conflict moved forwards, the struggle of the protesting villagers 
shifted from economic issues to involve moral values, making the public 
resistance of these villagers become more vigorous and difficult to resolve. 
So how and in what ways had local cadres of the Committee violated moral 
behaviour? As previously noted, among the 20 members of the Committee, 
15 were local cadres, of which eight were either residents or cadres of .E>~i 
L()c village. More than anyone else, these eight cadres not only directly 
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dealt with the land selling villagers over the land compensation issues but 
also encountered them in everyday life; some even had family relationships 
with a number of the protesting villagers. 
In such circumstances, many land selling villagers expected their 
village cadres and some commune cadres who lived in their village to help 
them claim a more rational policy on land use rights compensation. 
Although embedded in many land selling villagers' minds, such perceptions 
and views were neither directly spoken out to these cadres nor presented to 
the authorities as a reason for their resistance. In practice, however, what the 
protesting villagers witnessed was the fact that instead of doing good for 
their village fellows, or the village as a whole, as some villagers assumed 
these local cadres should do, their behaviour, as some protesting villagers 
later alleged, disadvantaged the protesting villagers. They showed no 
willingness to help villagers [kh6ng chtu giup ddn], stayed far from the 
village fellows [s6ng xa ddn], and/or even cumulatively and systematically 
engaged in corrupt practices [tham nhung c6 h? th6ng]. 
Such misbehaviour created much disagreement and resistance among 
the villagers. A number of the protesting villagers supposed that these 
cadres were not only representatives of the state at the local level but also 
representatives of the local community, and more importantly their position 
was, in many cases, thanks to their village fellows who believed in them and 
had elected them. Therefore, they should not only do what the state 
requested; they also had to consider what their village fellows wanted and 
needed. When these cadres of the Committee did not care about such moral 
claims but went on with the compensation and site-clearing program, a 
number of villagers therefore protested. Their discontent increased when the 
moral claims were combined with their claims for economic rights. It was 
not rare to to see in some cases a number of local cadres standing in the 
middle of conflicting views, or economic claims, between the state and 
villagers. How to settle such a situation must have been difficult for the 
local cadres. One example is the case ofThinh Li~t cadres in rural Ha N<)i. 
Malarney argues that cadres had to make concessions to a number of co-
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resident villagers by pretending not to know what they saw in order to 
successfully implement the state reform policy in ritual practices (Malamey 
2002: 215). 
Violations of moral behaviour by the village cadres and commune 
cadres who lived in D~i LQc village had already occurred previously. Many 
D~ LQc villagers had been involved with their counterparts in another 
village and a number of researchers and authorities over the question of the 
Ly dynasty's homeland, especially the birthplace of Ly Cong Udn - the first 
king who had established the dynasty of the Ly and the Capital ofHa NQi in 
the early 11th century. In Vietnamese scholarship, the question of the Ly's 
homeland in general, and the birthplace of Ly Cong Udn in particular, 
remains controversial, despite the fact that the B~c Ninh Chamber of 
Culture and Sport has endorsed the view that D~i Hung14 is the sole home 
village of king Ly Cong Udn. Consequently, the better off D~i Hung 
villagers tried to convince the public of this recognition, and illegally copied 
the image of the worshipping items worshipped in D~i LQc communal house 
to decorate D~i Hung's Ly- kings- worshipping- shrine. 
However, many villagers in four other villages, including D~i LQc, did 
not accept such recognition, as they believe that the homeland of king Ly 
Cong Udn was located in a larger region that today might include five 
villages of three communes in Tir Son district. The D~i LQc villagers 
argued that of these five villages, D~i LQc was the home village of king Ly 
Cong Udn's mother, the place of his birth, and the place of the Ly royal 
family's forbidden cemetery. D~i Hung and other villages were the home of 
king Ly Cong Udn's father and the places where he grew up as well as 
where he received his Buddhist education. With such a view, many D~i LQc 
people, particularly the elderly, demanded the scientists and authorities 
review the former recognition of the issue, not only for their village identity 
but also because of the truth of history. 
In fact, the struggle over the home land of the Ly was not taken 
seriously and openly until the year 2000 when the Ha NQi capital authorities 
14 Pseudonym. 
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planned, in collaboration with researchers, to hold a grand ceremony 
celebrating the 990th anniversary of the birth of Thang Long - Bong Do -
Ha N{)i, followed by a larger celebration for his lOOOth year in 2010. In the 
former impressive ceremony in 2000, over one hundred f>~i Hung villagers 
were invited to attend the ceremony while no one in f>~i L{)c or the other 
three villages received an invitation. A number of elderly of both genders in 
f>~i L<)c [gia liio hai giai lang Dqi L(Jc] started to demand that the 
organizers invite them to attend the ceremony. They saw their presence 
there as not just for fun or the fame of some villagers but more importantly, 
for the village identity, since it would indicate some official recognition by 
the public and the state of f>~i L<)c village as part of the Ly dynasty' 
homeland. 
Such a struggle would not have strongly affected f>~i L<)c village 
cadres or some commune cadres who lived in f>~i L<)c if the workers and 
villagers had not discovered an old grave on 13th April 2001 during the 
construction of the national highway number 1 A that runs through the rice 
fields where the above mentioned forbidden cemetery and the shrine of king 
Ly Cong Ufut's mother are supposed to be located. Many f>~i L<)c villagers 
immediately argued that this precious evidence must be the grave of kingLy 
Cong Ufut's mother, or at least an old grave of someone who belonged to 
the Ly dynasty. Therefore, they asked the construction to be delayed, and 
appealed to the scientists and officials in the province as well as Ha N{)i to 
research the grave. The grave shortly became a "subject of current affairs" 
[vdn at thai Slf] as the press, television, researchers, officials, and local 
people began to talk about it. One archaeologist, who was then ordered 
officially to be the leader of a team of scientists to excavate the grave, wrote 
to a national newspaper: 
Prof.[ ... ], Associate Prof. [ ... ],Dr.[ ... ], Dr. [ ... ]and us came to 
the site to examine it and all of us concluded that this is an 
architecturally designed relic of the Ly dynasty [di tich kiin true 
tho'i Ly] .... We strongly recommend the Project Management 
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Board ... together with the local and central authorities soon find 
a solution to protect and research this exceptionally important 
relic. 15 
While talking with the elderly and other people in D~i L(>c village, the 
archaeologist also stated, as some villagers later told me, "this is a really 
rare and valuable relic constructed by the Ly, and these lines of bricks alone 
are enough to be recognized as a national historical site." D~i L(>c villagers 
took such evidence seriously, with lots of hope for their fight for the village 
identity. 
Shortly afterwards, in pursuance of an order of the Minister for 
Culture, Information, and Sports, an official research team of archeologists 
(from the Institution of Archeology) and officials (from B~c Ninh Chamber 
of Culture, Information and Sport, and from B~c Ninh Museum) was set up 
to excavate the grave. On 16th May 2001, the research team- who had all 
previously visited the site, officially excavated the site. However, the team 
headed by the archaeologist mentioned above turned 180 degrees to state 
that the grave dated from [nien dqi] the 4th - 6th centuries, and was a 
Chinese grave [m9 Han], right on the first day they excavated the site. The 
local authorities were then asked to remove the grave so construction could 
proceed. 
Such a move aroused public criticism from the villagers, especially 
many elderly in D~i L(>c. Unluckily for the team, some elderly watched 
them throughout the excavation and accidentally witnessed two members of 
the team take pottery pieces from elsewhere in the field to put into the grave 
to demonstrate their conclusion before they announced it. Consequently, one 
day later, the village elderly held a meeting with over two hundred villagers, 
including the village head, to firstly oppose the conclusion of the research 
team, and secondly to nominate 25 elderly [25 c11] to represent over 300 
elderly and nearly 3000 D~i L(>c villagers to lodge petitions with the 
Government Office; the Ministry of Culture, Information, and Sports; B~c 
15 Bao Khoa h9c va Dai s6ng, thOng 4 va 512001. 
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Ninh People's Committee; the Institute of Archaeology; and the press and 
other institutions of the state to oppose the team's conclusion. 
Some local cadres, however, tried to prevent the elderly from 
petitioning and protesting against the research team, which resulted in many 
D~i L()c villagers' opposition not only to the team but also the local cadres. 
Two key commune cadres, one of whom later became head and another a 
member of the Committee for land use rights compensation and site 
clearing, co-sent an official letter [cong van] to the places the elderly had 
sent petitions to, or visited to apologize for their actions, and opposed the 
petitions which the D~i L()c elderly had lodged. The cadres claimed the 
objections were the mistaken view of a few, not the view ofthe village as a 
whole. In response to that, the D~i L()c elderly wrote more petitions, 
enclosing over 300 signatures from the elderly, and again sent them to the 
addresses mentioned above in order to demonstrate that it was the view of 
many, not a few in the village. Like the two commune cadres, D~i L()c 
cadres, especially the village head, who later became a member of the 
Committee and the head of the voting team, confiscated the petitions the 
elderly wrote and asked them to hand over the list of 300 elderly' 
signatures. On 9th July 2001, a press conference was organized to officially 
announce the research conclusion, and finally the local cadres were ordered 
to remove the grave. The grave was then removed. 
The conclusion of the research team was, in fact, opposed by other 
researchers, who argued that it was not a Chinese grave but a Vietnamese 
one, and it must be the grave of someone who belonged to the Ly dynasty .16 
D~i L()c villagers took this opposition seriously and used it to argue against 
the research team's conclusion. Some villagers even suspected that the 
research team was bribed by the wealthier D~i Hung villagers, or were more 
concerned about the construction of the national highway than the truth of 
history. They also thought it very odd that while some 'strange' researchers 
tried to 'help' D~i L()c by arguing against the team and urged a review of 
the previous recognition ofthe homeland of the Ly, their own village cadres 
16 Bao Van hOa, thang 7/2001. 
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and the commune cadres who lived in their village did not care about the 
village identity. Instead, they just cared about their position, private benefit, 
and were afraid of the higher officials; therefore they prevented D1;1i L()c 
villagers from undertaking their 'rightful' struggle. This conduct of the 
village and commune cadres really made many villagers hate them. In a 
village meeting later, some elderly scolded the village head as "scooping 
water onto his face" [ cac C¥ m&ng nhu tat nuac vao mt;lt], one elderly 
villager later told me. 17 
Beside this instance, a number of villagers also suspected that some 
key village and commune cadres had been involved in corruption. They 
alleged some village cadres "lent communal land" [gUi rur)ng cong] to some 
families to share the compensation money for the village communal land 
use rights. For example, one villager said: "We do not receive compensation 
money for various pieces of communal land and unused-land located 
throughout village fields, like small ponds, narrow canals, edges of fields 
and so forth. The village and commune did not receive it either. So where 
the compensation money for such pieces has gone?" In addition, another 
village cadre was suspected of corruptly taking over 13 million VND during 
the village school construction. Instead of being punished, he was then 
promoted to a commune cadre. Later, one informant complained: "One 
villager stole 200,000 VND from his neighbor, he has been sentenced for 18 
months in jail. This cadre corrupted millions VND, but he has been warned 
only". 
These misbehaviors, alongside other wrongdoings of some village 
cadres and some commune ones who resided in D1;1i L()c, occurred within a 
period of five years, and finally produced negative attitudes from a number 
of villagers. Although they did not strongly protest at the time, villagers 
used such evidence to judge their cadres' moral behavior and attitudes 
towards their fellow villagers. When similar actions and behaviors occurred 
again in the program of land use rights compensation and site clearing, the 
17 Scolding some one as "scooping water onto his or her face" is a Vietnamese symbolic 
expression, or a metaphor, indicating that the scolder is really angry with and has little 
respect for the subject he or she is scolding. 
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former evidence and attitudes of the villagers towards this group of cadres 
were a very potential force contributing to the generation of public 
resistance. The land use rights selling villagers' resistance therefore resulted 
from more than a struggle for economic interest, but also involved moral 
values. The public resistance of the land-selling villagers originated from 
their claims for economic rights but was consolidated by their objections 
towards some local cadres' violations of moral behaviour. Many protesting 
villagers saw their village cadres and the commune cadres living with them 
in the village as cumulatively corrupt, unwilling to help the villagers, and 
also daring to mistreat a number of villagers in different ways. 
Other Views 
Besides the above views, other parties involved in the program of land 
use rights compensation and site clearing articulated their rationale against, 
or at least not in support of, the protesting villagers. These other views 
included those of a few land selling and non-selling villagers, of the 
Committee, of some local cadres in D~i LQc neighbourhood, of a journalist, 
and of the higher authorities. 
While most the land-selling villagers fought against the Committee 
and its land use rights compensation and site clearing program, a few land 
selling villagers agreed with the Committee, and consequently they did not 
participate in the resistance. But as I understood it, only a few said that the 
compensation price was reasonable, and that they did not want a labour use 
contract from the entrepreneurs. After the voting affair, two elderly land 
selling villagers even mobilized some land selling villagers not to resist 
because they said such compensation policy was already reasonable, and 
anyway the villagers could not resist the state. 18 Meanwhile, a couple of 
non-selling villagers also complained that the public actions of the 
protesting villagers, especially their use of school children, would damage 
18 In response to this move, some protesting villagers circulated a poem in the village, 
criticized the two elderly, and derisorily named one of them " Mr. Great Fellow Bottom" 
[C!lM6ng]. 
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the image of the village. However, these views were not strongly 
articulated, and in fact I rarely heard them. 
Among the strongest opponents of the protesting villagers was the 
Committee. From the beginning, the Committee made clear that the district 
authorities' plan to build up an industrial zone had been approved by the 
provincial authorities, which also decided the compensation price of land 
use rights. It also noted that the eight entrepreneurs decided the monetary 
subsidy and promised to take part of their labour force from the land-selling 
households. The job for the Committee, as shown in its name, was to 
implement the compensation for land use rights of the villagers and then 
clear the site for the eight entrepreneurs to use. This process was carried out 
in accordance with state policies. Therefore, the land selling villagers' 
claims for a higher price and a labour employment contract were not in 
accordance with state policy, and impossible to satisfY. In accordance with 
such a view, the Committee's response was to persuade the land-selling 
villagers to support the industrialization and modernization program of the 
home district. Some members of the Committee several times praised the 
land selling villagers for their rich heroic tradition in the war against the 
Americans and in the construction and development of cooperatives in the 
past. The Head of the Committee also appealed to the land sellers to 
sacrifice one more time for the locality and the district by supporting the 
industrial zone building. 
As resistance of the land selling villagers increased strongly, the 
village cadres of the Committee stepped back a bit by allocating to the land 
use rights selling villagers a part of the monetary subsidy that the eight 
entrepreneurs granted the village, i.e. 3,000 of the 10,000 VND per square 
metre of land acquired. However, the land-selling villagers struggled for 
more than that, because such an additional amount of money plus the 
compensation price did not yet represent a reasonable price for land use 
rights compensation, and they had not yet received a contract of labour use. 
In the Committee's view, however, no more concessions could be made, 
and it pointed out that the eight entrepreneurs were no longer offering the 
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commune a subsidy of 10,000 VND per square metre of land. In addition, 
the subsidy money for job retraining for land selling villagers had already 
been included in the compensation price of 16,164,000 VND per sao. 
Some members of the Committee finally accused the land selling 
villagers of having spent too much money on their new house building and 
upgrading, on motorbike purchases, and gambling. Now, seeing the small 
amount of money they had left, they were asking for more or for an 
enjoyment of the subsidy. Also, they accused the land-selling villagers of 
having little understanding of the state policy, and blamed them for 
demanding too much. Several members of the Committee even labelled 
some land selling villagers as "public-unrest provokers," "bad elements," 
"extremists," and explained the protest movement as mainly aroused by 
these elements. Some key village and commune cadres of the Committee 
also argued that the land was not owned by the land-selling villagers, thus it 
was not their land. All the land selling villagers had was the use rights of the 
agricultural land, which the state had allocated to them [giao ], but now was 
taking back [thu h6i] for the construction of the district industrial zone. 
In addition, some local cadres of a neighouring commune who I talked 
to said that if the Committee and higher authorities did not handle well the 
program of land use rights compensation and site clearing in D~i L9c on this 
occasion, next time the villagers [dan] here and elsewhere would demand 
more money and rights, and consequently the state would lose their rights 
and power in decision-making and management of land, especially of land 
use rights compensation. Finally, of course, the state would encounter lots 
of difficulties in seizing land use rights for industrial zones and other 
purposes as well. 
In support of the Committee, a journalist wrote two consecutive 
articles in the newspaper Sue khoe & Dai s6ng [The Health & Life] in Ha 
N9i to explain the reasons for the election affair in D~i L<)c. He criticized 
the protesting villagers in D~i L9c as a whole, and accused them of being 
the main cause of the trouble. He pointed out that the land sellers there had 
used the National Assembly Election as a means to demand more economic 
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rights in their land use rights compensation and to "beat" [ ilanh] some local 
cadres. He also rightly accused some protesting villagers of attacking 
members of the Committee and higher officials when they came to resolve 
the voting affair. He called a number of the protesting villagers 
"opportunists and extremists," and negatively compared D~i L(}c village 
with Umg Nho, a resistant village depicted in a movie "Chuy?n limg Nho" 
screened on national television in 1998.19 Finally, he concluded that the 
voting affair in D~i L(}c mainly resulted from the fact that a number of 
opportunists and ultra-extremists took advantage of too much democracy 
[dan chit qua tr6n] to provoke public unrest on Election Day.20 
Many villagers in D~i L(}c became angry about those articles and 
immediately opposed the journalist's view. They said that they supported 
the state policies from beginning to end, they supported modernization and 
industrialization, and they supported this industrial zone building. What they 
were doing was not fighting against the state, but simply struggling for their 
economic rights and against "the problem of cadres." The publication of 
such articles moreover went against their village's heroic tradition in the 
American war and collectivization. Therefore, over 40 villagers hired a bus 
to go to the headquarters of this newspaper to protest against the publication 
of incorrect information, and to require a review of the articles' content. 
They pointed out that the election problems had been recognised by the 
National Voting Council, and they counter-accused this newspaper of 
publishing incorrect information, which could stir up further conflict in their 
locality, and damage the identity oftheir village. Actually, a number ofD~i 
L(}c villagers often recalled that the village history was one part of the Ly's 
19 The movie entitled Chuy~n lang Nh6 [The Story ofNho Village] narrated the villagers' 
resistance against the local authorities in L~c Nhu~ village, Kim Bang district, Ha Nam 
province. Villagers there followed a talented-but-bad retired university lecturer, educated in 
the Former Soviet Union, to struggle for the return of 70 mdu of agricultural land that the 
commune authorities had taken from his villlage for another to use. Villagers then fenced 
the village, set up a rapid resistant unit named 44 7 to counter-attack the local cadres and the 
police while they tried to capture the resistant leader and his followers. Finally, with 
explanation and persuasion, local cadres and the police successfully persuaded the villagers 
not to wrongly resist state policies, and later detained the leader and sentenced him to death 
(Bao An ninh thi gi&i cu6i thcing 2002. "Chuy~n lang Nho va m¢t tri th(rc tr6 thanh ke gi~t 
nguoi." sf> 11, thang 7). 
20 Bao SUe: khOe & Dm s6ng, thcing 5, 61 2002. 
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and also avoid false rumours as well as to facilitate a settlement of this hot 
problem in the locality.24 
Beyond the Local Conflict 
Such conflicts over land use rights compensation and site clearing 
have not only happened in D~i L()c village but also in a number of places 
throughout the country in the past years. It is not only a conflict between 
land selling villagers and the Committee· overseeing the land use rights 
compensation and site clearance, but is also rooted in the contradictory 
views of the holders of land use rights and the state over the question of 
decision-making, distribution, and holding of rights over agricultural land. 
The public resistance of land selling villagers in :E>~i L()c is therefore not an 
isolated case, and as a result, the resistance of land selling villagers, which 
in many cases took the form of activities supported by some non-selling 
villagers and other institutions of the state, has finally affected the state's 
policy making in regards to agricultural land and land compensation. 
Taking D~ L()c as a case study, if one leaves aside the moral problems 
and wrongdoings of the local cadres, the Committee cited the state land 
tenure policy as the basis for the land use rights compensation and site 
clearing program. Thus, the conflict over land use rights compensation was 
a contest between a number of villagers who hold land use rights and the 
state, who holds ownership rights and management rights to land, over the 
question of how and. in what ways land use rights should compensated, who 
can decide the value of land use rights, and what is a reasonable price of 
compensation? 
As I argue, in the broadest sense, the villagers also articulated their 
views on how the land rights should be distributed, managed, held, used, 
and compensated, and for whose benefit, and what the role of the state 
should be in such matters. Usually, such views are implicit, or not spoken 
out clearly to an observer. However, in a number of circumstances, they do 
24 Brio Sue khoe & Dm s6ng, thring 612002. 
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owners of the land had the right to determine the mode of compensation and 
the value of the land they owned in disposal. 
The process of decollectivization significantly changed the land tenure 
arrangements in Vietnam. In the early days of decollectivization, the 1980 
Constitution stated that all types of land in Vietnam belong to the entire 
Vietnamese people, who are represented by the Vietnamese Socialist State, 
and are managed by the state. This viewpoint was then endorsed by the 
Land Laws of 1988, and subsequent amendments. In the state legislation, 
we see three types of rights to land: ownership rights, management rights, 
and use rights, held by various holders. In the view of the state, ownership 
rights and management rights in land are the key, as they determine who 
holds the use rights. Consequently, there has been a change in the state 
decision-making and policy on land compensation. Decree number 22 of the 
Government, issued in I 998, provides a legal framework for land use rights 
compensation in Vietnam. According to this Decree, based on the ·price 
framework of the government [khung gia cua Chinh phu], provincial 
authorities decide the price for land use rights compensation. This means 
that the compensation price of land use rights is decided by the state, which 
holds ownership rights and management rights, not by villagers - the 
holders of use rights, and the compensation price is constrained by 
administrative territories. 
Such shifts in land ownership and decision-making over land 
appropriation as well as determination of land values strengthen the state's 
position in control and management of the land. Therefore, the rights to 
determine the mode and price of land compensation has moved out of the 
villagers' hands because the land is no longer theirs, but the entire people's. 
What the villagers can have now is land use rights, which the state allocates 
to them for a given period of time. But once the state can allocate [giao] 
such land use rights, it can seize them back too [thu h6i]. In addition, in any 
seizure of the land, the state does not compensate for the land itself but only 
the land use rights together with produce and other kinds of property, if any, 
that the villagers have constructed on the land. 
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field work, numerous similar cases of conflict over land use rights 
compensation happened in different places in Ha NQi, Ha Tay, Vinh PMc, 
PM ThQ, and other provinces in the central and southern parts as the holders 
of land use rights in these localities experienced similar problems to the D~i 
LQc villagers. Finally, many of them also publicly resisted the state policy 
on land use rights compensation. Such public resistance of a number of 
villagers, from time to time, was made public by the press and television. 
For example, a program of current affairs [chuang trznh thai Slf] on channel 
1 of Vietnam National Television (VTV1) screened a live one hour long 
program, entitled "Land [use rights] compensation and site clearing," on the 
afternoon of 27th October 2002. In this program, four speakers, including 
cadastral officials and researchers, debated hotly various issues, including 
land use rights compensation price and subsidy money, when the state 
seizes land use rights in Vietnam. On 13th November 2002, this channel 
screened another economic program entitled "On the situation of the present 
site clearing" which discussed the difficulties in land use rights 
compensation and site clearing, and indicated that these difficulties have 
delayed a number of investment projects of domestic and overseas 
entrepreneurs. In addition, it also reported many cases of public resistance 
involving a number of land use rights selling villagers. 
The problem of land use rights compensation and the resulting public 
resistance was also documented in various newspapers, which have become 
one source of data for this Chapter. One of the recent conflicts occurred in a 
suburb village of Ha NQi, where a project appropriated 36.86 hectares of 
land of a number of villagers to build a new residential area. As part of their 
resistance, the protesting villagers captured five staff members ofthe Project 
Management Board, including the Manager of the Board, beat and 
imprisoned them in the village communal house for many hours. The 
district officials and the police tried to interfere but could not prevent these 
villagers' protests. The villagers even blocked the village entranceways and 
beat drums to encourage more villagers to participate in the resistance when 
some commune cadres approach them for settlement. Only when the 
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highest officials of the corporation which had taken their land use rights 
came for discussion, did they release the captives.27 Another example is An 
Khanh, where the public resistance of a number of land use rights selling 
villagers lasted for over two years, with the result that some entrepreneurs 
could not construct their factories.28 
Researchers and the state officials at the central level have also 
become involved with questions of a reasonable price of land use rights 
compensation, and who should decide on this price. Although Vietnam is 
committed to a market economy, the value of land use rights remains 
controversial because of the different views of the various parties involved. 
Within the state arena, one view recognizes that the land use rights price 
that the state has set is too low and is not close to the real market value (Vu 
Van Long 2002: 11; Nguyen Thi Phuong 2002). Another agrees with this 
view, but oddly argues that the prices of land use rights in the current 
market are unreal [gia ao], because they are too high. This means there must 
be a real price [gia tht;it] of land use rights, which lies between the state 
price and the market one. 29 Regarding the second question of who can 
determine the level of compensation for land use rights, again, there are two 
main views. One view recommends maintaining the state's current policies. 
It argues that though land tenure policies of the state might change, the land 
still belongs to the entire people, who are represented by the state, and is 
also managed by the state, therefore the state should decide the price of land 
use rights compensation. In contrast, the second view suggests that the state 
should take note of what the land selling villagers in D~i Ll)c and elsewhere 
have argued, and that there are other factors which the state needs to 
consider in determining a reasonable price of land use rights compensation. 
This view even proposes that the best way would be for the state and the 
holders of land use rights to come to an agreement. In addition, this view 
27 Bao Nhtin diin 2003. "V€ V\1 XO xat a xli My Dinh." Ngay 03/04/2003, 5:28PM, at 
http://www.nhandan.org.vn. 
28 Baa Doi Doim kit 2003. "Khi doanh nghi~p keu ciru! Bai I: "Chien s1,t" ddt dai t~i cvm 
cong nghi~p An Khanh." s6 58, ngay 2217/2003. 
29 Vnexpress.net. "Sa hitu toan diin v€ ddt dai chi Ia hu quy€n." Ngay 27/10/2003; and "D\l 
thao Lu~t Ddt dai chua thao giJ dugc "gia ddt gia t~o"." Ngay 3/6/2003. 
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advocates two types of land use rights compensation. If the use rights are 
taken for public and non-economic purposes, the compensation price of land 
use rights should be decided by the state, otherwise the issue should be 
discussed by the land use rights takers and land use rights givers (Le Van Tu 
1997; Ly Hoang Tan 2002). 
Finally, the problem of land use rights compensation and the resulting 
public resistance reached the top level of the state leadership. In Party 
Plenum number 7 [H9i nghi ldn thu bay] in 2003, the Central Party 
Committee issued a Resolution which first pointed out that land petitions 
had become a serious issue and were very common in the country. 
Secondly, it indicated that it was very difficult for the state to seize land use 
rights for industrial aims (Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang 2003). A state-
funded study on rural security further argued that the public resistance of a 
number of land use rights holders created tensions between land use rights 
givers and land use rights takers, and had become one of several key 
dynamics for local conflicts in the countryside (Vu Quan ly Khoa hoc va 
Cong nghe 2000). As a result, the state policy on land use rights 
compensation and Land Law on the whole needed to be revised. In 2003, for 
the first time in Vietnamese history, a Land Law amendment was circulated 
to the people for comments before its official authorization by the National 
Assembly. On I Oth December 2003, the latest version of the revised Land 
Law was passed, to be effective from 1 July 2004. In this amendment, the 
question of compensation for, and the compensation price of, land use rights 
. reflects many of the concerns and debates raised by the E>~i L<}c land selling 
villagers. Complaints about the unreasonable policy of the state as regards 
land use rights compensation and site clearing for industrial zone building, 
and the resulting public resistance is thus one of several forces that have 
driven the state to change its land use rights compensation policies and to 
amend the state land tenure regime on the whole. 
IV. Conclusion 
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The conflict between the land use rights selling villagers and the 
Committee over the program of land use rights compensation and site 
clearing for the industrial zone in E>~i L()c lasted for nearly one year. Unlike 
Xiaolin Guo's simple conclusion that in his case study of a township in 
northeast Yunnan - China economic benefits were the main focus in the 
conflict between the land selling villagers and local cadres (Guo 2001 ), the 
land use rights compensation conflict in E>~i L()c was complexly shaped by 
economic, cultural, historical, social and political aspects, and involved 
numerous parties at both the local level and higher levels of the state. 
Many land selling villagers in E>~i L()c shared some common views on 
the decision-making, distribution, and holding of land rights, especially land 
use rights. They did not struggle to gain what are defined as ownership 
rights [quyJn sa hitu] and management rights [quyJn quim ly] in the state 
legislation. Instead, they accepted and often talked about their holdings of 
land use rights [ quyJn sit d~ng]. In their views, however, the holdings of use 
rights to agricultural land are equivalent to a practical level of land 
ownership (in contrast to ideological ownership). More importantly, the 
values and meanings of land use rights have increased to the villagers in the 
Red River delta after decollectivization. As a result, many villagers 
struggled to have a say over essential questions of how and in what ways 
their land use rights should be compensated, what formulates a reasonable 
price of compensation, the rights of the holders of land use rights and of the 
state, and what the role of the state in land use rights taking should be. The 
land selling villagers' views were articulated strongly and clearly, and they 
conflicted with the views of the state in many perspectives. The land use 
rights selling villagers' views were very simple, practical, and related 
closely to their daily lives. Therefore, these views held them together as 
participants in a struggle for what they think they deserved. 
The public resistance of the land-selling villagers first arose from their 
claims for more economic rights in land use rights appropriation. As the 
conflict moved on, however, it shifted beyond the economic dimension to 
involve moral issues. Many protesting villagers saw the role and moral 
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Chapter Four: The Politics of Communal Land: The 
Contending Views and Conflicts 
I. Introduction 
As one of three villages that make up a commune, 1 Phil Duong village 
is located about one kilometre from D~;ti L()c village, three kilometres from 
Tir Son di~trict capital, and 20 kilometres from Ha N()i downtown. 
According to an investigation by the Commune People's Committee, in 
October 2001 the village contained 2,343 inhabitants, who lived in 655 
households, which comprised: 551 agricultural households [M nang 
nghi¢p], eight small handicraft and industrial households [M cong nghi¢p va 
tidu thu cong nghi¢p], three builder-households [M xay dlf11g], six trading 
households [M thu(JYlg nghi¢p], 18 services-housholds [h9 hor;zt d(jng djch 
v11], and 69 others [M khcic]. 
Despite an increased level of economic diversification since 
decollectivization, agricultural production remained essential for many Phil 
Duong villagers. In such a context, agricultural land, which per capita was 
584 square metres (in 1993), still plays a key role in the life ofthe majority 
of Phil Duong villagers. The main crops cultivated in the village are wet-
rice and some subsidiary vegetables like potatoes, sweet potatoes, peanuts, 
cabbages, onions, and garlic. In contrast to D~;ti L()c, many Phil Duang 
villagers have paid much less attention to intensively farming their 
agricultural land in the winter season, although their agricultural land can 
grow three crops a year: two wet-rice crops and one subsidiary crop in 
winter. Instead, many villagers focus on a variety of non-agricultural work 
for cash, like sewing, construction, petty trade, and wage labour, which 
earns them a higher amount of income than the winter crop would. 
1 As previously noted, for confidential reasons the name of this commune is not used. The 
term "commune cadres" refers to the cadres of the commune to which Phil Duang 
administratively belongs. Also, the real names of the studied villages have been replaced 
with pseudonyms. Accordingly, all documents and newspapers' articles that show 
confidential information on these studied villages and communes are not fully displayed. 
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Alongside the farming work, animal husbandry is another important part of 
many villagers' economy. In 2001, Phil Duang villagers as a whole raised 
five buffaloes, 64 cows, 932 pigs, 5,569 chickens, and 2,968 geese and 
ducks. While agricultural farming brings many villagers their main 
livelihood, non-agricultural work and animal husbandry give them a major 
source of cash and savings. 
Since an electrical accident on the 3rd June 1998 stole the life of one 
female villager, many PM Duang villagers have been involved in public 
resistance against a number of key commune cadres, initially because of 
these commune cadres' immoral and unjust treatment of the victim's corpse 
and her family. However, the protesting villagers' target soon shifted to 
claims regarding village communal land use rights and enjoyment of 
communal land output, as well as the problem of commune cadre curruption 
and misbehavior. 
Under the great pressure of such public resistance, which occurred in 
the form of petitions, acts of denunciation in numerous offices of the state, 
circulation of leaflets, and delay of payment of agricultural land taxes as 
well as other fees in the village, the district authorities had to send two 
inspection teams to examine the issues raised collectively by PM Duang 
villagers. The conclusions of these district inspectors were, however, not 
accepted by the protesting villagers, because as they insisted, these 
inspectors were protecting commune cadres. Therefore, they bypassed the 
district authorities and went to the provincial authorities and even some 
central agencies in Hanoi to resolve their claims, and to denounce and 
petition the wrongdoings of commune cadres. As a result, in August 1999, 
Bile Ninh Provincial People's Committee had to send a multi-disciplinary 
team of inspectors [Doan Thanh tra lien nganh] to investigate this 
complicated situation in Phil Duang village. This inspection team finally 
concluded that the collectivity of commune cadres [tt;ip tM can b9 xa], who 
Phil Duang protesting villagers had denounced and petitioned, had 
mismanaged and misused the communal land and its communal land output, 
and had seriously committed corruption in different forms. 
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So what reasons caused the public resistance of many PM Duang 
villagers, and why? As I have just outlined, the protesting villagers targeted 
three key issues: their claims to holding of, and decision-making over, their 
village communal land use rights, enjoyment of the village communal land 
output, and commune cadre corruption and misbehaviour. These three key 
issues are critically explored and analysed in this Chapter and Chapter Five. 
While Chapter Five is devoted to a scrutiny of the issue of commune cadre 
corruption and misbehaviour, this current Chapter will examine PM Duang 
villagers' claims to their village communal land. 
The main aim of this Chapter is, therefore, to understand why and in 
what ways the protesting villagers claimed their village communal land. 
What rationale did they present to claim the land and its output? How and 
why did the rationale of Phil Duang villagers contradict the views of the 
commune cadres and the state land tenure regime on the whole? Put it 
another way, the Chapter explores the contending views of different parties 
over the question of how communal land use rights in the village should be 
held, managed, used, by whom and for whose benefit, and who should 
decide these questions? Throughout this Chapter, I argue that many Phil 
Duang villagers perceived, and in fact claimed, that the village institution 
should be the holder of the village communal land use rights and therefore 
have the key rights to decide the control, use, and enjoyment of communal 
land output. Such a rationale helped to gather many villagers in a collective 
action to claim the village communal land. Such a rationale, however, 
contradicts the state land tenure regime and the conduct of such a regime in 
the locality, and therefore created conflict. I also argue that in dealing with 
the outside world, many villagers gathered in collective action and contested 
for the village's communal land use rights and enjoyment of communal land 
output. In dealing within their own world, i.e. their own village community, 
however, communal land use rights became a controversial resource about 
which various groups of villagers articulated different attitudes. 
In order to answer the above questions, first, I examine the contending 
views over communal land among the different parties involved in Phil 
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Duong village. Then I present two ethnographic case studies: one 
concerning the illegal encroachment on communal land, and another 
showing the villagers' claims to the village communal land. It is important 
to note that the claims to village communal land in PM Duong occurred 
alongside the villagers' resistance against the corruption and misbehaviour 
of the commune cadres, and the latter is to be examined in-depth in the next 
Chapter. 
II. Rebirth of Communal Land 
Prior to the 1950s land reform, agricultural communal land [ cong 
aiJn] and residential communal land [cong thd], in various forms, had 
existed for a long time. The former had long been a vital component of the 
political and socio-economic life in many villages in the central and 
northern regions (Tran Tu 1984). The literature on village agricultural 
communal land has discussed several main issues: how this land was held, 
used, by whom, and why conflicts over it occurred in the villages (Vu Huy 
Phuc 1979; Truong Huu Quynh 1983; Ngo Vinh Long 1990, 1991; Truong 
Huu Quynh va Do Bang 1997). In brief, first, under the kings' ideological 
ownership of all kinds of land in Vietnam, as previously analysized, there 
had been three systems of practical ownership: state ownership, communal 
ownership, and private ownership. As the practical owners of agricultural 
communal land, the villages had considerable autonomy to decide how and 
in what ways this land should be distributed and used. In many cases, the 
village communal land was divided into numerous portions (communal land 
for studies, communal land for mandarins' salaries for example), however, 
the majority of the village communal land was periodically allocated to 
male adults [ainh] in the village to use, who in return had to pay head tax 
[thui than] to the state. 2 In most cases, allocation of the village communal 
land was equal; but the rationale of equality critically emphasized the social 
status of the communal land receivers in their village society. As a result, 
2 In some cases, those who were not ilinh, such as widows and orphans, also received 
communal land shares. 
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inequality appeared because some adult males who had higher social status 
often received better shares [khdu phdn] of communal land than others, like 
larger in area, higher in quality, or better in location. 
Secondly, the area of the village communal land varied from village to 
village, and region to region. In the area I did field research for this study, 
for example, in LQc - the neighbouring village of Phil Duong, the 1805 
village agricultural land book [dia hfl] reveals that the area of both 
communal water and farmland accounted for only five per cent of the total 
area of the village agricultural land, which in 1805 was 305 mdu, five sao, 
and 5 thu6'c. However, in D~i L()c, the 1805 village agricultural land book 
shows the village communal land accounted for a much larger percentage: 
53 per cent, i.e. 183 mdu one sao, while private farmland accounted for 47 
per cent, i.e. 168 mdu 8 sao (the total area of the village farmland in 1805 
was 348 mdu, one sao, and 13 thu6'c, not including water land). At the 
national level, agricultural communal land varied greatly from the north to 
the south. In the colonial period, one study notes that agricultural communal 
land and residential communal land areas accounted for 21 per cent in the 
northern region [Bdc B9], 25 per cent in the central region [Trung B9], and 
only three per cent in the southern region [Nam B9] (Tran Phuong 1968: 
29).3 
Thirdly, from time to time, the village communal land was abused by 
local elites in various ways, and such abuse in many cases resulted in 
resistance of the villagers. In his study, Ngo Vinh Long points out that the 
appropriation of communal land by local elites became extremely serious 
during the colonial time, which led to a great decrease of communal land 
area in many villages, and finally resulted in resistance of the villagers in 
the northern and central regions (Ngo Vinh Long 1990). 
After the 1950s land reform, the village agricultural communal land 
ceased to exist above the 17th parallel (the northern half of the country), 
which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam controlled. During the period of 
agricultural collectivization, from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, except 
3 The majority of the percentage was agricultural communal land because residential 
communal land in most cases accounted for a small figure. 
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for the plots of five per cent of agricultural land for family economy to 
which cooperative members held the use rights, most ofthe agricultural land 
in the Red River delta was gradually collectivized into agricultural 
cooperatives for management and collective farming. In several decades of 
collectivization, although agricultural land was farmed collectively, it was 
not the village communal land as it used to be. Instead, it was the 
agricultural land of cooperatives to which most villagers held membership, 
or put another way, the practical system of cooperative ownership of 
agricultural land. 
From the early 1980s, a process of de facto agricultural 
decollectivization started, and proceeded to the early 1990s. This process of 
decollectivization led to a rebirth of agricultural communal land in the 
countryside. So how did the rebirth of communal land come about? As 
previously noted in Chapter Two, in the 1988 distribution "the second-round 
agricultural land" and water land, which included streams, ponds, and lakes, 
in many villages were not distributed to villagers for use. Therefore, the 
villagers were not the holders of these land use rights, but the villages or 
cooperatives, who then allocated or auctioned these to good tillers, or those 
who could farm the land best, or needed it most for cash crops.4 In the 
redistribution of land use rights around 1993, "the second-round agricultural 
land" was changed to ddt c6ng ich [agricultural land for collective interest], 
while the water land continued to be under the control of the communities. 
These two types of land, therefore, are called communal land in this study. 
In other words, the term communal land refers to the area of agricultural 
land, the use rights to which were not allotted to individual villagers for use, 
but kept for collective aims: "the second-round agricultural land" in 1988 -
1992, "agricultural land for collective interest" from 1992-1993, and water 
land. This type of agricultural communal land is not identified with 
agricultural collectivization, instead it appears to traditional form of the 
village agricultural communal land. 
4 As previously noted in Chapter Two, in practice, in various cases this type of land use 
rights was equally distributed among agricultural persons in their communities. 
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As in history, the area of communal land, especially the "agricultural 
land for collective interest," varies from region to region, province to 
province, district to district, commune to commune, and even village to 
village. In theory, the 1993 Land Law and Decree number 64 of the 
government authorized the provincial authorities to reserve five per cent, at 
maximum, of the total area of agricultural land in each locality as &it cong 
ich. In practice, however, some provinces reserved more than five per cent, 
some kept less than five per cent, and others held none. According to an 
investigation conducted after the 1997 social unrest in Thai Binh province, 
the nationwide percentage of communal agricultural land in 1997 accounted 
for 3.80 percent. However, this figure differs considerably between regions, 
for example, in the Red River delta: nearly ten per cent, in the centre: about 
nine per cent, and in the south: less than one per cent. Within the Red River 
delta, the percentage of communal agricultural land also differs from 
province to province, such as in Ha N()i: 2.86 per cent, in Thai Binh: 11.77 
per cent, in BAc Ninh: 8.31 per cent (Do Hoai Nam, Le Cao Dam 2001).5 
Looking at Ha BAc province alone, in 1993, "the second-round agricultural 
land" occupied 8.4 per cent of total agricultural land area, and also from 
1993 this area of farmland was altered to "agricultural land for collective 
interest" (BCD cap GCN va LSBT 1993: 4 ). In 1997, after the re-division of 
Ha BAc into two smaller provinces: BAc Ninh and BAc Giang, "agricultural 
land for collective interest" in BAc Ninh province accounted for 10.7 per 
cent, equal to 5,672.69 hectares (Doan Cong tac tinh Bac Ninh 1997: 2). In 
Tien Son district (a part of,BAc Ninh), the area of &it cong ich accounted for 
a rather higher figure: 12.6 per cent (Doan Cong tac tinh Bac Ninh 1997: 3). 
Like many other villages, Phil Duong village also reserved an area of 
agricultural land as communal land. Looking back at the distribution and 
redistribution of agricultural land use rights in the village, we can see more 
clearly how this communal land appeared. In the 1988 distribution, ten per 
cent of the village agricultural land was equally allocated to every 
5 A 1997 report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development noted 12.6 per cent, 
as I will show later. 
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agricultural villager as land for family economy. 6 Accordingly, each villager 
received three thuac of this type of agricultural land, that was first rank in 
quality [adt hqng nhdt] and located close to the village residential areas. 
The rest, i.e. 90 per cent, was divided into two portions, 7.3 per cent was 
reserved as "the second-round agricultural land," and the rest was equally 
distributed between agricultural villagers on the principle of persons, i.e. 
ajnh sudt, and ages, i.e. according to lao a(mg. As one of the villages which 
carried out the pilot redistribution of land use rights, redistribution in Phu 
Duong was implemented in 1992, one year before the official plan in the 
country. In the redistribution, "agricultural land for family economy" was 
not redistributed. This means that many villagers who had received this land 
in 1988 continued to hold the use rights of this land, while some new born 
children did not receive any "agricultural land for family economy." As in 
many other villages, PhU Duong "first-round agricultural land" was adjusted 
among the peasant villagers, with methods that emphasized both the quality 
and quantity of land use rights receivers. The "the second-round agricultural 
land," which accounted for 7.3 per cent of the village agricultural land, was 
transferred to the "agricultural land for collective interest." At the same 
time, the village water land continued to be unallocated, and together with 
"agricultural land for collective interest," makes up what I call "communal 
land." 
III. The Contending Views 
The rebirth of agricultural communal land posed some crucial 
questions, as previously noted, about how communal land use rights in the 
village should be held, managed, used, by whom and for whose benefit, and 
who should decide these questions? Different parties, such as villagers, 
commune cadres, and the state land tenure regime as a whole expressed 
6 From 1961 to 1988, agricultural land for family economy theoretically amounted to five 
per cent of the total agricultural land area in the village. Many villagers either called these 
plots "land for vegetable farming" [ddt rau xanh) or "the five per cent land' [ddt nam phdn 
tram]. The 1988 Land Law authorised the doubling of this area, from five to ten per cent, 
and named it "[agricultural] land for family economy." 
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contending views about these issues. In this section I will consider the 
different views of various parties, how and in what ways the villagers 
expressed their views and why and how these contradicted those of other 
parties. 
In the view ofthe state land tenure policy, it is clear who holds the use 
rights of"the second-round agricultural land" and water land under the Land 
Law and other regulations. Generally speaking, prior to the 1993 Land Law, 
these two types of agricultural land were placed under the control of either 
cooperatives or the villages. In 1993, Land Law and Decree number 64 of 
the government regulated that the holding of communal land use rights, 
especially "agricultural land for collective interest," belonged to the 
Commune People's Committee. This means that in addition to being a 
representative of the holders of ownership and management rights at the 
local level, the Commune People's Committee is also the holder of 
communal land use rights. As such, the Committee auctions or rents 
communal land use rights to users, mostly villagers, for a certain period of 
time and collects a percentage of land's output, which can be either in kind 
or cash. The output of the communal land that the Commune People's 
Committee receives should then be used for the commune's collective 
benefit. In addition, according to the state land tenure policy, some parts of 
communal land can be transferred to non-agricultural land use, like sites of 
local infrastructure and residential land, but such transfer must be approved 
by the district and provincial authorities. However, communal land should 
not be allocated to people born after the 1992-1993 land use rights 
redistribution. 
As authorized by this state legislation, over several years, the 
Commune People's Committee directly intervened in the holding and use of 
communal land use rights in Phu Ducmg village. It transferred 5,566 square 
metres to a state company based in the commune territory, and sold the use 
rights of 9,863 square metres of communal land to villagers in the commune 
for residency (in accordance with a residential development plan of the 
commune). In 1995, it also shifted the holding of communal land use rights 
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in PhU Duong (and other villages of the commune) from the village to the 
Commune People's Committee. From that time, therefore, the output of 
communal land in PhU Duong was mainly decided, and especially used, by 
the Commune People's Committee for the benefit of the whole commune, 
not just for the village where the land is located. After this year, however, 
illegal encroachment on water land in Phu Duong increased. A number of 
commune cadres corruptly benefited from communal land, in different 
ways, i.e. land selling, encroachment, compensation, transactions and 
auctions for private gain. All these occurred in a period of seven years under 
the leadership of a President of the Commune People's Committee who 
lived in PhU Duong village. Such corrupt practices and wrongdoings led to 
claims by a number of villagers about the holding of communal land use 
rights in Phu Duong and the enjoyment of communal land output. These 
villagers claimed the communal land use rights should be held by their 
village, and used mainly for their village. 
Like other types of land claims, as I previously noted in Chapter Two, 
collective claims to communal land of the village in PhU Duong were based 
on a multitude of factors. The number one factor, I think, was that many 
villagers perceived that the village institution should be the holder of use 
rights on the communal land area that was and is located in their village. In 
their own terms, a number of protesting villagers often said that communal 
land was adt cita limg [the land of the village]. Although the state law tenure 
policy has been changed to legally authorize the commune authorities to 
manage and hold communal land use rights, they maintained that this does 
not mean that these authorities can alone decide everything in regard to the 
communal land of individual villages, for example, giving the communal 
land of this village to another party to use, transferring agricultural 
communal land use rights to others, or selling communal land use rights of 
one or more villages for the benefit of the whole commune. Some villagers 
even argued that the holding of communal land use rights by the commune 
authorities, as the state laws regulated, is just theoretical, not a reality, 
because such a holding is recorded in booklets, papers, or maps only. The 
152 
real control and holding of communal land use rights belong to the village in 
which the communal land is located. 
The traditional practices also influence the villagers' views. Prior to 
the 1950s, agricultural communal land was a pronounced feature in many 
northern and central villages (Tran Tu 1984; Ngo Vinh Long 1990, 1991 ). 
More importantly, communal land was controlled and used by villagers and 
for the benefit of the village where it was located. This system of practical 
ownership was well recognized by the feudal and colonial states. When 
communal land first reappearred, these rights came back to the villagers and 
the villages as a whole. In the first few years, the villages often decided the 
use of its communal land, and used most of its output for the benefit of the 
community. However, as the state land tenure policy changed, these rights 
of the individual villages have been lost to the communes. In PM Duong, 
these rights were officially shifted to the commune in 1995, which became 
one of the reasons that created villagers' public resistance. 
Secondly, as the holder of communal land use rights in practice, Phu 
Duong villagers then insisted that these use rights must be used by them, 
mostly for their village benefit. Put another way, they argued that the village 
should have power to decide how and in what ways the auction, lease, 
transactions, or illegal encroachment, and other uses of the communal land 
use rights should be handled. In the view of some villagers, all the conduct 
of commune cadres over Phu Duong communal land, i.e. the shift of use 
rights from the village to the commune and other transactions, including 
compensation for communal land use rights, had created inequality in the 
decision-making and access to communal land as well as its output between 
different parties, especially between the village and commune and between 
PM Duang villagers and others. Since the village was no longer the holder 
of communal land use rights, it had no power to decide the use of communal 
land, and finally had no right to enjoy communal land output. As was 
expressed in a petition signed on 26th May 1998 by two leaders of the 
protesting villagers, in the current process of management, sale, and use of 
Phu Duong communal land and its output, Phu Duong villagers were 
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excluded from the decision-making [dan kh6ng dur;c ban], not notified of 
how their village communal land output had been used [ khong bao cho 
dan], and therefore were aware of nothing [dan khong dur;c biit]. Another 
elderly resident pointed out another inequality between villagers in Phil 
Duang and other villages in the commune. As he said, a large area of Phu 
Duang communal land had been sold for residential land for villagers in the 
whole commune. The money collected from this transaction was then, 
however, being used for the benefit of the commune as a whole. As a result, 
as this elder said, "this village lost a large area of [communal] land but 
received nothing for it" [lang nay mdt nhiiu ddt rna khong dur;c cai gi ca]. 
Thirdly, the odd thing that many Phu Duang villagers noticed was that 
after the commune authorities transferred the use rights on their village 
communal land to the commune, the commune cadres did not control these 
rights properly, but allowed illegal encroachment in various ways at a 
conerning level. In addition, from time to time some commune cadres 
corruptly took advantange of communal land for their own private gain, as 
my Chapter Five will further examine. 
Another essential factor relates to the moral expectations of Phil 
Duang villagers of those commune cadres who live in Phu Duang village. 
Failing to understand this might lead to an inadequate understanding of the 
rationale of the villagers' actions and behavior towards the local cadres. In 
the 1990s, several key cadres of the commune, including the President of 
the People's Committee, President of Commune Fatherland Front and 
others, were Phil Duang residents. A number of Phil Duang villagers thus 
expected that these cadres would bring benefits to the village, not take away 
the village's communal resources. They hoped, somehow, that these cadres 
would allocate a certain amount of money raised from selling land use rights 
and land use rights compensation, and help them reclaim some village 
communal land that a state company had taken, or to give the village access, 
in practice, to decision-making over the village communal land. However, 
these commune cadres behaved in ways that totally contrasted with many 
Phu Duang villagers' expectations. 
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Geographically, Phil Duong is located close to the main traffic 
systems, therefore, village land is good for non farming purposes, trading, 
travel and communication for instance. The villagers' agricultural land per 
capita is also higher than their counterparts in the two other villages. In the 
view of the commune cadres, therefore, the taking of Phil Duong 
communal land to build new residential areas of the commune is plausible. 
However, as some Phil Duong villagers said, the taking of communal land 
and using its output for the whole commune is not reasonable, since, 
together with illegal encroachment and communal land transfer to the state 
company during the past few years, it has led to a dramatic reduction in the 
village communal land area, which has resulted in a decrease in the village's 
socio-economic welfare. For example, in 1995, Phil Duong adt cong ich 
area was 10,387.2 square metres, however, it had reduced to 6,465.6 square 
metres by mid 1999; that is not to mention an area of 5,566 square metres of 
communal land the company took from the village. The village water land 
area has also declined. 
Actually, claims for village communal land use rights and enjoyment 
of their output is not simply for the village of Phil Duang as a whole, as 
stated by a number of villagers. It is also to do with the access and benefits 
of individual villagers. A number of claimants often complained that during 
1988-1995, they did not have to pay as many fees to the village as they did 
after 1995 because the communal land output was mostly used for the 
village collective expenses. Some villagers even estimated that from 1995 to 
June 1999, the Commune People's Committee gained 559,279,520 VND 
from the lease and auction of communal land in the whole commune. Of 
this 559,279,520 VND, the commune authorities allocated 193,413,000 
VND, i.e. 34.59 per cent, to the three villages, and retained 365,866,520 
VND, amounting to 65.41 per cent. To the villagers, this latter amount 
seemed quite large. Nevertheless, the amount villagers paid in fees to the 
local authorities still increased. Therefore, some villagers questioned how, 
and for what, the commune cadres had used the communal land output. 
They even compared them to some commune cadres in other communes in 
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the district who did not intervene in the holdings of the village communal 
land but left the village to control, use, and enjoy most of the village 
communal land output. 
The final factor that underlines the collective claims to communal land 
relates to the fact that after decollectivization agricultural land use rights at 
large have again become more than a means of production but also a 
valuable form ofproperty.7 One need not say how much agricultural land is 
a means of production for villagers in Phil Duang, or elsewhere, since it is a 
matter of fact and already well understood. However, attached to this value 
is another value of agricultural land use rights as previously noted in 
Chapter One: a valuable form of property. As previously noted, according to 
the new land tenure regime, villagers are the holders of land use rights, but 
these use rights can be exchanged, transferred, inherited, morgaged, lent, 
rented out, and so forth like a normal commodity item. Therefore, to many 
villagers, once they have gained these rights it would not be easy for them to 
give up or surrender them to outsiders, especially in the context of the 
increasing scarcity of land and its increasing value since decollectivization 
in the area. 
I want to highlight that in the period of collectivization, this value of 
agricultural land was not recognized by the state. Prior to collectivization, 
the villagers were actually the practical owners of agricultural land, 
therefore they could dispose of their land as they liked. After the late 1950s, 
most of the agricultural land in the Red River delta and agricultural 
implements were collectivized, which resulted in the disappearance of many 
villagers' practical ownership of agricultural land, except their five per cent 
plots. As a result, they had no power to decide how the agricultural land of 
cooperatives would be distributed, used and for whom. In that case, 
agricultural land remained a means of production that the villagers worked 
on, and land farming in the cooperative was still the main source of income 
for many villagers. But agricultural land in the cooperative did not provide 
7 My point here is that the increased values of agricultural land use rights to villagers after 
decollectivization also affected their claims to communal agricultural land rights. My 
discussion in this section therefore also relates to agricultural land use rights at large. 
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cooperative members many incentives, especially as they were unable to sell 
or exchange it. Many villagers therefore began to neglect the agricultural 
land, although this might also have been a form of resistance against the 
collectivization policy (Kerkvliet 1995a). This endorses the observations of 
Kerkvliet that at the onset of collectivization many villagers were reluctant 
to surrender their fields to the cooperative cadres (Kerkvliet 1997). It also 
explains what Chu Van Lam concludes, that when agricultural land had 
been highly collectivized, agricultural land property mostly disappeared. He 
writes, "labourers who once cared for the [agricultural] land as they would 
their own bodies began to neglect it as something foreign to them" (Chu 
Van Lam 1993: 156). 
This situation, however, has changed since decollectivization as the 
villagers are now able to hold land use rights and also exchange them 
between themselves. My examination of the conflict over compensation for 
agricultural land use rights in D~i L()c village in Chapter Three gives a clear 
example of how and in what ways agricultural land use rights are seen as a 
valuable form of property. As a number of holders of many land use rights 
were compensated with a big amount of money for industrial zone building, 
some land selling villagers then had to rent agricultural land use rights from 
villagers in another village to farm, at a price that is often several times 
higher than the land use tax that the holders of agricultural land use rights 
have to pay the state. In her study of Dbng Yang village - 26 kilometres 
from Ha N()i, which in 1997 had 1,197 inhanbitants, 293 households, and 
agricultural land per capita of 2.3 sew, i.e. 828 square metres, Truong Huyen 
Chi argues that two-thirds of the households engaged in seasonal migration 
to Ha N()i for non-agricultural work after decollectivization. Economic 
diversification has not only led to a higher level of income for the villagers 
but also resulted in a situation in which many of them ignore their allocated 
agricultural land use rights. Through the words of her informants and her 
description of the situation in which 65 percent of village households were 
involved in "land taking" and "land giving" for no economic payment, in 
1998, she indicates that agricultural land [use rights] are of little socio-
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economic and political importance to many villagers (2001: 111-123). Her 
findings are very much different from mine found in Bac Ninh villages. 
Relating to the perceptions of agricultural land use rights as both 
means of production and valuable form of property, a crucial feature in the 
minds of many villagers is that the holdings of agricultural land use rights 
are clearly recognized and distinguished within the family, village, and 
beyond. In the villages that I have come across, many villagers often 
referred to "your land," "my land," "her land," and "his land," to indicate 
the holding of agricultural land use rights that each person had received in 
the distribution and redistribution of these rights. Such recognition is well 
acknowledged within a nuclear family, as can be clearly seen through the 
following examples of residential shift for marriage, family division, or 
compensation for agricultural land use rights. 
For example, in most cases a mature son who gets married and sets up 
his own new nuclear family is given his exact share of agricultural land use 
rights that he received in the redistribution. There is no difference in the 
case of a daughter who moves to her husband's home either. In one hamlet 
of LQc village, which contained 175 households, from 1992 to 2002, 15 
women moved out and 25 moved in for marriage. All of them, regardless of 
whether they moved in or out, married a nearby village man or a more 
distant man, have maintained their holdings of land use rights that they 
received in the 1992 redistribution. This revitalized the traditional practice 
before collectivization that a number of women owned plots of agricultural 
land outside the community in which they lived. This is very clear evidence 
of a strong recognition of land use rights property among the members of 
the family. This is also demonstrated in many cases of land use rights 
compensation, as previously examined in D~i L()c or elsewhere. As I have 
witnessed, a number of villagers who moved to Hi> Chi Minh city several 
· years ago for non-agricultural work have been given their share of 
compensation money by their families when their share of agricultural land 
use rights have been taken for a national highway or industrial zone, though 
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it would not be a surprise to see a few villagers refuse to receive their share 
for the good of other family members. 
This recognition of agricultural communal land use rights as property 
among non-family parties in the village whose members share blood and 
marriage relationships indicates that many villagers have a great concern 
about the differences between insiders and outsiders of the village 
community holding the village communal land use rights. These concerns 
then explain why Phu Duong villagers publicly objected to the transfer, 
taking, mismanagement, and misuse of their village communal land use 
rights and its output. Their collective claims to communal land underline 
their demand for clarification of the holding of land use rights between 
individuals and the village in one community, especially between the village 
and commune, as well as other outside institutions like a neighbouring 
village, or a state company, in regards to the village communal land. Such a 
clarification concerns villagers more in the context of increasing land 
scarcity in the area, especially when values of communal land use rights are 
increasing and when the water land use rights in the village are becoming a 
crucial source of residency for its inhabitants. 
In short, the rationale of the villagers' collective claims to the village 
communal land use rights was clearly shown and articulated through the 
voices and actions of many Phu Duong villagers, who referred to the village 
as the holder of the village communal land use rights, meaning that the 
village should have the power to decide how and in what ways communal 
land use rights should be distributed, used, for whom, and by whom. This 
rationale is not particular or specific to Phu Duong villagers. It can be seen 
in different forms elsewhere, for example in D~i L()c, L9c, and other 
villages that I analysize in Chapter Two and Three. 
IV. The Two Cases in Point 
Illegal Encroachment on Communal Land 
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As noted earlier in Chapter Two, illegal encroachment on communal 
land was one of several key-violating patterns ofLand Law in many areas of 
Vietnam after decollectivization, and consequently it has become one of the 
roots of conflict. In B~c Ninh province, official reports by different levels of 
authority also revealed a serious problem of illegal encroachment on 
communal land, however, these reports failed to identify what type of 
communal land was involved. 
Encroachment on communal land dates back to feudal times, as 
several researchers have revealed (Truong Huu Quynh va Do Bang 1997). 
However, the problem of land encroachment in Phit Duong began to be 
serious in the early 1990s. A number of villagers indicated this through a 
statement: "there is a robbery of communal land in our village." However, 
no detailed official statistics on illegal encroachment in terms of 
encroachers and encroached areas are available at this level. Actually, 
illegal land encroachment is not only a hot issue in Phu Duong but also in 
the two other villages of the commune: L9c and the other village. It was 
estimasted that about 400 households of the total of 1 ,830 in their commune 
had encroached on communal land to various extents after the 1992 land use 
rights redistribution. According to a cadastral cadre of the commune, who 
was in charge of agricultural land use rights distribution and redistribution 
as well as land use rights certificate granting from 1988 to 1992, most cases 
of illegal encroachment on cooperative land for residency prior to 1992 
were legalized in 1992 after the perpetrators paid a fine for the encroached 
area. In Phit Duong, some villagers qualitatively testified that illegal 
encroachment on the village communal land during the past years had led to 
the disappearance of several ponds, lakes, or some pieces of unused land, 
located within and near the village residential areas. One of the clearest 
examples is the vanishing of an eight-sao pond, i.e. 2,880 square metres, in 
the middle of one hamlet residential area. This large pond used to be the 
water land of a village landlord, and only became the village's communal 
property after the 1950s land reform. A 63-year-old man recalls that the 
pond was also a place where many villagers washed their belongings and it 
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was a place to store water during heavy rain. Since the early 1990s, 
however, this pond has been mostly replaced by the gardens and houses of a 
number of families, comprising normal villagers, party members, and local 
cadres, who reside next to the pond. 
My fieldwork data, collected through interviews and observations, 
provides evidence that encroachment since decollectivization in the villages 
has been most serious on water land and some unused land, because it is 
communal area that is loosely managed in comparison with others. This 
really differs from the period of collectivization, when farmland of many 
cooperatives was often a key target for cooperative members to widen their 
five per cent plots in order to have more land to farm on their own and for 
their own benefit. In his study, using Quang Truong's research, Kerkvliet 
writes: "Peasants also surreptitiously encroached on collective land to 
expand their privately farmed patches. Five per cent of a cooperative's land 
was the legal limit for private use, but by the 1970s, the actual proportion in 
several areas was 7 to 13 per cent" (Kerkvliet 1995b: 69). After 
decollectivization, however, many villagers neither have the opportunity to 
illegally widen their holding of farmland area nor do they have a heated 
desire to increase their farmland at the expense of their fellow villagers, 
because the whole farmland area has already been distributed, or auctioned, 
to villagers for farming. Instead, it is the water land and some pieces of 
unused land located within or near the village residential compounds that 
have become a target of encroachment for residency or even trading 
purposes. 
Since decollectivization, the various patterns of encroachment are 
simple and overt, as the reader can see from the examples in my photos at 
the end of this Chapter. Some local people have built new fences around 
their residential land on some areas of the village communal land. In other 
cases, other encroachers simply fill water land up with dirt and waste and 
occupy the land area. Acts of encroachment are overt, simple, and mostly 
occur in an everyday manner. 
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In the context of increasing demand for land versus the decreasing 
supply, the key motivation for land encroachment is residency. Since 
decollectivization, villagers no longer receive residential land for free, or 
little payment, from the local authorities as was often the case. During the 
period of collectivization, when the per capita agricultural land was 
relatively high, and especially when cooperatives owned a large area of 
agricultural land, any cooperative family who had two kitchens living under 
one roof [hQ hai bip] could ask for a plot of residential land, for free or little 
money, from a multitude of local institutions, such as cooperatives, party 
cells, and the commune authorities, though most of them were not 
authorized to allocate land for residency in this way. From the late 1980s, 
and especially in the early 1990s, however, in accordance with the state land 
tenure policy, villagers have to apply to purchase residential land from 
authorities. Yet, in most cases, the source of land for residential 
development is often transferred from agricultural land, therefore the 
conditions for villagers to purchase residential land from the state are 
stricter. Now only those families who have three kitchens living under the 
same roof [hQ ba hip] are eligible to apply to purchase from the state under 
the plan of residential development [ki hoqch giiin dan]. In fact, the length 
between these plans of residential development can be several years, and 
some families have to wait for some time before they can purchase 
residential land use rights. In a number of cases, some villagers fail, either 
because it is not their turn or it is too expensive for them to buy residential 
land use rights through this scheme. 
In the commune that Phil Duong village is a part of, the first plan of 
residential development was implemented in 1995, which sold 77 shares (or 
plots) [sudt] of residential land use rights to villagers in the three villages. 
However, the implementation of this plan and the use of the money it raised 
caused considerable conflict between many villagers in Phil Duong village 
and commune cadres over the eligibility to purchase land use rights, and 
especially the enjoyment of the money from the sales as well as the 
corruption involved. Eight years later, a second residential development 
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land sale took place in the commune. However, each village had been 
approved by the higher authorities to have about ten shares of residential 
land while tens of households were in need of residential land. In LQc, the 
largest village for example, 13 shares of residential land use rights were 
approved for the whole village population, while in only one of its five 
hamlets over 40 households had applied to purchase the land. This clearly 
indicates not only the decreasing supply of land available to villagers for 
residency but more importantly it reveals the key underlining problem of a 
fast increasing population in the commune. During the 1950s land reform, 
the population ofthe whole commune amounted to only 2,967 inhabitants,8 
but it had increased 233.6 per cent, i.e. to 6,932 inhabitants by 200 I. 
As a result of the modernization and industrialization programs of the 
state as well as urbanization in the area, the value of residential land as a 
form of private property has increased several times during the past ten 
years. In that context, a number of villagers find encroachment a great 
opportunity if it is available to them. For those who are not currently in need 
of land for residency, they encroach on land to increase their land use rights 
property, while for those who need the land, encroachment is an easy way to 
meet their wants. Therefore, it is hard to characterise the type and status of 
encroachers who take advantage of their residential locations to illegally 
expand their residential land by taking over the village communal land 
because they cover all types of village inhabitants. Some villagers even 
complain that some local cadres or their relatives encroached on the village 
communal land more than the ordinary villagers. In the commune to which 
Phil Duong administratively belongs, some villagers often criticized some 
local cadres in regards to this. 
Illegal encroachment on the village communal land not only created 
different patterns of resistance among villagers, but also between villagers 
and cadres. Among villagers in the community, encroachment aroused much 
discussion and gossip from the non-encroachers, who protested against the 
encroachers for taking the village communal land for private gain. However, 
8 According to a report on land reform by Doan uy B~c Ninh in 1956. 
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due to their social relations with the encroachers, who were often their 
fellow villagers, friends and even relatives, relations that were no less 
crucial than their economic relations with the village communal land, the 
non-encroachers often expressed their discontent in the form of gossip and 
discussion behind the back of these encroachers. During my stay in the 
village, I did not hear any overt criticism of encroachers in their presence. 
As some non-encroachers told me "we do not want to break down the 
village solidarity" [chung toi khOng mu6n gay mdt ilocm kit trong lang], or 
"the hamlet-village sentiment" [tinh lang ngh'ia x6m]. I could also imagine 
that many villagers felt it was not their place to openly criticize their fellow 
villagers for illegally encroaching on the village communal land, though 
their discontent often involved a feeling of jealousy. 
Unable to prevent some encroachers from taking the village communal 
land, some non-encroachers, particularly the elderly, turned to accuse the 
local cadres, especially key cadres of the commune such as the President of 
the People's Committee and the commune cadastral cadre, of not properly 
managing the communal land of their village. They accused these cadres of 
shifting the direct holding of communal land use rights from the village to 
the commune, but then being not able to manage them appropriately. A 
couple of male elders also several times sent letters to the commune 
authorities to ask them to take a more careful look at the situation of 
communal land encroachment. In fact, illegal encroachment on communal 
land increased from the early 1990s, especially in 1995 when the President 
of the People's Committee transferred almost all communal land from the 
three villages to the commune authorities for direct management and 
enjoyment of communal land output. As previously noted, from 1988 to 
1995, communal land was managed by the village, either through the 
cooperative or village head; therefore the use of communal land was 
basically decided in the village meetings. The village communal land output 
was also mostly used for the collective benefit of the village. From 1995, 
however, the commune authorities shifted the direct holding of Phu Duong 
communal land use rights to the commune. Consequently, the commune 
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authorities, mostly the Commune People's Committee, decided how to use 
most of all output from communal land located in Phil Duong village and 
who should benefit from it although the land was still being directly used by 
villagers in Phil Duong village. 
The resistance of some Phu Duong villagers increased when· the 
commune cadres could not control the problem of illegal encroachment on 
the village communal land, or settle it in the way that the villagers wanted. 
As I understand it, the local authorities could resolve a few cases, usually 
relating to the corridor land of main roads or the sites of state buildings, by 
seizing the encroached land. In several cases it was not easy for local cadres 
to retrieve areas of encroached land because the encroachers demanded that 
the cadres first seize the land that party members, cadres, and their relatives 
or friends, had encroached on. Many local cadres would not do this, which 
finally led to the use of coercive measures [cuang chJ] to tackle the problem 
of encroachment. In the majority of cases, a common resolution was to fine 
[phgt] the encroachers to legalize [hQP thuc h6a] their areas of encroached 
land. This means that after paying a fine, the encroachers could keep the 
encroached land as their private land use rights. However, resolving the 
problem of encroachment in this way also led to another problem: cadre 
corruption. 
Some commune cadres were accused by the protesting villagers in Phu 
Duong of neither reporting the area of encroached land that had been 
legalized through fines and the amount of fine money, nor informing the 
village community of how and for whom the fine money had been used. 
Therefore, a number in Phil Duong suspected that these cadres shared a 
large portion of the fine money between themselves, putting a small portion 
in the commune budget. In some cases, the villagers complained that the 
fines were small, even several times lower than the price that a number of 
villagers had to pay to purchase a share of residential land from the state. In 
addition, the fines differed between encroachers, some villagers complained, 
because cadres fined the encroachers depending on their personal relations 
with them. These cadres were also reluctant to deal with some hard-headed 
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[czmg ddu] or blunt [cim] encroachers. For example, a number of non-
encroaching villagers told me about the story of one villager who 
encroached over I 00 square metres of the village water land. Settling this 
case, in the first place the cadastral cadre of the commune required him to 
pay 1.8 million VND as a fine. However, this encroacher did not agree, 
arguing that the fine was too high. Negotiations between the cadre and this 
blunt encroacher lasted for several months, and finally, prior to the end of 
his working-term, the cadastral cadre reduced the fine to only 50,000 VND 
to legalise the encroached water land. (In their resistance later, some 
protesting villagers in Phu Duong wrote a poem questioning why and how 
this case could have occurred.) 
From the perspective of the encroachers, their main want was to 
legalize their area of encroached land. Therefore, for many of them, to pay a 
higher fine than other encroachers, who had closer relations with local 
cadres, might not matter greatly. To many non-encroachers, however, such 
resolution of encroachment created further disagreement about the way 
some cadres handled the problem, because encroachment itself created 
inequality among villagers in access to land use rights for residency or 
property. 
A number of PhU Duong villagers, especially the elderly, who often 
had more free time and cared more about the village communal property, 
proposed a solution to resolve the problem of communal land encroachment 
in the village. Some male elders indicated to me that the current patterns of 
encroachment ensured that the commune authorities had little possibility of 
regaining the areas of encroached land. Legalising the encroached land 
through fines led to inequality and injustice among villagers and between 
villagers and cadres. It also led to a loss of the village communal land use 
rights for no benefit to the collective [tt;ip thJ], and broke down unity in the 
village, which finally contributed to the generation of local conflicts. A 
number of non-encroaching villagers clearly pointed out that the areas of 
water and unused land in the village continued to decrease while the village 
and they benefited nothing. Some others even argued, "communal land is 
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the land of the village," thus the village should decide, on its own, who had 
encroached on the village communal land, where, and how much. The 
village then should decide which areas of communal land could be legalized 
through a fine, and which areas must be returned to the village. In the 
former case, the village would decide itself the amount that each encroacher 
had to pay, depending on the area, quality, and location of the encroached 
land. The money from the resulting fines would be used by the village, and 
for the village's collective benefit, to construct for example village 
infrastructure like roads, a communal house or a pagoda. If not, the 
encroachers must return the encroached land to the village. In this way, 
neither the village would lose its communal land nor would some cadres 
corruptly take advantage of communal land. Finally, the problem of 
communal land encroachment would not create inequality and conflict 
among villagers, and between villagers and cadres. 
However, such proposals were not taken into consideration by the 
commune authorities because they contrasted with the current regulations of 
the state, and the view as well as the conduct of the commune authorities 
over the problem. As a result, the problem of illegal encroachment on 
village communal land and the settlement of this resulted in public and 
collective claims on village communal land. 
Claims on the Village Communal Land 
Besides their resistance against the problem of illegal encroachment 
on the village communal land, many villagers in Phil Duong also claimed a 
say in decision-making over their village communal land for various 
reasons. The perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of the claimants had been 
articulated for several years through their everyday discussions, gossip, in 
village meetings, and particularly via the petitions they wrote to the higher 
authorities. Claims to have rights to decide how the village communal land 
use rights should be held, used, by whom, and for whose benfit, occurred in 
several arenas: the villagers' collective struggle to retrieve 5,566 square 
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metres of village communal land that a state company had borrowed, their 
collective claim to a share of the money raised by selling village communal 
land use rights, and their collective claim to enjoy the compensation money 
for the village communal land use rights. 
Regarding the first issue, to illustrate the struggle of Phil Duong 
villagers to retrieve the communal land that a company had borrowed, I 
need briefly to look back at the history of this issue. In 1964, a state 
company came and settled in Phil Duong village. Initially, the company was 
given 29,000 square metres of agricultural land, for free, by the village 
cooperative, party cell, and higher authorities to build its factory. In the late 
1960s, to hide its machines due to the Americans' heavy bombing in North 
Vietnam, the company further borrowed 5,566 square metres of agricultural 
land, which was the gardern land for Phil Duong elderly. After the 
American war, the company returned this area of agricultural land to the 
village. In 1979, because of its increased production, the company needed 
more space, therefore it once more borrowed this area of land from Phil 
Duong village to use. After Ddi Mai, the production of the company 
decreased, and consequently, the area of land it used dramatically decreased. 
However, in 1993, when the company was granted a certificate verifying its 
holding of land use rights, the area of borrowed land (5,566 square metres 
from Phil Duong) had been included in its area of land use rights holding. 
This means that the company was granted use rights to all the land it 
occupied, i.e. the area it had been given in 1964 and the area it borrowed 
from Phil Duong village in 1979. Many Phil Duong villagers, and even 
some village cadres, were not aware of this transaction that turned the area 
of borrowed land to owned land until 1995 when the company dug several 
ponds on the borrowed land area to farm fish. This was also the time when 
the commune authorities were preparing a site for a residential development 
scheme in Phil Duong and LQc village, therefore the company sold the dirt 
from these ponds to the commune authorities to fill in the site for residential 
development, and also to some brick makers in Phil Duong. Also in this 
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year, the company rented out part of the borrowed land, which was not yet 
dug to make ponds, to some Phu Duong villagers for rice cultivation. 
When some Phu Duong villagers witnessed these acts of the company 
in 1995, they started to claim the area of agricultural land that the company 
borrowed from their village in 1979. Claims to this area of land were made 
systematically, with the participation of ordinary villagers, some village 
cadres, and the village party members. In several meetings that the village 
party cell held to investigate the transaction of this agricultural land area, 
some claimants thought that the company could not receive a certificate of 
land use rights without approval from the local authorities. So they wanted 
to know who approved, or agreed, to transfer the use rights on the borrowed 
land to the company. Consequently, three people who had held the position 
of President of the Commune People's Committee from 1979 to 1995 were 
questioned, and it turned out that the current President and cadastral cadre, 
in 1995, on behalf of local authorities, had verified the transfer of this land. 
This transfer of land use rights, which the provincial authorities 
officially approved and granted a certificate of land use rights for, was done 
with no compensation of land use rights to either Phu Duong village nor the 
commune. This created disagreement among many Phu Duong villagers, 
villagers who were party members, and village cadres. They argued that it 
was their village land, and the village had lent it to the company to use. Now 
the company no longer needed the land, but instead of returning it to the 
villagers to use, the company had applied for a legalization of its holding of 
use rights on the borrowed land. It then destroyed the land by digging 
ponds, and even rented some of it out to several Phu Duong villagers to 
collect rent [thu to]. Some claimants even suspected that those cadres, the 
company, and higher officials had colluded with one another in the land 
transfer and shared the compensation money between them. Finally, Phu 
Duong party cell issued a resolution [nghi quyit] to "claim the land that the 
company borrowed" [doi ddt cho ccr quan muon]. After that, many villagers 
started to send requests to various levels of authority, asking for a return of 
this area of agricultural land. Several requesting letters [don d~ nghi] were 
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written from 1995 to 1999, and signed by some key cadres of the village, 
including the village party secretary, vice-secretary, village head, head of 
the village elderly association, and head of the village fatherland front. A 
penetrating view, which ran through these letters, is a strong expression of 
the struggle to retain use rights on this area of land that the company 
borrowed. This view also argues that the transfer of these agricultural land 
use rights must be approved by Phil Duang party cell, cadres, and villagers, 
and compensation must be paid to the village. Otherwise, the villagers [dan] 
did not agree, and asked the company to return this area of agricultural land 
to the villagers to use fphai tra a~ dan su d~mg]. 
Claims to this area of the village communal land gained no positive 
outcome because the higher authorities denied these requests. In 1999, the 
Provincial Cadastral Chamber stated clearly, in an official letter [ cong van] 
to the claimants, that the transaction of agricultural land use rights was 
carried out legally in accordance with approvals of all levels of authority: 
the village, commune, district, and the province. Meanwhile, in 1999 the 
Central Party Committee issued a directive on "19 works that party 
members cannot do" [19 aiJu dang vien khOng au(lc lam]. One of these 
prohibited party members to join in collective petitions and public protests, 
therefore Phil Duang party cell and its members ceased to be publicly 
involved in claims relating to the village communal land. In addition, from 
that year, Phil Duang had a new party secretary who had close relations 
with some key commune cadres and later simultaneously held a position in 
commune authorities, therefore keeping the village party cell distant from 
land claims. Other villagers, however, continued to publicly claim the land. 
Some argued that this area of agricultural land of the village could not be 
transferred without the villagers' consent, or compensation to them, 
especially as the company did not really need this land. 
The second case of Phil Duang villagers' collective claims to its 
village communal land relates to their demand to enjoy a sum of money 
from the sale oftheir communal land use rights. As was previously noted in 
Chapter Two, the selling of village communal land use rights to build local 
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infrastructure was common in many localities. However, it is another area 
that shows how and in what ways villagers contested how the village 
communal land should be held, used, by whom, and for whose benefit. In 
the commune of which PhU Duang is a part, in order to raise enough 
funding for local infrastructure construction, and also to meet the villagers' 
demand for residential land, the Commune People's Committee successfully 
applied to the district and provincial authorities for a transfer of 9,863 
square metres of agricultural land to residential land. In 1995 when the plan 
was implemented, the use rights on an extra 3,912 square metres of 
agricultural land were sold. Of the total area of transferred land use rights, 
72.11 per cent, i.e. 9,415 square metres, was taken from Phu Duang 
communal land; only 27.89 per cent, i.e. 3,640 square metres, was taken 
from L9c communal land; and none from the other village. This transferred 
land was divided into 77 shares [sudt] of residential land to sell. However, 
the commune authorities decided to sell two-thirds of these shares to those 
families who needed residential land, called h(J tieu chudn, at a price of 
15,000,000 VND per share, each in theory being equal to 140 square metres. 
H(J tieu chudn were those families who at the time of land use rights selling 
had at least two sons above the age of ten living in the commune, and 
residential land area of less than 250 square metres. The rest of the shares 
were auctioned [itdu thdu], at prices from 20 to 30 million VND per share, 
to any villager in the commune who could afford to buy, in order to gain a 
higher amount of funding for the commune authorities. As a result, some 
families who needed land for residency could not buy it because they were 
too low on the waiting list or could not afford to buy. More importantly, 
most of the land sold was taken from the PhU Ducmg communal land, but 
the sale was open to all villagers in the commune. 
Through the selling of land use rights for residency, the commune 
authorities gained 1,204,235,000 VND, which many Phu Duang villagers 
estimated to be equal to 1,200 buffaloes. From this 1,204,235,000 VND, the 
Commune People's Committee paid the provincial authorities 104,000,000 
VND (8.63 per cent), as fees for the transfer of agricultural land use rights 
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to residential land use rights. The rest, 1,100,235,000 VND (91.37 per cent), 
was put into the commune budget for use. The Commune People's 
Committee later invested the money in the construction of local 
infrastructure. Yet, many Phil Duong villagers found that commune cadres 
had been involved in corrupt practices both in the selling of land use rights 
and in the construction of local infrastructure. Therefore, they petitioned the 
commune cadres, especially the key cadres. This problem of cadre 
corruption and the villagers' resistance will be examined in-depth in 
Chapter Five. 
What I want to analyse now are the claims of Phil Duong villagers for 
a share of the money from the sale of their village communal land use 
rights. Once more, many Phil Duong villagers insisted that most of the land 
area that was sold for residency was their village communal land. Therefore, 
they said, the money from this sale must partially be used for the village 
benefit, not the commune as a whole. At the beginning of the land use rights 
sale, Phu Duong party cell, the elderly association, and the fatherland front 
therefore sent a number of letters asking the Commune People's Committee 
and Party Organization to allocate Phil Duong village a portion of the land 
sale money for the building of the village communal house. However, their 
requests were firmly denied because communal land use rights are not of the 
village, but of the commune. 
As noted earlier, prior to 1995, the village water land and adt cong ich 
were directly controlled by either the village cooperative or the village head. 
The output of these lands was also used for village collective aims, 
upgrading the village infrastructure, holding collective festivals, and paying 
social welfare for example. In practice, many institutions in the village, like 
the party cell, elderly association, war veterans association, women's 
association, youth union, and so forth drew part of their funding from 
cultivating pieces of communal land that were allocated to them. In LQc, for 
example, from 1988 to 1995, the village communal land was used in 
different ways, some of which were not really in accordance with the state 
land tenure policies. From the total area of the village communal land, one 
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portion was allocated to all village cadres to use as a source of salary, i.e. 
each village cadre received one sao of farmland. Another portion was giao 
thdu to some villagers who were not eligible to access agricultural 
distribution and redistribution. (The difference between giao thdu and aciu 
thdu in most cases is the amount of payment the tillers have to pay. In giao 
thdu, the tillers pay the same land use taxes as the normal villagers who 
were allocated agricultural land, but in aciu thdu the tillers pay as much as 
they stated at the auction). Another portion of the village communal land 
was auctioned. The rest was allocated to various mass associations in the 
village for fund raising, though these associations did not farm the land, but 
rented it out to some villagers for a certain amount of money and a certain 
period of time. 
In 1993, the Land Law and Decree number 64 of the government 
communalized the village communal land, i.e. authorised the commune to 
hold the use rights on communal land in villages under its administration. 
However, at that time such communalization was not really implemented in 
many localities including Phu Duong and other villages the commune. In 
1995, however, to accommodate the Land Law and Decree number 64, the 
President of the Commune People's Committee transferred communal land 
use rights of the three villages to the Commune People's Committee for 
management, and resultant enjoyment of communal land output. In such a 
context, the shift of communal land use rights from the village to the 
commune means, in many cases, the village no longer has power to decide 
how and for whom the village communal land output is to be used because 
of the intervention of the commune authorities. In Phil Duong, the villagers 
still farmed communal land located in their villages, but the produce no 
longer belonged to the village as it used to, but to the commune authorities. 
This means that the commune authorities decided how to use, and who 
should benefit from, the communal land of Phil Duong village. These 
commune authorities decided that the village should enjoy 30 per cent of the 
village communal land output, while the commune enjoyed the rest, i.e. 70 
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per cent. In return for this 70 per cent, the commune authorities were 
responsible for paying land use taxes on Phu Duong communal land area. 
This mechanism of governing communal land use rights did not 
usually create conflict between the village and commune when the villagers 
in practice still used their village communal land, and partly enjoyed its 
output. In other circumstances, however, it did. Phu Duong is a good 
example of this latter situation. A number of Phu Duong villagers insisted 
that the selling of communal land use rights for residency in 1995 had 
reduced their village communal land area, which consequently decreased 
not only the access of villagers to the communal land for farming but also 
reduced the village welfare from communal land, since the money from the 
sale of the land use rights had not been used for the village benefit but for 
the whole commune. In addition, some villagers argued, villagers in other 
villages of the commune did not lose any communal land, or lost only a 
little, however, they benefited at the expense of Phu Duong villagers. 
Therefore, some Phu Duong villagers demanded the commune authorities 
also allocate them about 30 per cent of the land use rights selling money so 
the village could build its own communal house. But, the key cadres of the 
commune, including the President of the People's Committee, Commune 
Cadastral cadre, President of Commune Fatherland Front, Secretary of 
Commune Party Organization, denied such demands, because they were not 
in accordance with the state land tenure policies. 
The final collective claim in regard to village communal land was Phu 
Duong villagers' demands to enjoy the compensation money which had 
been paid for some of the village communal land use rights. From 1997 to 
1998, as noted earlier, the construction of highway number one took an area 
of 1,128 square metres of PhU Duong communal land. In return, 
compensation of 30,828,800 VND was paid. Again, this posed the question 
of who should be the beneficiary ofthis amount of money, though it is not a 
large case. Like the case of the money from sale of communal land use 
rights, the commune authorities decided this compensation money be put in 
the commune budget for the use of the commune. In contrast, a number of 
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villagers claimed that their village should be the recipient of this 
compensation money and use it for their village benefit. Consequently, these 
claimants took a closer look at how the compensation was paid. However, 
once more, they failed. 
Taking Stronger Actions: Selling the Village Communal Land Use 
Rights 
Having failed in their consecutive claims in regard to the village 
communal land, Phil Duang claimants took stronger action to determine 
their power and rights over such land. This was initiated in 1998, when Phil 
Duang party cell issued a resolution that authorised the village elderly 
association to sell 3,859 square metres of water land in the village to gain 
money for building a communal house [ainh lcmg].9 
As argued in several studies (Hy Van Luong 1993; Bo Van hoa-Thong 
tin 1993; Endress 2001, 2002 ), from the late 1980s alongside economic 
reform, various traditional rituals and collective festivals, which revolved 
around the village communal house, pagoda, and shrine, were also 
revitalized in adapted forms after several decades of being condemned and 
abolished by the state. This phenomenon accompanied official recognition 
by the state of many communal houses, pagodas, and shrines as historical 
and cultural sites in Vietnam. By 1996, Kirsten Endress observes that the 
Ministry of Culture, Information, and Sports had recognized 1860 historical 
and _cultural sites throughout the country, and 188 sites in Ha BAc province 
(Endress 2002: 308). This revitalization of traditional practices and 
recognition of historical and cultural sites by the state resulted in new 
building, or restoration, of the worshipping places such as communal 
houses, pagodas, and shrines in many communities (Nguyen Van Buu 1993: 
23). This in turn relates to claims by villagers to their old worshipping lands 
(Nguyen Van Buu 1993: 24; Endress 2002: 308), or sources of funding to 
build or repair them. 
9 In many cases, the party cells played a key role in claiming village land after 
decollectivization in the area, as was broadly discussed in Chapter Two. 
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In Phil Duang, the simultaneous collective claims of the villagers to 
the village communal land and their struggle to build a communal house 
show the two were closely related and all essential to the villagers. Briefly, 
Phil Duang, like other villages in the commune, used to have its own 
communal house for collective worship of the village guardian deities [thdn 
thcmh hoang] and also for a village meeting place. 10 Besides their own 
village communal house, all villages in the commune shared a larger 
collective communal house [dinh chung], which was the worshipping place 
where villagers from different villages collectively worshipped their four 
deities who, according to legends, were the four generals [b6n vj tu6ng] of 
king An Duang Vuang. During the last years of the French Resistance War 
(1946-1954), all communal houses in the commune were destroyed, either 
by the local military or the French troops. In L9c village, however, the 
villagers quickly used materials from a house of one landlord in the village 
to build a cultural house on the site of the village old communal house. In 
1992, this cultural house was turned into the village communal house to 
worship LQc village deity. In another village of the commune, villagers 
turned the village pagoda, Keo, which had luckily remained intact through 
the wars, into a communal house. In 1992, this communal house was 
recognized as a historical and cultural site. Although seen as the cultural 
property of the whole commune, it became a worshipping place for villagers 
in this village. Among the three villages in the commune at that time, only 
Phil Duang village did not have a communal house for villagers to worship 
their village deities, and for other collective rituals, festivals, or meetings. 
In such a context, the need and desire of many Phil Duang villagers, 
especially the elderly, who included ordinary villagers, party members, and 
some village cadres, to build a communal house increased. The question of 
how to achieve this desire was then openly discussed in several meetings, 
either held by the party cell or the village elderly association. In I 996, the 
party cell issued a resolution that assigned the elderly association a duty to 
build the village communal house. However, a thorny question at the time 
10 Phu Duang villagers call this nghe, and the larger collective communal house that all 
villages in the commune shared, dinh chung. 
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was still the question of where to get funding for this, and very soon many 
villagers sensed that it could be drawn from the village communal land. 
As noted ealier, the claims of Phu Duong villagers to a share of the 
money gained from communal land transactions lasted more than three 
years, but resulted in no positive outcome because the claims were denied 
by the commune cadres. In 1998, the village elderly association decided to 
sell 3,859 square metres of water land that was seen as the village 
communal land, to gain funding for the village communal house. The 
decision was strongly endorsed by 290 village elderly' signatures. 
Consequently, the elderly association established a Committee comprising 
29 persons, headed by the president of Phu Duong elderly association, to 
implement the plan. The selling of the village communal land use rights was 
carried out in two forms: liquidation [thanh ly] and long-term allocation 
[giao ldu daz], but how long was not stated. All contracts clearly noted that 
this selling of the village communal land use rights was based on: 1. 
Requests [ta trinh] of Phu Duong villagers sent to the commune authorities 
from 1996 to 1998; 2. A Phu Duong party cell resolution, issued in 1998; 3. 
The demands of the land use rights buyers; 4. To prevent illegal 
encroachment; 5. Aspirations of all PM Duong people. It was also noted 
that the village elderly association liquidated, or allocated for long term use, 
the village communal land use rights to collect money to build the village 
cultural centre. Therefore, the village leadership [lanh aqo than] were 
required to make it easy for land use rights buyers to gain legalization [hQ"p 
thuc h6a] and a certificate of land use rights holding. Through this sale, the 
Committee gained 65,738,000 VND and successfully built a new communal 
house on the old site, which has become a worshipping place of village 
deities as well as a collective meeting place in the village. 
The selling of the village communal land use rights, however, was 
opposed by different parties in the village and commune: the person renting 
the land use rights, encroachers, commune cadres, and especially the 
offspring of one former landlord, who some elderly called con chau ilia chu 
[landlords' offspring]. The Phu Duong elderly who had sold the area of 
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communal land for a communal house, therefore, had to deal with these 
various parties. First, the water land use rights were rented out to one 
villager for fish farming, with a rental fee of 15 kilograms of fish per sao 
per year, the fees being paid upfront at the onset of rental tenure. In 1998, 
the rental contract on this land had not expired; only two-thirds had been 
used. Therefore the elderly had to give the renter 500,000 VND 
compensation for the fees he had already paid the local authorities. 
Secondly, the elderly had to compete with some encroachers to retrieve the 
area they had illegally taken from the pond. Thirdly, later, when Phil 
Duong villagers denounced and petitioned the key cadres of the commune 
because of their corruption and other wrongdoings, the President of the 
Commune People's Committee counter- denounced Phil Duong elderly for 
illegally selling the communal land use rights, and required Phil Duong 
elderly to explain [giai trinh] how they had used the money from the sale on 
communal house building, otherwise he would use his power to "tum the 
elderly into refuse" [cho cac C¥ ra ba]. This threat, however, did not have 
much effect, because the elderly had presented their rationale for their 
conduct. One 68 year old non-peasant elder, who had led the move, argued 
that: 
If we did not sell that land [use rights], they would have already 
been sold off by the [commune] cadres, or encroached on by 
some villagers. In fact, the [commune] cadres had [illegally] sold 
communal land [use rights] of our village, so we - the elderly 
could do it too. We both violated the laws. If the state punishs, 
the state has to punish the commune cadres first and more 
heavily than us, because the cadres did it first, more heavily, and 
also for their pockets. We also [illegally] sold the land [use 
rights], but only a little and for the benefit of the village, and for 
the next generation (Interview with B4, 28/5/2002). 
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Meanwhile, some female elders [cac c~ ba] pleased the male elders 
who sold the land use rights and constructed the communal house by saying 
that if the male elders were imprisoned for what they had done, they - the 
female elderly, would bring food to the prison for them everyday. 
The above obstacles the elderly faced bothered them little. They used 
sentiment [tinh cam] to mobilize the renter, who was about to break the 
contract anyway because he was gaining no benefits, and to persuade 
encroachers to help them do good for the village. They also knew that the 
commune cadres would not be able to punish them, because the cadres had 
already violated the state Land Law and committed other wrongdoings. The 
thorniest problem, however, arose from some offspring of one former 
landlord [con chau ilia chu] in the village. To explain this point, I need to 
look back to the 1950s land reform in this area, and point out how and in 
what ways the sale of village communal land use rights relates to this land 
reform. 
In the 1950s land reform, the commune to which PhU Duong village 
belongs was chosen as one of the pilot communes by Bic-Bic Executive 
Committee [Dm1n tiy Bdc-Bdc] to carry out land reform. 11 The outcomes of 
the land reform in this commune were, therefore, regularly reported in 
writing to the land reform Bic-Bic Executive Committee [Doim tiy Bdc-
Bdc], and later the Bic-Ninh Executive Committee [Doim uy Bdc Ninh] for 
other communes in the region to learn from. 12 The land reform cadres 
arrived in the commune on 9 December 1955. At that time, the commune 
contained seven hamlets, among which Phil Duong comprised two. 
According to the reform cadres' reports, in early 1956, the commune 
population was 2,967 inhabitants (1,647 were over 16 years old). Among 
these inhabitants, 105 were classified as positive masses [qudn chung tich 
clfc] by the land reform teams, who were able to denounce and accuse [adu 
11 It should be noted that this pilot land reform was implemented by the Executive 
Committee of Bite Giang and Bite Ninh provinces in late 1955. 
12 Data for this section on the 1950s land reform comes mainly from various reports of land 
reform teams, which I collected in numerous offices in the studied districts and provinces, 
and from on my interviews in villages. Again, for confidential reasons, these reports are not 
displayed in full. 
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t6] landlords in the subsequent meetings and trials. From these 105 qudn 
chung tich CifC, the teams picked 11 "roots" [r~] (five came from very poor 
peasants [c6 nang], and six from poor peasants [bdn nang]), and 22 "beads" 
or "chains" [chuJ'i] (14 workers and labourers [cong nang], and eight poor 
peasants). 13 
Also, according to the population classification by the land reform 
cadres, in 1956, the commune had 741 households comprising 37 landlords 
[ata chu], 14 15 rich peasants [phu nang], 16 households who had little 
agricultural land but rented it out for rent [it rur)ng adt nhung phdt canh thu 
to], 221 middle peasants [trung nang], 254 poor peasants [bdn nang], 186 
very poor peasants [c6 nang], six other kinds [h9 khac], and six were absent 
[aivc'ing]. 15 
During the punishment of landlords during the land reform, three 
landlords living in LQc village were accused of various crimes. One of them, 
a key cadre of the Commune Resistance Administrative Committee [lJy ban 
Himh chinh Khdng chiin xa], was accused of being a landlord, a member of 
Vietnamese National Party [Qu6c dan acing], and of murder. In fact, he was 
neither a Qu6c dan acing nor a person who killed his assistant to "cover the 
clue" [bit adu m6i] as he was first accused of by the land reform cadres and 
their activists. However, as he was the first landlord to be punished [xu trf], 
he was immediatly shot after the court's sentence. After the error was 
acknowledged, he was recognized as a resistant landlord [aja chu khang 
chiin] who had served in the Commune Resistance Administrative 
Committee, and cleared from the crimes of being a Qu6c dan acing and a 
murderer. His assistant died, the correction cadres stated, from drowning 
while fishing in the village. 
Another landlord, the father of a key current commune cadre and a key 
cadre of the Commune Party Organization prior to the reform, was accused 
of being both a landlord and a Qu6c dan acing. However, he resolutely did 
13 According to a report of Dolin uy Bile Ninh in 1956. 
14 If classified on the basis of households, the commune had 37 landlord households. 
However, the real number of landlords, as first classified, amounted to 39 because in some 
households two persons had been named as landlords. 
15 According to a report of Dolin uy Ba.c Ninh in 1956. 
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not accept the title of a Qu6c dan dang imposed on him. As a result, after 
two attempts to condem him, the team could not charge him [hai idn adu t6 
khOng gttc]. He was then accused of being a hard head [czmg adu], but as 
some villagers today recalled, thanks to his czmg adu he survived. The third 
landlord who was punished was a party member who held a key position in 
the Commune Party Organization. He was accused of revolutionary 
sabotage, corruption, and having a love affair with a landlord's daughter 
[ch6ng pha each m(lng, tham o va hu h6a vai con gai aja chu]. 16 When he 
was denounced and accused of these crimes, he became ill. He therefore 
survived because the correction campaign arrived before he could be 
punished. 
Besides these three landlords in LQc village, who faced serious 
charges and even a death sentence, some other landlords were imprisoned 
either in the village or the district. Among them, several committed suicide 
because they could not endure these experiences. In addition, a number of 
Labour Party members in the commune were punished [xu tri] in different 
ways, although the commune was seen as one of several local military bases 
in the area. 17 One report revealed that, among 53 members of the Commune 
Party Organization at that time, 14 were punished during the rent reduction 
campaign, 36 were punished during the land reform, i.e from early 
December 1955 to June 1956 - the time correction was started in the 
commune. In a broader area of Tir Son district, 95 of its 379 Labour Party 
members were punished during the rent reduction, and 215 were punished 
during the land reform (Doan uy Bac Ninh 1956). 
Concerning the question of land confiscation and division, in 1955, the 
commune had a total area of farmland of 1,405 mdu, three sao, and nine 
thu&c, i.e. about 506 hectares, 18 although the farmland per capita slightly 
differed from one village to another. In contrast to Phil Duang, LQc had less 
farmland per capita, and the farmland distribution in this village in the 
16 According to a report of Ban Chdp hanh Tinh uy Bile Ninh in 1956. 
17 Being a local military base is an important factor that helped this commune to achieve 
the award of"hero" [anh hUng] from the central state in 2002. 
18 According to a report of Doan uy Bic-Bfic in 1955. 
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reform resulted in each normal villager holding an average of about 3 siw, 
i.e. 1,080 square metres, though landlords often received smaller land shares 
that were poorer in quality in comparison with poorer villagers. The reform 
also led to a situation in which some poor villagers who had no, or little 
farmland, gained a larger portion in the reform while some others gained 
little, or none, while some, like the rich-landed peasants, had to surrender 
their land. 
As previously noted, land reform onfy started in this commune at the 
end of 1955 and early 1956. This was lucky for the local landed elites, party 
members, and cadres, because the correction of errors was also soon 
implemented. But the most critical tension arose in the commune when the 
team corrected their errors. Some people who had been unjustly punished 
[bi oan sai], now returned to criticize [chi trich], and even beat [aanh] the 
land reform cadres, especially the activists who immorally and wrongly 
accused them. During this time, some landlords also reclaimed their 
properties that land reform cadres had confiscated to allocate to their poor 
fellow villagers. After the correction, 70 per cent of landlords in the 
commune returned to their old houses. However, no one could regain their 
old agricultural land that was confiscated and allocated to other villagers. 
After the correction, three of the 39 landlords in the commune were 
reclassified as rich peasants, one was reduced to the group of villagers who 
had little land but rented it out, and three were demoted to the middle 
peasant group. Of the 15 rich peasants, eight were reclassified as middle 
peasants, while the rest remained as they were first classified. Of the 16 
households who had little land but rented it out, 13 were demoted to middle 
peasants, one was reclassified as a handicraft household, and one was 
promoted to landlord status. 19 
In PM Ducmg village, the water land that the team confiscated from 
the landlords, including the area that the elderly later sold, was not allocated 
to the villagers to use. The confiscated water land then became the land of 
the village cooperative, though in many cases it was left unused. In the 1988 
19 According to a report ofDoan uy Bile Ninh in 1956. 
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distribution and 1992 redistribution, no areas of water land in Phu Duong 
were allocated to villagers either, instead they were kept as communal land 
that was rented and auctioned to some villagers to use. 
The sale of the village communal land use rights by the elderly in 
1998 led to a reaction by some offspring of a former landlord in Phu Duong 
because this pond had been the water land of their parents. That landlord's 
offspring demanded the right to buy the water land use rights first, 
especially at a cheap price, because they argued that it was their father's 
land. If the elderly sold to others for more, one son of this landlord 
threatened to denounce the elderly to the higher authorities because they 
were illegally selling land use rights [ban adt trai thdm quydn]. However, 
the elderly wanted to sell the land use rights to some "big head villagers" 
[ke co mau mqt] who really needed land in order to avoid, as said one 68 
year old man, the commune cadres' claiming back the land use rights, or 
threatening the buyers. Actually, some elderly knew that the landlord's son 
did not need the land, neither did he want to buy the land. He was only 
opposing the sale of land use rights because it was his father's land. 
Therefore, the elderly counter attacked by threatening to denounce him for 
overestimating his contribution to the revolution [co cong w7i each m(lng] in 
his application for the title of a family who had contributed to the revolution 
[gia ilinh co cong vm each m(lng] so as to receive a monthly pension of 
72,000 VND, if he resisted the sale of the land use rights. Finally, the man 
withdrew his claim, and the elderly sold the land use rights to some "big 
head villagers" in the village. 
Such claims to their parents' old land appeared in other villages I 
studied. In Phu Duong, Mrs C remembered her land that she had donated 
[hiJn] to the village in the 1950s land reform. In the reform, her family was 
classified as a landlord, although her family's land was not confiscated 
because her husband donated it to the village. One portion of her donated 
land was then turned into a cooperative yard [san kho h9]J tac xa] during the 
high scale collectivization. Recently, 40 square metres of the old 
cooperative yard had been encroached on by one villager to build a shop for 
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trading. As a result, Mrs C criticized this encroacher by gossipping and 
scolding without mentioning her name [chui a6ng].20 She argued that her 
family had donated the land to the village so it should not be encroached on 
for private benefit. She then criticized the commune cadres because they did 
not stop the encroacher. Talking with Mr L in LQc, I also heard his memory 
of his father's agricultural land that was confiscated in the 1950s land 
reform. Prior to the reform, his father was a cadastral official [tru&ng hfl] in 
the village. The land reform cadres came and classified his family as a 
landlord household who owned four mdu ru(jng in 30 plots. Consequently, 
his grandfather was held under house arrest, and a large area of his 
agricultural land was confiscated to allocate to poor villagers. Until today, 
although he does not wish to claim any of his farmily taken land, Mr L still 
remembers the location of many plots that his family owned before the 
reform and recalls how some of these plots had been transformed into 
residential land over time. 
Although the land reform happened more than four decades ago, some 
villagers in these villages today still remember the land of their grandparents 
and parents, which was confiscated for other villagers. My research did not 
find any vengeful attitude, or "feud," which former landlords or their 
offspring harbour in their minds toward their fellow villagers, or children of 
those who wrongly denounced and accused them or their ancestors in the 
1950s land reform. However, several villagers still claim rights over the use 
of their family's old land. What we see from some villagers' claims to their 
old land, or their parental land in PhU Duong, is that they are weak, not as 
strong and determined as the various collective claims of villagers to the 
village land. 
V. Conclusion 
20 Although the encroached area was vety little, it was located in a good trading location, 
therefore the illegal occupation of this land for trading earned the encroacher a good 
income. 
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First, I want to conclude that the electrical accident on the 3rd June 
1998 in the village was only a water drop that dripped into an already full 
glass of water, making it overflow. In other words, it became the starting 
point for the breakout of many Phil Duong villagers' public resistance and 
claims because of their discontent about the managment and use of the 
village communal land as well as its output, and the accompanying cadre 
corruption and misbehavior. My analysis, in this Chapter and others, 
partially endorses the explanations of some authors about the social unrest 
in Thai Binh in 1997 in Xay dt,mg hq t&ng ca sa nang than trong qua trinh 
c6ng nghi?p h6a, hi?n aqi h6a iY Vi?t Nam (200 1 ). The authors of this book 
argue that this social unrest was mainly a result of local cadre corruption in 
their dealings with communal resources, which involved selling of adt c6ng 
ich and contributions by the people in the process of local infrastructure 
construction. Local cadre corruption, these authors argue, led to inequality 
between cadres and the villagers which, together with the cadre 
mistreatment of the villagers, then created local conflicts. 
Secondly, many villagers did not struggle to hold ownership rights to 
communal land; they cared about the management of communal land and 
considered that the village institution should be the holder of village 
communal land use rights. To them, communal land use rights have various 
meanings and values for both individual villagers and the community as a 
whole. More importantly, communal land in history and since 
decollectivization was and is the land of the village. Therefore, the village 
should have the power and right to decide how communal land use rights 
should be held, used, by whom, and for whose benefit. This view not only 
originated from traditional practices but also from the recognition of land 
use rights and demands to clarify the boundary of land use rights holding 
between members of the nuclear family, individual villagers in the village, 
individual villagers and the village as a whole, one village and another, and 
between the village and the commune. Claims to the village communal land 
use rights and the resulting resistance of Phil Duong villagers resulted not 
only from the transfer of use rights holdings but also the misuse and 
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mismanagement of the village communal land use rights as well as their 
output. 
Finally, shortly after its rebirth, communal land became a 
controversial resource towards which different groups of villagers and 
institutions have different attitudes and behaviors. As a result, the various 
parties involved want different relations to the land to be implemented. All 
of the individuals and organizations I have spoken to, however, seem to 
indicate that when dealing with the outside world, the villagers often claim 
the land use rights for their village as a whole. In dealing within their own 
world, however, many of them compete with one to another for individual 
gain. Furthermore, as in history, the plots of communal land are often 
closely related to local cadre corruption, encroachment, inequality, and 
other wrongdoings embedded in everyday village life and the interactions 
among villagers, as well as between villagers and local cadres. 
186 
Photos 11-12: Communal Waterland in the Village 
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Photos 13-14: Illegal Encroachment over Communal Waterland 
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Chapter Five: The Problem of Local Cadre Corruption 
I. Introduction 
The main aim of this Chapter, as previously noted in Chapter Four, is 
to examine the third aspect of conflicts in the village: the problem of 
commune cadre corruption and misbehavior and the villagers' resulting 
resistance. I present an in-depth case study which illustrates that the 
problem of cadre corruption, which is closely related to land and land 
output, was one of several key reasons that generated local conflicts since 
decollectivization. I also elaborate another circumstance in which many 
villagers shared some common views over the use of land output and other 
communal resources, and expressed their discontent toward the problem of 
local cadre corruption in the process of management and use of communal 
resources, especially communal land. 
In this section, I discuss the definition of corruption in Vietnam, and 
then examine in detail some types of corruption for private gain, which the 
protesting villagers in Phu Duong accused the commune cadres of, to see 
how and to what extent local cadre corruption occurred and created 
reactions from the villagers. Section two discusses six types of corruption 
involving land that villagers themselves identified. Section three looks at the 
protests. And the fourth section analyses the villagers' views about 
corruption. 
Throughout the Chapter, I argue that corruption by a number of local 
cadres increased in various forms after decollectivization and was related 
closely to land resources. I argue that many villagers accept minor amounts 
of corruption, however, "too much" corruption is not tolerable. I then 
discuss how corruption was more than a cause of local conflicts; the 
problem of cadre corruption in the village was used by the protesting 
villagers as a legal weapon, or an excuse, to fight against some commune 
cadres who they hated because of the reasons that have been documented in 
this and previous Chapters. 
190 
Corruption exists at different extent in all society. The key is to 
analyse corruption within the studied society (Levy 1995: 2). So in Vietnam, 
what is perceived as corruption? In the Vietnamese language, the term tham 
nhflng is a translation of the English term: "corruption." Corruption, in the 
view of the state, is generally defined as: 
The act or behavior that the people who hold power and position 
conduct through abuse of their position and power to embezzle, 
bribe, or intentionally violate the state laws and regulations for 
private gain, and damage the property of the state, the collective 
and the individual, and violate the rightful activities of the 
institution and the organization (Quoc hoi nuoc Cong hoa Xa hoi 
Chu nghia VietNam 1998: 49).-
More specifically, the state has generalized corrupt acts into eleven 
major forms, comprising: 
I. Embezzling socialist property; 2. Receiving bribes; 3. Using 
socialist property to bribe, taking advantage of one's position to 
give bribes and mediate bribery; 4. Taking advantage of one's 
position and power to cheat people, appropriate socialist 
property, abusing the trust of others to appropriate socialist 
property; 5. Taking advantage of one's position and power to use 
socialist property; 6. Abusing one's position and power to 
appropriate private property of the individual; 7. Taking 
advantage of one's position and power while doing business 
and/or missions for private gain; 8. Abusing one's position and 
power while doing business and/or missions for private gain; 9. 
Taking advantage of one's position to affect other people for 
private gain; I 0. Raising illegal funds for private gain; 11. 
Falsifying documents in doing business for private gain (Quoc 
hoi nuoc Cong hoa Xa hoi Chu nghia VietNam 1998: 49-67). 
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Although the above covers various forms of corruption in the state and 
society, it highlights an essential feature that the state concentrates more on 
corruption involving those who work in the state. This emphasis is also 
noticeable in China where the state has stated that corruption is "activities 
by state personnel who use their positions to acquire public property by 
misappropriation, embezzlement, theft, fraud or other illegal methods" 
(Levy 1995: 4). Of those who work in the state in Vietnam, however, 
greater emphasis has been put on nguai c6 chuc v~ va quyJn hqn, literally 
meaning those people who have power and position in various levels of the 
state. As defined in Decree number 64 of the government (Chinh Phu nuoc 
Cong hoa Xa hoi Chu Nghia VietNam 1998), this group includes five types 
of cadres and officials who work in various sectors of the state from local to 
the centre. At the local level (in the rural areas), as was previously noted in 
Chapter One, nguai co chuc v~ va quyJn hqn are key cadres of the 
commune and village (Chinh Phu nuoc Cong hoa Xa hoi Chu Nghia Viet 
Nam 1998). 
Various sources of data on corruption and anti-corruption in Vietnam 
indicate another essential feature, which is that the central state has a critical 
attitude towards corruption, and has made great efforts to curb corruption, as 
previously noted in Chapter Two. As a result, at least in theory, the state has 
been determined to punish corrupt officials and cadres whatever position 
they might hold in the state apparatus. This critical attitude has been visible 
in various anti-corruption campaigns, especially in the legislation. In an 
analysis of corrupt crimes in the 1999 Criminal Code, Nguyen Ngoc Diep 
points out that they are generalized into eight types of crimes, to which the 
highest punishment could be a death sentence (Nguyen Ngoc Diep 2000: 7-
47). Meanwhile, Martin Gainsborough (2003) rightly reveals the fact that 
large corruption cases increased in Vietnam in the 1990s, and he argues that 
the central state made great efforts to detect and prosecute such cases during 
this decade because it was attempting to threaten and discipline the lower 
cadres and officials in the context of increased decentralization. Such an 
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argument is correct, however, it is not adequate. I want to add two more 
points, first, that the determined detection and tough prosecution of big 
corruption cases demonstrated the central state's critical attitudes and 
serious action in curbing corruption, and secondly, like many villagers as I 
discuss later, that the central state could not tolerate "too much" corruption 
in these cases. 
In a study of corruption, economic crimes and social transformation in 
China after the 1979 economic reform, Richard Levy (1995) brought to light 
four key controversial views on corruption of four Chinese parties: the 
government, the 1989 democracy activists, the conservatives, and the 
reformers. However, he failed to document the view of many Chinese 
villagers in the countryside. In Vietnam, many people used the same general 
term (tham nhung) as the state to indicate corruption. However, besides this, 
they also used various simple and specific terms to express different acts 
and forms of corruption in everyday life. In the studied villages, many 
villagers narrowly related corruption to graft, extortion, embezzlement, 
speculation and profiteering (they did not often mention nepotism in my 
various interviews). Expressing those forms of corruption, they used words 
like chiim doqt [to usurp], idy cua c()ng [to take public/communal property], 
biin thu [to embezzle], dua h6i l(J [to offer a bribe] or an h6i l(J [to eat/take 
a bribe], aut lot [to bribe], k;i d¥ng [to take advantage of], an [eat] and chqy 
[containing various meanings, as discussed below]. 
At a broader level, people in Vietnam, in a similar way to people in 
China, refered to corruption as a variety of more specific acts; consequently 
they used numerous terms to express such acts of corruption. In an 
incomplete draft paper on corrupt practices in education in Vietnam, John 
Kleinen explains concepts of tidn chua [pagoda money], tidn phong hi 
[money in envelopes], and lf}u [informal sources of income], which are seen 
as corrupt acts. These, however, were not used by many villagers in their 
protests over the problem of local cadre corruption. 1 Martin Gainsborough 
also illuminates other concepts, one of which is 6 du [umbrella]. 6 du, he 
1 Personal communication. 
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explains, is "the idea of the umbrella whereby lower level institutions or 
individuals receive backing or protection from those higher up the political 
chain" (2003: 73). 
The terms I most often heard in the studied villagers narrowly referred 
to local cadre corruption in the villages. Of those terms used by the 
villagers, several are neither new to Vietnamese society as they can be 
found in feudal history, nor are they special or peculiar to the Vietnamese, 
but have also been recognized in other societies. Offering or taking bribes 
for example, is a clear act of corruption perceived in many societies. 
However, terms like an and chqy need to be further explained in the context 
of Vietnamese culture because they convey various meanings. First, an 
literately means eat. Eating, or an, can convey both positive and negative 
meanings. In the conventional sense, an is to eat food in everyday life. In a 
positive sense, an ifur;c [to eat well] is the ability of one person to work and 
speak well. In contrast, the negative meaning of an is to corrupt, like eat 
bribery [an h6i 19], eat of the people [an cua dan], or eat of the state [an cua 
nha nuac] or collective [an cua cong]. Such Perceptions of the negative 
meaning of an are also commonly found in various parts of the state and 
society. For example, in her study about "speaking pictures" on government 
corruption and political thought in contemporary Vietnam, Pham Thu Thuy 
presents vivid satirical cartoons, which were originally published in Bao 
Lao D9ng and Bao Sai Gon Giai Ph6ng in 1997 and 1998, showing worms 
and rats, i.e. corrupt cadres and officials, eating public funds and state 
property (Pham Thu Thuy 2003: 102-103). In one example, Thuy writes: 
The viewers are encouraged to believe that these [corrupt] 
officials have grown fat from 'eating' (an) an inordinate amount 
of funds and assets that do not belong to them. In one biem hoa, 
a doctor advises his patient, who is apparently a senior official or 
company executive, to abstain from 'eating' public money and 
property (cua cong) as a perfect solution to his indigestion and 
high blood pressure problems (Pham Thu Thuy 2003: I 05). 
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The second term that has become an expression of corrupt acts in 
Vietnam today (though I heard the latter less often than the former in the 
studied villages) is chqy, literally meaning to run. Unlike nepotism (i.e. one 
person abuses his or her official power and position to favor friends, 
relatives or loved ones to access good positions in the state apparatus), chqy 
in the corrupt sense is to use money and personal connections, or other 
means, to make arrangements in return for payment to make private gain for 
someone who is not legally and morally eligible to enjoy something. For 
example, chqy aiim is the act of giving money, or other inducements, to 
ensure that teachers, lecturers or other staff members give higher marks to a 
student or pupil; chqy truang is the payment to a school or officials in order 
to illegally move from one school to another, or to enrol in a good school; 
chqy dt,t an is the use of connections, resources and lobbies to get a project 
approved, or to be funded, or not to be inspected or inspected without 
revealing bad performances; chqy chuc is to pay for promotion, or to gain a 
position that one has not legally merited;2 chqy an is to pay for less heavy or 
no punishment in the court for a crime that could normally be more 
severelly punished, or even to get out of prison when the sentence was 
guilty;3 and so forth. 
Such perceptions of corruption of the state and villagers show a 
common view that corruption is the abuse of power and position for private 
gain. This shared view supports a consensus in the literature on corruption 
which centres on public office and/or interest versus private interest 
(Gillespie and Okruhlik 1991: 77; Goudie and Stasavage 1998: 115-116; Lu 
2000: 8-9). According to this type of definition, corruption is perceived as 
2 This particular act of corruption is nothing new. As in China (for an overview of the 
Chinese case, see Lu 2000: 199-200), in traditional Vietnam a few rich villagers and 
landlords were able to buy official positions and titles from the local authorities to become 
mandarins, or those who did not have to pay head tax to the state. During the period of 
collectivization, this practice disappeared and only re-emerged in different forms after D6i 
Mai. 
3 The recently prosecuted case of Nam Can, in which Trful Mai H1;111h and other officials 
were involved, is a good example of this. Trful Mai Hl;lllh, the Head of Vietnam Radio, used 
his official positions to get Nam Can out of prison in 1997. 
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acts which abuse public office and/or public interest for private gain.4 The 
concept of public interest in this case can be understood as the interest of a 
community, institution, or of the state as a whole. Similarly, the concept of 
private gain, according to Zengke He, is not simply seen as the interest of 
one person; rather it can also be the interest of a group of people, work 
units, departments and even regions (He 2000: 244). 
In the current case I examine, the corrupt acts of the local cadres 
mainly took the form of abuse of their official position and power for 
private gain. In most cases, corruption was collectively committed by a 
group of local cadres, therefore, it is called collective corruption. Collective 
corruption, one of the popular forms of corruption in contemporary China, is 
defined as: 
[A] form of corruption that occurs when a group of corrupt 
people conspire and collude to pursue individual interests at 
public expense. Collective corruption is not conducted by a lone 
individual; rather, it is a kind of collective behavior of aggregates 
of discrete individuals. Collective corruption entails innovative 
and sometimes extensive use of planning, collaboration, and 
other organizational means without ethical and legal boundaries 
(Gong 2002: 87). 
As a result, the villagers often simultaneously protested against 
numerous corrupt cadres in the commune, and the resulting inspections by 
the higher state authorities also pointed out this pattern of collective 
corruption, as I will discuss in the subsequent sections. 
II. Local Cadre Corruption Involving Land 
4 It should be emphasized that viewing corruption in this way cannot be broadly applied to 
examine all forms of corruption in cross-cultural studies. Some acts that abuse public office 
and/or interest for private gain might be seen as corrupt in one society while not in others. 
However, it perfectly reflects the perceptions and attitudes of the state and villagers towards 
corruption in my case study. 
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In their protests against a number of commune cadres, many Phu 
Duong villagers concentrated on six types of local corruption involving land 
in recent years. The first type is cadres illegally benefitting from the 
distribution of land use rights. A good example is the sale of 77 shares of 
land use rights for residences in 1995. As was previously noted in Chapter 
Four, in 1995 the People's Committee transferred 13,775 square metres of 
communal land located in Phu Duong and LQc to residential land for selling 
to the villagers to use. Prior to the sale of the use rights for residence, a 
Committee that included 13 key cadres, headed by the President of the 
Commune People's Committee, was set up to be in charge of preparing the 
site and deciding who was eligible to buy the land under hQ tieu chudn 
(qualified households), i.e. those families who had three kitchens under the 
same roof, and who could buy it under auction. 
Even at the first step of the preparation of the site, the Committee was 
accused by many PhU Duong villagers of corruption. As previously noted, 
the land areas to be transferred to residential land were water and farming 
land, therefore they were not ready for house building. To make the land 
ready for sale, the Committee had to use a large amount of dirt to fill in and 
raise the site. While doing so, the Committee colluded with the District 
Youth Union and another businessman to illegally pay for 4,193.5 cubic 
metres of dirt that was not used on the site to enjoy 130,000,000 VND 
profit. In other words, 30 per cent of the dirt was not used on the site as 
required in the contracts. However, the workers claimed for the full 
payment. As a result, the villagers who later bought the land use rights for 
residency had to bear the cost, because the expense of filling in and raising 
the site was added to the land use rights price. In addition, a number of PhU 
Duong villagers asked to do the job, at a cost of 21,000 VND per cubic 
metre of dirt, but the Committee refused, and gave the contracts to the 
Youth Union of the district and a businessman who charged an additional 
sum of I 0,000 VND per each cubic metre of dirt. 
When the site was ready for sale, instead of selling all the land shares 
to qualified families [hQ gia dinh tieu chudn] who needed the land and had 
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applied to purchase the land, the Committee decided to auction one-third of 
the 77 shares in order to gain more money for the "locality" [aja phuong]. 
This meant that the commune authorities had more money for the 
commune's use, but a number of villagers who had spent time and energy 
on making applications to the Commune People's Committee for approval 
from district and provincial authorities could not get access to the land use 
rights they were qualified for, but had to wait for the next time. 
In addition, in the auction of one-third of the 77 land shares, some 
poor villagers who needed the land for residency could not buy the land 
because they did not have sufficient money. Meanwhile, some better-off 
commune cadres, including the President of the Commune People's 
Committee and commune cadastral cadre, who some villagers believed 
needed no more residential land, bought one share each. In fact, a number of 
villagers argued that in any purchase of land use rights, the commune cadres 
always achieved shares that were not only larger in area but also better in 
location compared to the amount they paid for them. In contrast, other 
ordinary villagers had to accept shares that were smaller in area. The 
clearest example some villagers saw was that the area of land shares that ten 
villagers bought under h9 gia ainh tieu chudn had been illegally reduced 
from 150 square metres to 100 square metre each, while the three shares that 
the key cadres of the commune, including the President of the Commune 
People's Committee and cadastral cadre, bought at auction had been 
illegally increased from 72 square metres each to over 100 square metres. 
Such corrupt behavior was not limited to this commune; it also 
occurred in others. In Dong village for example, a number of newpapers 
reported similar patterns of local cadre corruption in regard to the sale of 
agricultural land use rights for residency, and in auctions of land use rights 
for industrial development. For many years, the majority of villagers in 
Dong village specialized in woodwork and gained incomes from this 
business. Both agricultural and residential land per capita in the village were 
low, and in such a context land use rights were regarded as more valuable if 
used for industrial sites and residency than for a source of agricultural 
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income. Actually, in comparison with other villages in the area, by 1994 the 
price of residential land in Dong was very high, amounting to four or five 
million, and even 50 and 60 million VND per one thu&c, i.e. 24 square 
metres.5 
In 1993, the Commune People's Committee gave the "green light" 
[Mt ilen xanh] to Dong cooperative cadres to auction agricultural land use 
rights shares, which were supposed to be sold for residency to hQ gia ilinh 
tieu chudn, including the policy-families, to achieve more funding. 
However, only some better-off villagers in the community were able to buy 
the land, while a number of poor families, including those who had war 
invalid members and martyrs, could not buy the land due to lack of money. 
Those families who bought the land then sold it for profit when the land 
value increased, and many villagers believed that this was a clear case of 
land use rights speculation. Another case related to the sale of land use 
rights for handicraft industrial zone building in the village in 2001. Ho Chi 
Minh City Police Newspaper [Bao C6ng an Thanh ph6 HJ Chi Minh] 
reported that: 
During the division [i.e. the sale] of land plots to build the 
industrial zone, according to the villagers' reflections, almost all 
the commune mandarins (commune cadres) occupied the plots 
located nearby the main road, while the "black villagers" [dan 
ilen, i.e. the ordinary villagers] received the inner plots. Many 
villagers suggested that lot-drawing [b6c tham] should be 
applied in order to gain equality and to prevent disputes among 
the buyers, however, the President [of the Commune People's 
Committee] [ ... ] stated that "any one who refuses to receive the 
given plot, withdraws his/herself from the industrial zone; there 
will be no lot-drawing!" A number of villagers also said many 
5 Bao Nong nghi~p Vi~t Nam, nl!m 1994. 
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"commune mandarins" gained plots that were double the area of 
those of other buyers, but paid the same amount.6 
The second type of corruption is illicit use of funds for infrastructure 
construction in the villages and commune. As previously illustrated in 
Chapter Two, the construction of local infrastructure like the electricity 
system, roads, schools, clinics and so forth was a key plan of the local state 
in the 1990s. In the commune of which Phil Duong village is a part, from 
1995 to 1997, alongside over one billion VND that the commune authorities 
obtained from the sale of communal land use rights for residency in 1995, 
the higher authorities also gave it several hundreds of million VND as state 
capital for local infrastructure construction. In addition, during these years, 
the Commune People's Committee collected tens of million VND from 
villagers in the commune, and gained over 360 million VND from 
communal land output. In the local context at the time, all these sources of 
funding amounted to a large sum, and were all put into the commune budget 
to be managed and used by the People's Committee. From 1995 to 1997, 
almost all the above funding was used to build local commune 
infrastructure, including a water-pumping station for agricultural 
production, a commune clinic, a primary and secondary school, and so forth. 
However, various acts of corrupt behavior by the same cadres of the 
commune were reported by villagers in Phil Duong viiiage, the most 
common being: 1. Claiming the prices of building materials higher than they 
actually were; 2. Purchasing building materials of poor quality (thus cheap 
in price) while claiming for payment of materials of good quality (therefore 
more expensive) in order to enjoy the difference; 3. Claiming for payment 
of what had not been purchased. All these also related to the abuse of 
official position and manipulation of legal documents for personal gain. 
Of the local infrastructure built since 1995, the building of the water-
pumping station for agricultural production clearly shows how the commune 
cadres colluded with builders to commit wrongdoings for personal gain. 
6 Biio Cong an thimh ph6 H6 Chi Minh, nli.m 2002. 
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This water-pumping station was constructed by a district construction 
company, at a cost of 323,094,000 VND, of which the input from the 
commune budget amounted to 84,155,471 VND, the rest coming from the 
capital granted by the higher state authorities. In the construction process, 
instead of buying brand-new water pumping machines, the commune cadres 
and the builders bought second-hand ones to enjoy themselves the price 
difference between the old and the new. But when the construction was 
completed, the water-pumping station did not work properly, and if it did, it 
often consumed more electricity resulting in the villagers having to pay 
more irrigation fees. Therefore, since its auguration in 1997, the water-
pumping station has been used only once or twice a year. Meanwhile, in 
order to carry the water from this pumping station to the fields, nearly one 
mdu of communal land has been used to build irrigational channels. A 
number of PM Duong villagers finally became angry with the commune 
cadres because the pumping station brought them little benefit in 
comparison to its cost due to the cadre corruption involved. 
Another case was the building of a commune clinic on 148 square 
metres of communal land of Phil Duong village. This construction cost 
218,690,000 VND, in which the provincial authorities invested 50,000,000 
VND, the rest coming from the commune budget. Again, in the 
construction, the commune cadres colluded with builders, who were not 
villagers in the commune, to corruptly acquire payment for a brick purchase. 
This was discovered immediately by a number of PM Duong villagers, who 
claimed that the bricks that had been used in this building had actually been 
collected by the commune cadres from some villagers who used the 
communal land for brick making.7 However, the commune cadres later 
7 After the late 1980s and early 1990s, all three villages of the studied commune auctioned 
some area of the village communal land to a number of villagers for brick making to collect 
bricks for the village. The brick makers paid the village 20 per cent of the bricks they made, 
and the village used the collected bricks to construct its infrastructure, like roads and school 
for example. Since 1995, when the communal land use rights of the villages became 
managed by the commune authorities, the President of the People's Committee made new 
contracts with the brick makers under the same rules. Instead of paying the bricks to the 
village, however, the contracters paid them to the Commune People's Committee. The 
number of bricks the commune authorities received through this source during 1995 and 
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declared in the payment for this construction that the bricks had been 
purchased at a price of over 200 VND per brick. Such an act provided the 
commune cadres an opportunity to enjoy the money that had not been used 
for brick purchase. In a similar way, in the construction of a primary and 
secondary school that cost 622,142,000 VND, and a cemetary for the war 
martyrs in the commune that reportedly cost 87,000,000 VND, the same 
commune cadres corruptedly abused their position for personal benefit. That 
is not to mention the construction of various small-scale irrigational 
systems, like water-inlet sluices in the past few years. 
Although some commune cadres claimed that these constructions were 
carried out in accordance with regulations of the higher state in terms of 
legal procedures and for the needs of local people, the protests of PhU 
Duang villagers did not relate to these reasons. Their complaint was that the 
collective corruption of the commune cadres in all these works finally led to 
bad quality of these constructions. Some villagers became discontented 
when the cadres refused to give the construction work to villagers in the 
commune who specialised in this sort of work, and had requested it. In PhU 
Duang, three builder-households and a number of villagers who specialized 
in construction work usually had to go out of the village to find work. 
However, they were not permitted to construct the local infrastructure in 
their own commune. 
The third type of local cadre corruption relates to communal land 
encroachment and the settlement of this problem, which I discussed in 
Chapter Four. Instead of repeating this case, I will discuss another case in 
Dong village to show how some cadres corruptly abused their official 
position for private gain while resolving the question of illegal widening of 
the five per cent plots on cooperative land. In Dong village, since the early 
1960s, due to the high need for residential land, many villagers had widened 
their five per cent plots at the expense of the cooperative agricultural land, 
and then turned them all into residential land for their own use and 
ownership. In 1968, Ha B~c provincial authorities legalized these actions, 
1998 amounted to 458,735 bricks, but a large number of these, which were used in 
commune constructions, became a source of commune cadre corruption. 
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and officially allowed the transformation of "five per cent land," including 
the encroached areas, into the residential land of the villagers. Despite this 
legalization, from 1990 to 1994, the President of the Commune People's 
Committee examined the problem of land encroachment again, and required 
nearly 200 households in the village who had encroached on cooperative 
agricultural land for residency to pay fines for legalization. As a result, each 
encroacher was required to pay 40 kilograms of paddy, equal to 60,000 
VND at that time, per square metre of encroached land. 8 While collecting 
these fines, however, the President did not collect fines from himself or 
some of his relatives or colleagues. More importanly, the amount collected, 
76,330,000 VND, was not added to the commune budget but was used 
illegally.9 
The fourth type relates to land use rights compensation. As shown in 
the compensation of agricultural land use rights for an industrial zone in D{li 
L(k village, which was scrutinized in Chapter Three, some cadres of the 
Committee colluded with each other for private gain to compensate more 
land use rights than they were officially approved. 
A fifth involves agricultural land ranking. Prior to the 1988 
distribution of agricultural land use rights, in theory all communes in the 
district had to rank their agricultural land. Ranking statistics would not only 
prepare the ground for an equal distribution of land use rights among 
recipients, but also provide a criterion for the state to collect land use taxes 
from the tillers. At that time, the ranking of agricultural land in the district 
was implemented in accordance with Directive number 299, issued by the 
central government in 1980. In the studied district in 1987, only 13 
communes had made contracts with state institutions to rank agricultural 
land before distribution. The rest of the 14 communes implemented the 
ranking of land themselves (UBND huyen Tien Son 1987: 2). In practice, 
however, in many of the latter, including the commune to which Phu Duang 
village belongs, the cadres did not rank the land but used the land ranking 
statistics that had been previously collected in 1978 by agricultural 
8 Bao Nong nghi?p Vi?t Nam, nii.m 1994. 
9 Bao Nong nghi?p Vi?t Nam, nam 1994. 
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cooperatives to implement the 1988 land use rights distribution. In the 
redistribution, a new set of criteria for agricultural land ranking had been 
issued and applied. However, again the cooperative and commune cadres in 
the commune did no land ranking prior to the 1992 redistribution of land use 
rights. This means that the ranking statistics of agricultural land in the 
commune to which Phil Duang belongs, collected in 1978, were used to 
decide the land taxes that the tillers have to pay to the state. 
The above did not become seriously troublesome until 1997, when the 
state officials came to the commune to rank the areas of agricultural land 
that were to be taken to build the national highway. At that time, after 
examining the areas of land for compensation, the state officials' records 
revealed that the areas of agricultural land appropriated in Phil Duang were 
of the second rank, while the villagers who farmed the fields had been 
paying land use taxes to the commune authorities for the first rank for years. 
Therefore, a number of Phil Duang villagers argued that the cadres had 
corruptly misranked the agricultural land to collect more land taxes for 
private gain, and they feared that other areas of agricultural land might have 
been misranked too. Finally, they demanded the commune authorities rank 
all agricultural land again. The problem of land ranking occurred at the 
same time as Phil Duang villagers were claiming a share of village 
communal land money, and were struggling for a return of the land area that 
a state company had borrowed. However, I found it difficult to identify the 
extent of the cadre corruption involving land ranking that the villagers had 
highlighted, except that some cadres may have claimed the ranking funding 
for doing no ranking. 
The last type of corruption was the selling of electricity. Although it 
did not relate to land, this corrupt act was done by the same key commune 
cadres the villagers had petitioned and denounced. It also directly affected 
the villagers, and caused an electrical accident that provoked collective 
protests in the community. Since 1990, the sale of electricity to the villagers 
in this commune had been governed by a team headed by the President of 
the People's Committee. From 1990 to 1998, this team charged the 
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electricity purchasers a higher price than had been regulated by the higher 
state authorities. In addition, this team had been illegally selling the 
electricity to the company which borrowed the previously discussed area of 
land from Phil Duong, and kept the differences between the price the team 
charged the company and the lower one it paid the electricity company. 
None of the profit from these manipulations in electricity sales was placed 
in the commune budget, but was shared among the cadres in different forms. 
Furthermore, the illegal sale of electricity to the state company had caused 
the death of a woman in Phil Duong, but the commune cadres refused to 
accept responsibility for this accident. 
In short, these six types of corruption that villagers in Phil Duong 
objected to, and higher authorities later investigated, reveal that local cadres 
regularly abused their authority during the 1990s. These acts of collective 
corruption related closely to the collectivity of the commune cadres, 
especially the key cadres, who shared residential location and everyday 
interaction with villagers in Phil Duong. The corruption also related to 
collusion between local cadres and businessmen, and sometimes with some 
district officials. In most cases, the corruption occurred in relation to land in 
the community, especially communal land and its output usage, indicating 
that land has become the most crucial source of cadre corruption in the local 
context since decollectivization. As in China (Gong 2002), such corruption 
was mainly collectively perfomed by a number of cadres. Consequently, 
although the villagers and the higher authorities detected the problems and 
protested against them, it was very difficult to spell out exactly how many 
communal resources one single cadre had corruptly appropriated for private 
gain. 
As noted previously, such cadre corruption is not peculiar to the 
studied villages and communes, but has commonly occurred in many rural 
communities since decollectivization. To date, the most widespread case of 
local cadre corruption that has been brought to light occurred in Thai Binh 
province, where a state-funded research project notes that: 
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this case can not be understood solely as resistance to corruption, but also as 
a response to other issues. 
Prior to the collective reactions in 1998, some villagers in Phil Duang 
had already individually petitioned some key cadres of the commune in 
relation to personal land issues. One example is Mr T, 65 years old in 2002, 
who petitioned the President of the Commune People's Committee and the 
Phil Duang village cooperative manager because of the corrupt taking of his 
"martyrs' land" [ru9ng li?t sy]. From his birth until 1991, Mr T lived with 
his mother, Mrs V, whose third son died in battle as a war martyr. Shortly 
prior to the 1992 land use rights redistribution, she became very weak 
because of old age, and Mr T and his brother, Mr H, moved her to Mr H's 
family so that if she passed away, she would die in the house of her eldest 
son. In fact, she went to the other world shortly thereafter. But the problem 
was that her death came during the land use rights redistribution. According 
to the state policies, every martyr's family was allocated a good ration of 
land use rights to be farmed for free to get produce with which to worship 
the martyr. This means that Mrs V still owned one ration of "martyr' land" 
when she passed away, and this land should have gone to one of her 
inheritors. Mr T, argued that he should be the one to receive this ration of 
martyr land use rights, not his eldest brother, because Mr T had lived with 
and fed his mother till the days prior to her death, and had worshipped his 
martyred brother for years. In practice, however, Phil Duang's cooperative 
manager gave this ration of land use rights to Mr T's elder brother because, 
as Mr T understood it, this manager was a relative and "in the same group" 
[cimg hQi] as the President of the Commune People's Committee, whose 
daughter married the son of Mr T's eldest brother (Mr H). Having failed to 
acquire this land use rights ration through discussion with cooperative and 
commune cadres, Mr T petitioned both the village cooperative manager and 
the President of the Commune People's Committee in the district and 
provincial authorities because of, as he argued, the corrupt abuse of position 
and power for the benefit of a relative. 
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From 1998, a number of Phil Duong villagers started to collectively 
question the cadres about the 1995 sale of communal land use rights for 
residency, especially how the money and other communal resources had 
been used for local infrastructure building. As these villagers considered 
that some cadres did not pay enough attention to their inquiries, or went 
around and resorted to elaborate subterfuges to avoid answering their 
questions, they set up an inspection team, which they called "TJ thanh tra 
kinh ti-xii h9i," literally meaning "the inspection team of socio-economy," 
to investigate the socio-economic issues in the locality. However, the 
President of the Commune People's Committee soon dismissed the team 
because of its illegitimacy. 
Instead of giving up their protests, the villagers went to the district 
authorities to denounce these key cadres for committing corrupt acts and 
other wrongdoings, as previously analysed, and demanded that the district 
authorities investigate the case. The day before they officially went to the 
district authorities, one elderly leader deliberatedly dropped a letter of 
denunciation at the entrance gate of the house of the President of the 
Commune People's Committee, as he said, to see whether this top cadre 
would recognize and accept his corrupt misconduct and misbehaviour 
towards a number of villagers in Phil Duong, and think of how to make 
amends in the future. In this letter of denunciation, the protesting villagers 
highlighted the six types of curruption discussed previously, and argued that 
the commune cadres had committed such wrongdoings for private gain. 
They also pointed out that such a problem of corruption had impacted on the 
community as a whole as well as individual villagers, and therefore they 
strongly appealed to the district authorities to investigate the case. 
In the following days, however, the President indirectly accused the 
protesting villagers, particularly the elderly who led the way, of wrongly 
petitioning [ki?n ziu ki?n lao] him and other commune cadres. More 
importantly, some cadres named the petitioners "br;m hay di ki?n," meaning 
the gang of regular petitioners, "lu gay r6i'' [the public-unrest-provoking 
gang], or called them bad names like "phdn tit xdu" [bad elements] and 
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talked about them as troublesome and disturbing villagers. The President of 
the Commune People's Committee also mockingly told some elderly that he 
challenged them to petition him [thach cac C'{l ai ki?n]. As a result, these 
protesting villagers, especially the elderly, critically accused the key cadres, 
particularly the President, of scorning and ignoring the villagers [khinh 
dan], and not wanting to listen to their opinions [khong chtu nghe y kiin cua 
dan], and moved to stronger collective action by going to the district 
authorities to denounce and petition the commune cadres. 
At the same time in the village, a number of villagers organized their 
school-aged children to stand in queues, wear red scarves, and go around the 
village, beating drums and repeatedly shouting the slogan "Overthrow the 
corrupt gang!" [Da aao b9n tham nhung!]. They also wrote poems that they 
circulated in all three villages of the commune to publicize the corruption 
and other wrongdoings that they believed, or suspected, the commune 
cadres had committed since 1995. 10 
Under the leadership of some knowledgeable and retired elderly, the 
various forms of protests of Phu Duong villagers eventually forced the 
district authorities to investigate the case. However, the villagers soon 
disagreed with the conclusions of the district inspectors, and moved to 
appeal to the provincial authorities, and even visited various central 
agencies in Ha N()i, like the General Department of State Inspection [T6ng 
Thanh tra Nha nuac], Government Office [Van phong Chinh phu] and so 
forth, to send their letters of denunciation and petition. Finally, BAc Ninh 
People's Committee decided to investigate the problems that the Phu Duong 
villagers had highlighted. 
I 0 For example, in one poem the writer vividly narrated the story of one female villager 
who could not sleep because of thinking about the cadre corruption and other wrongdoings. 
In several others, the protesting villagers pointed out those areas in which they suspected 
that commune cadre corruption was involved. At the end of these poems, the villagers often 
put a penname like "The group of people who are cleaning up the society in the village" or 
"The group of poets who are fighting against the wrongdoings in the village." According to 
the state laws of Vietnam, it is illegal to deliver this type of poems and similar materials in 
public. 
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As a result, in August 1999, a Doim thanh tra lien ngimh [team of 
multi-disciplinary inspectors] was set up and started to investigate various 
issues in relation to the villagers' denunciations and petitions. Finally, the 
conclusions the provincial inspectors made were totally different from those 
that the district inspectors had previously reached. The provincial team 
concluded that the collectivity [tt;lp thJ] of the commune cadres, under the 
leadership of the President of the People's Committee, had committed 
corruption and other wrongdoings. Therefore, the team proposed that the 
provincial authorities confiscate the corrupt resources and punish those 
cadres who had corruptedly breached the state laws and regulations in their 
management and use of land resources, construction of local infrastructure 
and other areas. Such conclusions created conflicting views in the 
commune. While a number of protesting villagers praised the provincial 
inspectors for doing their job well and justly, although they did not totally 
agree with the team on some small issues, some commune cadres, especially 
the President of the People's Committee, really hated the team. Talking with 
me, some commune cadres did not accept that they had been corrupt, 
although they did not publicly deny the conclusions of the provincial 
inspectors. 
In line with the conclusions and proposals ofthe provincial inspectors, 
the President of B~c Ninh People's Committee issued a decision that 
ordered: 1. the President of the Commune People's Committee to retrieve 
all the resources that the provincial inspectors found to have been corruptly 
taken; and 2. the district authorities to punish the collectivity of the 
commune cadres in accordance with state laws and regulations. 
The conflict, however, did not end there because the decisions of the 
provincial authorities could not be fully implemented. Till the day I left the 
village, many Phil Duang villagers continued to fight to recover the 
resources that had been corruptly taken and to punish the corrupt cadres. 
Except for a sum of three million VND that one commune cadre had 
surrendered, the rest of the money could not be recovered for various 
reasons. One reason related to the reorganization of the District Youth 
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Union, one of the institutions which had to hand back the corrupt money. In 
1999, when Tien Son district was divided into two smaller districts, the 
Youth Union had been divided too, and some officials related to the case 
had either moved to a new district or been promoted. This made the retrieval 
of corrupt money difficult if not impossible. 
The punishment of corrupt cadres was not properly carried out either. 
In the commune, for example, the President of the People's Committee who 
was the main target of the protesting villagers, and had been heavily charged 
with wrongdoings and corruption by the provincial inspectors, had retired at 
the end of his working-term. Another key cadre had since taken up the post 
of the President of the Commune People's Committee. One cadre who was 
charged with corruptly taking three million VND became a Vice-President 
of the Commune People's Committee (he had handed back the corrupt 
money). The Secretary of the Commune Party Organization moved to the 
post of Chairman of the Commune Fatherland Front. The cadastral cadre 
had been removed from his post in the next working term. In that way, as a 
number of villagers later complained, these corrupt cadres had 'ianded 
, 
safely. 
It was a long and hard struggle for these protesting villagers to bring 
the case to the district and then provincial authorities. The decisions of the 
higher authorities, however, would not be strictly implemented. To the 
protesting villagers, their acts of petition and denounciation had cost them a 
lot of time, energy and even money. What they wanted was not simply to 
point out which cadre had committed what wrongdoing or corruption, but 
more importantly, to recover the money that had been obtained through 
corruption and to punish the corrupt cadres. When they could not achieve 
these aims, many turned to more confrontational actions. They delayed 
paying taxes and fees, and pressured higher authorities to punish the corrupt 
cadres and retrieve what had been stolen. 
The deliberate delaying of payment of taxes and fees in fact started in 
the first season in 1998 when four families, who were close relatives of the 
female victim in the electrical accident, did not pay their taxes and fees to 
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protest against the commune cadres. In the second season of that year, more 
villagers followed this action, and in 1999, the collective delay of payment 
of various kinds of taxes and fees became a weapon that the protesting 
villagers used to press the higher authorities to investigate the case against 
the commune cadres (see Table 1). The number of villagers who 
participated in this action depended on how the higher state authorities 
treated the problems in their village and commune. For example, in the first 
season of 1999, when the district inspectors came to investigate corruption 
and other wrongdoings in the commune, the number of households who 
delayed payment of taxes and fees was only 48. However, in the second 
season, 345 households collectively delayed their payments to protest 
against the conclusions of the district inspection teams. Later, in the first 
half of 2000, when the provincial inspectors had thoroughly investigated the 
case again, the number of households who delayed their taxes and fees 
reduced to 28. But again, from 2001, when the protesting villagers noticed 
that no progress in retrieving the corrupt money and punishing the corrupt 
cadres had been made, many more villagers delayed their payments. In the 
first half of 2002, 400 of the total 665 households collectively delayed their 
payment of various taxes and fees to the state. 
Table 1: The number of households who did not pay taxes and fees in 
Doi Soc village from 1998 to 2002 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Season Firs Secon Firs Sec on Firs Sec on Firs Secon Firs Secon 
t d t d t d t d t d 
Numbe 4 8 48 345 145 28 200 350 400 
r 
Source: Author's synthesis of data from taxes and fees books in the 
commune. 
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However, not all the villagers who did not pay their taxes and fees 
were motivated by the commune cadres' corruption and other wrongdoings. 
Some villagers did not pay just because they saw that nothing happened to 
their village fellows who had paid no taxes or fees over several years, 
therefore they wanted to do that too. A few did not pay because of personal 
problems they had had with the cadres. At the same time, most of those 
families who continued to pay taxes and fees were party members or the 
cadres themselves and their close relatives. 
Such determined and collective delay of payment of taxes and fees 
created discussion between the protest leaders and their peasant followers, 
showing how different groups of villagers had different views on the extent 
to which, and in what ways, they should react to the cadres and the higher 
state authorities. None of the leaders and few party members wanted the 
villagers to put pressure on the cadres and higher officials by refusing to pay 
their obligations such as taxes and fees because this action was absolutely 
illegal and violated state laws and regulations. One of the leaders who had 
studied abroad and used to be a key official in another province argued that 
only a number of cadres had been involved in corruption and other 
wrongdoings, so what the villagers should do was to protest against these 
cadres. Delaying the payments of various kinds of taxes and fees as the 
villagers had done, he further explained, would affect local institutions like 
schools that did nothing wrong, or damage local development, like the 
construction and repair of local road and irrigational systems, since these 
partially rely on villagers' contributions to the commune. He meant that the 
protesting villagers should pay their obligations in full to the state while 
opposing the cadres. 
But many ordinary villagers who directly farmed the land and had to 
pay various types of taxes and fees articulated a contrasting view. Some 
peasant villagers argued that the corrupt money should be collected at the 
same time as the strict punishment of the cadres who had committed the 
wrongdoings. But since this had yet to happen, the delay of payment of 
taxes and fees would help to press the cadres and officials to do this. One 
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male middle-aged villager even humourously criticized their elderly leaders 
by saying that "the elderly have not stood up straight yet [in the fight against 
the corrupt cadres] since they are still afraid of the cadres."11 
The commune authorities and district officials had to use various 
means to deal with the villagers' collective delay of payment of taxes and 
fees. In the first place, when those first four households did not pay their 
dues, the commune authorities did nothing. As a key cadre of the commune 
said: 
I did not do anything at that time since I thought these villagers 
had lost their relative so they were temporarily delaying some 
taxes and fees. But I was not aware that later too many villagers 
would follow them (Interview B16, 7/8/2002). 
Later, as many villagers began to collectively delay their obligations, 
the commune authorities established a Committee to mobilize them to pay 
their obligatory taxes and fees. Either by directly talking to the protesting 
villagers or via the local radio, the Committee and other cadres tried to 
persuade villagers to carry out their duties to the state. At the same time, 
some district officials also visited the village to persuade the protesting 
villagers to carry out their obligations. Such efforts led to nothing other than 
giving a number of villagers a chance to express their own views and 
reasons why they would not pay taxes and fees. For example, when the 
Committee carne to talk and persuade villagers to pay taxes, one elderly told 
the cadres: "Comrades! Are you right to persuade us to pay taxes? In 
another case, one female villager told the Committee that: 
11 One issue that emerges in this thesis is the leadersip of the elderly in the protests of the 
villagers. In the studied villages, mainly elderly men (sometimes also women) took charge 
of the leadership. Several factors explain this. One is that the elderly had good knowledge 
and free time, which both helped them to better investigate and explain the wrong and right 
in regard to various issues. Thanks to this, they were then in a good position to gather 
people in collective action. Finally, they were mature and brave enough to stand up as the 
main counter-figures who could interact with the local cadres, especially the key cadres 
who, in many cases, did not only have good experience in leadership and governmence but 
also were mature aged. To. make further generalizations on this feature, however, I think 
more research in other parts of Vietnam needs to be done. 
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I thank the party and the government. Thanks to the party and the 
government, I have a warm, full and happy life today. I do not 
resist the taxes [ ch6ng thuJ]! I do not resist the party and the 
government. I do not pay taxes and fees because the [commune] 
cadres have committed too many wrongdoings and corruption. 
So I keep this amount of money until the cadres have corrected 
their wrongdoings, I will then again pay the taxes in full 
(Interview with B3, 13/5/2002). 
In another case, a 40 year-old woman told the Committee, 
We are peasants but we all know what the cadres do and how 
they behave towards us. The cadres have misbehaved too much, 
corrupted too much, eaten too much, and we cannot stand for 
that, therefore we have to fight against the cadres. When we 
cannot fight the cadres, we become angry. When we are angry, 
we become blunt, and we do not pay taxes and fees (Interview 
with B13, 19/7/2002). 
Finally, the commune authorities used coercive means to press the 
protesting villagers to pay their obligational taxes and fees. For example, 
any villager who did not pay taxes and fees to the state would not be able to 
gain a birth registration or a letter of introduction from the commune 
authorities. This solution, however, did not prove very effective since it 
could only apply to those villagers who needed a certificate. As a result, 
debt collectors of the commune had to come directly to those villagers. In 
some cases, the protesting villagers fiercely resisted. In one case, when the 
collectors visited a female villager, she asked them: "Do you know why I do 
not pay taxes and fees?" These collectors could not argue with her, so they 
moved on to another family. In another case, when a key commune cadre 
with his collectors came to collect taxes and fees from one woman, he told 
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this villager: "From a long time ago to today, I have never seen anyone who 
farms the land of the state but pays no taxes!" This female villager asked 
him in return: "Do you know why we people pay no taxes and fees? Our 
[great] ancestors, grandparents and parents paid taxes in full amount, but 
now we do not!" (She meant that she delayed her payments because of 
cadre corruption.) The most violent case related to a male villager who did 
not pay taxes and fees to the state for three years. When the collectors failed 
to persuade him, some threatened to enter his house and take his paddy by 
force. But he stopped them at his entrance gate, holding a big knife and 
saying that any one who entered his house to get the paddy would be 
beheaded immediately. 
IV. Villagers' Views towards Corruption 
In the views of many villagers, corruption became problematic only 
when it exceeded the culturally acceptable level and entailed economic and 
political greediness. Once corruption surpassed this acceptable level, it 
became a question of violation of state laws and moral values, although it is 
not easy to identifY the blurred line between what is acceptable and not 
acceptable regarding corruption. In more severe circumstances, corruption 
was not tolerable if it occurred alongside other forms of legal and moral 
violations and caused adverse consquences to the state and the people. 
Therefore, corruption was not something totally bad and unacceptable 
which must be totally condemned. Many villagers who I talked to often 
indicated that it would not have been a big matter if the cadres had corruptly 
abused the communal resources a little bit while doing good for the village 
and commune. They called those minor corrupt acts idy tiJn u6ng nuac hut 
thu6c, meaning to get some money for tea and cigarettes, while travelling 
back and forth to do business. 
Such attitudes of the villagers originate from the Vietnamese culture, 
which not only tolerates minor corrupt acts by the elites, mandarins and 
officials of the state, but also nurtures various traditional customs of 
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reciprocity. The custom of gift giving and taking, for example, has long 
been a positive tradition in Vietnamese society. One student might bring a 
little gift to his principle mentor on some special occasions, the Lunar New 
Year for example, to show respect and gratitude to the person who has 
taught and/or supervised him. 
Some villagers even said that everyone would be corrupt while doing 
his or her job by refering to a Vietnamese proverb: "Eating from what you 
are doing" [Lam nghi gi an nghJ dy], like "A tailor eats clothing materials, 
a builder eats building materials" [ThQ" may an vai thQ" xay an h6]. This does 
not mean that villagers agree with all forms of corruption; rather it shows 
their little concern about minor acts of corruption. Consequently they did 
not see such acts as a big problem or use them as evidence to judge the 
morality and performance of a person. Such attitudes are also commonly 
held in other societies. In Thai society, for example, people either see minor 
acts of corruption as cultural practices or as a way to help to smooth 
interactions among parties involved in business or other work. A study by 
two researchers exploring attitudes of people of different walks of life 
towards corruption discovered that, for example, many Thais saw minor 
corrupt acts of policemen and state officials as gifts of good will, tea money, 
or improper behavior (Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 1994: 135-140). 
Therefore, they concluded that " ... for many Thais, acts ... will be called 
corruption only if they involved large sums of money, stem from 
aggressively greedy intentions, and have consequences which are clearly 
damaging for society as a whole" (Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 1994: 
163). 
In the studied communities, corruption by the cadres really became a 
big problem to the protesting villagers because of its extent, circumstances 
and consequences. In regard to the first, many villagers argued that the 
cadres had been involved in too much corruption and other wrongdoings, 
although some were aware that the problem of corruption was (and is) not 
peculiar to their commune, but a national disaster [ qu6c m;m]. They had seen 
that the same group of cadres committed corruption systematically, 
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repeatedly, and in many areas, as previously noted. These cadres even 
continued to be corrupt when some villagers, especially the elderly, had 
voiced their discontent and opinions. Finally, the protesting villagers 
accused some commune cadres of "eating too much." One informant said 
"everything comes from land but how much -wcomes out cadres pocket~ 
most of it" to indicate that most of funding in the village come from the use 
and sale of communal land and critically blamed cadres in regard to it. 
Others even vividly compared them with a man who has a big stomach and 
a polished forehead- two of the symbolic characteristics that many villagers 
often used to judge a man of fulfilled life. 
Although the villagers sometimes could not spell out exactly the 
volume and ways in which the cadres had committed corruption, they could 
see and feel this qualitatively through an examination ofthe outcome of the 
cadre conduct in regard to management and use of land and other communal 
resources, as well as the economic status of the cadres. In Phil Duong, the 
first clear evidence that many villagers saw was from 1995 to 1998 when 
the commune authorities collected a large amount of money from different 
sources. However, the output from this large sum of funding seemed to have 
been little in quantity and poor in quality, and brought the villagers less 
benefit than they expected. As a result, a number of villagers suspected that 
the cadres were corrupt. 
At the same time, the fast increase in economic status of some 
commune cadres, especially those who held key positions in the local 
government, concerned the villagers. To PM Duong villagers who lived 
together with several key commune cadres in a small village, some could 
see the amount and sources of everyday income of these cadres, and knew 
that their salary and other income from agricultural production as well as 
other work did not demonstrate that these cadres had a good income. Some 
elderly villagers even recalled the life history of these key cadres, and noted 
that they had become rich in a short period of time. For example, some 
elderly remembered that one key cadre of the commune used to be a poor 
and miserable man who lost his father at an early age and lived in a small 
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house for years. Like other men of his age, he joined the army and returned 
to the village in the early 1970s. He later became a cooperative cadre of the 
village, and then a commune cadre in 1989. But in the late 1990s, he bought 
sofas, beds, a cabinet, a TV, a motorbike, and spent money on curing his son 
in hospital. Some villagers even suspected that he still had a large sum of 
money deposited in the bank. 12 
Another case is another commune cadre who Phil Duong villagers 
noticed became rich in a short time. This man used to be a state official, and 
returned to his home village in the 1980s. When he first arrived in the 
village, his family was no better off than many other villagers. After several 
years working as a village cooperative cadre, from the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s, he had not yet become better off. However, after 1994 when he 
became a commune cadre, he increased his family's material goods a lot, 
though his salary was not much and his family's agricultural production 
brought no more benefit than other villagers' in the community. In a few 
years, many villagers noticed that he had built a new house; bought a good 
motorbike, a TV and a fridge; and had money for his sons to go to 
university in Ha N()i. His wife also gave up her farming work and rented the 
agricultural land use rights to other villagers. State-funded researchers 
brought to light similar cases in Thai Binh province. They write: 
[M]any key cadres of the commune, like the President of the 
Commune People's Committee, Secretary of the Commune Party 
Organization and financial cadre, cadastral cadres have built new 
houses, changed their motorbikes from this model to another, 
and the wives of commune cadres also changed their life style 
and clothing fashion to become the rich in the countryside (Vu 
Quan ly Khoa hoc va Cong Nghe 2000: 79). 
12 In the eyes of the villagers, nhiiu equals "lots of," "many," or "a large amount." 
However, we have to put nhiiu in the local context at the time of the study to understand 
the meaning and circumstance of this word. A certain amount of money might be a lot to 
the villagers, but to others, like higher state officials or a foreign researcher, that amount 
seems to be tiny. 
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Examining the life history and everyday economic activities of the 
cadres, many villagers questioned the fast increase of wealth of some 
commune cadres, which the visible evidence indicated could not have been 
achieved legally. How could these commune cadres become rich so fast? 
Where had they acquired the money to build a big house, buy a motorbike, 
and so forth? Such questions concerned many villagers. In one letter of 
denunciation which the protesting villagers wrote to the higher authorities, 
they questioned the fast increase in wealth of the local cadres in a short 
time, and vividly told the higher state officials that if these cadres had 
become rich legally, then they should share their ways of doing business 
with the villagers so they could all get rich together [phai tuyen truyJn ai 
dan cung hQc lam gidu]. 
Regarding the circumstance of corruption, the attitudes of the 
protesting villagers towards cadre corruption became more critical when the 
corrupt behavior occurred alongside the cadres' misbehavior towards the 
villagers. In Phil Duong, when a number of villagers discovered corruption 
and other wrongdoings by the commune cadres, they came to ask the cadres 
about the wrongs and rights in the management and use of communal 
resources and other issues. However, instead of dealing properly with the 
reactions of the villagers, some commune cadres did not accept their 
misconduct and corrupt acts or attempt to correct them. Instead they 
mistreated the protesting villagers as previously highlighted. In the case of 
D~i L(>c, the misbehavior involved some local cadres manipulating the 
program of land use rights compensation at the expense of the village 
fellows and so forth. 
In regard to consequences, in contrast with the view in the literature on 
corruption which simply argues that corruption can contribute to economic 
development in some societies (Johnston 1986: 459; Gillespie and Okruhlik 
1991: 78; Bardhan 1997: 1322; Goudie and Stasavage 1998: 138-140), the 
problem of local cadre corruption in Phil Duong directly and negatively 
affected the economic interest of both villagers and the community as a 
whole. Many villagers became the subjects who had to bear the 
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consequences of local cadre corruption. Corruption and other wrongdoings 
by the commune cadres led to a loss of the village communal land area and 
poor quality infrastructure. For example, the construction of the water-
pumping station, which cost 323,094,000 VND, was of little use. To many 
villagers, this amount of money was really a large sum, equal to about 70 or 
80 per cent of the commune budget in a normal year, so they expected a 
good return. But this did not happen! 
Gathering all three factors together, many villagers had clear evidence 
to judge the nature of their cadres on the basis of two key virtues: talent [ted] 
and morality [d'uc]. In regard to talent, unlike some researchers who argued 
that the local cadres in Vietnam since decollectivization were low in 
educational level [ trinh d'9 ht;Jc vein thdp ], weak in working ability [nang b,cc 
yiu ], and therefore poorly governed the local government (Thang Van Phuc 
va Nguyen Van Khanh 1996; Pharn Quang Minh 2002), the protesting 
villagers in PM Duong believed that the key commune cadres were those 
who had talent [ c6 ted] and had a good ability to manage local government 
in comparison to many ordinary villagers. In his own terms, one retired-
elderly man, who was a soldier till 1975, a worker in a district factory in the 
following years, and then a leader of the protesting villagers in his horne 
village, said that the cadres (including one key commune cadre, who had 
been a cadre of the village and commune for over 20 years, and some other 
key cadres) "are good in eating, speaking and working" [ chung n6 an d'u(J'c, 
n6i d'u(J'c, lam d'u(J'c], positively meaning that the cadres can speak, think 
and work very well. In the eyes of other elderly, the cadres are young [tre], 
active [nang d'9ng], and have talent [co tazl 
From the perspective of morality, however, after all that had 
happened, the protesting villagers, especially some elderly, judged some 
commune cadres as those "whose characteristics are bad" [tinh chung n6 
xdu]. To explain their bad characteristics, different villagers mentioned 
different things, and pointed out different aspects of the story depending on 
who they were, what they had experienced with which cadre, or when and 
where they talked about it. However, some common expressions used 
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(behind the backs of their cadres) by protesting villagers included: "lam sai 
qua nhi€u" [committing too much wrongdoings], "an qua nhiiu" [eating too 
much], "kh6ng chtu nghe dan" [not listening to the villagers], "khong chju 
giup dan" [having no willingness to help the villagers], "khinh dan" 
[looking down on the villagers], or "coi thu(Jng y kiin cua dan" [ignoring 
and scorning the villagers' opinions]. 
In the Vietnamese culture, from traditional to modem times, the virtue 
of morality [due] is really key, and is seen as no less an important quality 
than a person's talent [tai], especially as a leader. For the villagers, I think 
that what they indicated about morality not only referred to morality at work 
but also to the everyday life behavior between villagers and cadres in the 
community. Therefore, the lack or decay of morality of the cadres became 
one of the critical problems that resulted in the protests of villagers against 
some local cadres. In the studied villages, when some villagers hated and 
disrespected the cadres, they called them bad names. In PhU Ducmg, some 
protesting villagers called several commune cadres who they denounced and 
petitioned "chung no" [they (but in a dismissive and dispectful manner)] and 
"b9n tham nhilng' [the corrupt gang]. In -E>~i L()c, some protesting villagers 
named the cadres in the Committee of land use rights compensation and site 
clearance "win aJ can b9" [the problem of cadres]. In the case of Dong 
village, following the terms employed by reporters in newspapers articles 
some villagers called some cadres "cu(Jng hao thai a6i mai'' [the tyrants in 
the renovation period], 13 or used the phase "the face of new tyrants" [ bQ 
mgt cu(Jng hao mai] to describe a group of local cadres. 14 
Finally, the protesting villagers began to fight against these cadres as a 
result of their perceived wrongdoings, previously analyzed in Chapter Four 
and the current Chapter. In their minds, however, some villagers were aware 
that it would be a hard job for them to fight against the corruption problem 
for various reasons. In the first place, due to the lack of transparency, the 
villagers had no clear and proven evidence for their corruption claims. To 
find hard evidence, or to require the higher state authorities to investigate 
13 Bao Cong an thanh ph6 HJ Chi Minh, nam 2002. 
14 Bao TruyJn hinh, n!im 2001. 
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the case, all took time and energy. More importantly, in many cases local 
corruption usually related to, and was collectively committed by, more than 
one or two cadres who held power and position in the local government, 
therefore combating these cadres would be very dangerous. One elderly 
leader said that once he had committed himself and started the battle against 
the corrupt gang, he had to fight to the end. Lastly, as was noted earlier, 
some intellectual elderly knew that in the current local context, the cadres 
were the talented people, and if these talented cadres intentionally abused 
their official positions for private gain, it would then be very difficult for the 
villagers to combat them. To explain how difficult their fight against the 
problem of local corruption was, one elderly man vividly compared the 
corrupt forces to an eel [con luan], which often lay deep down under the 
mud. If the villagers did not pay attention to it, or looked at the surface of 
the mud, they would not be able to recognize it. Even when they had 
recognized it, and started stopping its progress, it would be able to go in 
other areas too, and finally the villagers would not easily get or stop it. 
Another elderly person stated that the current fight against the corrupt 
cadres was more difficult than "carrying a backpack and an AK southward 
through the Tru(mg Son mountains to fight against the Americans to secure 
the country" as he had done decades ago. 
The Use of the Crime ofCorruption as a Legal Weapon. 
But did the problem of local corruption really concern the villagers 
and consequently generate their resistance? Throughout the Chapter, I have 
argued that corruption by the local cadres became one of several key 
reasons for local conflicts after decollectivization because of its prevalence. 
I have also argued that local cadre corruption created serious reactions from 
villagers because it occurred alongside other forms of wrongdoings and 
misbehavior committed by the cadres. More importantly, however, my 
research discovered that the problem of corruption was used as a legal 
weapon, or an excuse, by the protesting villagers to attack a number of local 
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cadres. This means that corruption by the local cadres became more 
significant to the generation of local conflicts because the protesting 
villagers used this corruption to denounce and petition the local cadres in 
state offices and as a justification for their protests. 
In comparison to the corrupt behavior of other types of people in the 
state and society like businessmen and state officials, local cadre corruption 
occurred on a much smaller scale. Discoveries of various corrupt cases in 
the 1990s throughout Vietnam associated with businessmen, like Tamexco 
(1996), Minh Ph\lllg-Epco (1997) and Tan Tru<mg Xanh (1999) 
(Gainsborough 2003), La Thi Kim Oanh, or related to high-ranking 
officials, such as the Minister ofEnnery Vu NgQc Hai, Vice-Prime Minister 
Ngo Xuiin L()c, and the recent case of Tdn Mai Hl;lllh- the Head of Voice 
of Vietnam Radio, showed that the local cadre corruption which had 
occurred in Phu Duong and other studied villages, or elsewhere, was tiny in 
terms of the amount of money involved. In the corrupt case of Tamexco, for 
example, its Director alone was charged with bribing nearly 40 
organisations and personally embezzling 144 billion VND within a few 
years (Gainsborough 2003). In another case, the Minister of Energy Vu 
NgQc Hai, caused a loss of state money of nearly USD 300,000 (Kerkvliet 
2001: 264-265). 
In addition, local cadre corruption is not a totally new phenomenon; it 
had already occurred in various forms during the period of collectivization 
(Tran Nhu Trang 1972: 418-430). In his study, Kerkvliet argues that under 
the Communist state administration, corruption has been a problem at least 
since the early 1960s in the agricultural cooperatives (Kerkvliet 2001: 264 ). 
While other researchers have generalized the problem of local cadre 
corruption during this period as follows: 
Some persons appropriated the labour output of others. This 
phenomenon did not occur through the appropriation of the 
means of production as had taken place in history, but on the 
basis of being associated with those who hold a position in 
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production, economy, politics and/or the society in the 
countryside. The appropriation took place in ... forms like the 
person in a managing position embezzling [communal 
resources], occupying [collective] capital, turning collective 
resources into private ones . .. Appropriations in the name of 
management fees led to a reduction of peasants' income from the 
cooperative to the extent to which they [the cooperative 
members] had to leave the farmland fallow (Chu Van Lam et al. 
1992: 74). 
A major feature I want to point out here is that various forms of local 
cadre corruption during collectivization, and the corrupt acts by other types 
of people like businessmen and higher state officials after decollectivization, 
did not create much public reaction from the villagers. The small-scale 
corruption by local cadres since decollectivization, however, has really had 
an effect. Similar observations are found in China, where Xiaobo Lu writes 
"I believe that these high-profile cases do not excite the discontent and 
alienation of the people nearly as much as does the deviant behavior of 
lower-level officials who have daily interaction with and direct supervisory 
power over ordinary citizens" (Lu 2000: 5). So how can we explain this? 
The main reason seems to be that the villagers could see corruption, such as 
who was corrupt, where, when and to what extent. Therefore, they were 
aware of the subject of their protest. Corruption by the local cadres had also 
directly affected the interests of individual villagers and their communities 
as a whole. More importantly, the villagers used corruption as a legal 
weapon, or an excuse, to attack some local cadres. In many cases, they used 
claims of corruption to accuse a number of cadres of breaching state laws 
and regulations for private gain, which resulted in the higher authorities 
having to investigate and punish the cadres. This strategy of the protesting 
villagers resulted from the fact that the state had articulated critical attitudes 
to the problem of corruption, and threatened to strictly punish those who 
were corrupt. Such views of the state have been expressed clearly and 
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strongly through various channels like the voices of some high-ranking 
officials and leaders (Kerkvliet 1994: 20-28) and in various legal documents 
like the Ordinance on Anti-Corruption [Phap l?nh ch6ng tham nhung], 
Criminal Code [Lw;it hinh s¥], and anti-corruption campaigns at various 
levels since 1990, as previously highlighted. 
To the protesting villagers in Phil Duong, their reactions to the local 
cadres were not merely and simply a response to corruption but also to 
several key issues that simultaneously occurred in the one community in the 
space of a few years. The protests resulted from the failure of the protesting 
villagers' claims for village communal land resources. They also resulted 
from the villagers' dissatisfaction with the cadres' wrongdoings and 
misbehavior. All these factors caused the protesting villagers to hate a 
number of cadres, and then to find a way to fight against them. They had no 
legal right and power to punish the cadres; however, the higher state 
authorities did. In order to force the higher authorities to do what the 
protesting villagers wanted, they had to think of how to denounce and 
petition the cadres, and how to ensure the higher state officials pay attention 
to their problems in the locality. 
The protesting villagers could not of course denounce or petition a 
number of cadres who they hated just because the cadres had not been 
willing to help them, since the villagers' claims for economic rights over 
land were often not in accordance with state laws and regulations. For 
example, the land use rights selling villagers' claims for a higher price for 
compensation and a commitment to labour employment in the D~i L(}c case, 
or various claims for village communal land and its output in Phu Duong 
village, were all totally contradictory to state land tenure policies and 
regulations. The villagers could not denounce and petition local cadres just 
because they had mistreated them by, for example, taking revenge on the 
villagers or ignoring and scorning some villagers' comments and 
suggestions. Even if such behavior occurred, how could they present 
evidence for it? Who would believe the villagers, especially in cases in 
which the protesting villagers illegally claimed more economic rights? The 
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problem of misbehavior would not easy to prove to the higher state 
authorities, although this was a key cause of discontent among the villagers, 
especially the elderly, since it was clear evidence of the immorality of local 
cadres. 
In such a context, the protesting villagers found that fighting 
corruption represented a legal and reasonable way to help them to attack 
local cadres. This means that in addition to being a cause for protest, the 
problem of cadre corruption was used as a means to demand higher state 
officials did what the villagers wanted, or as an excuse to express their 
discontent in other things. As a result, the local conflicts became more 
troublesome and difficult to resolve. 
In their delay of payment of various kinds of taxes and fees for 
example, the protesting villagers in PhU Duong accused the commune and 
cooperative cadres of corruptedly misranking agricultural land for personal 
benefit, and articulated that this was one of several key reasons for them to 
delay their payments to the state. Some villagers even argued that they 
would not pay until the cadres had ranked the land again in accordance with 
state laws and regulations. However, the problem of misranking of 
agricultural land was not the real cause of the conflicts in the community. 
Instead, it was used as a legal weapon to fight against some cadres who they 
hated. To the public and higher state authorities, the misranking of 
agricultural land was really a big problem, a clear violation of state laws and 
regulations. More importantly, unlike the problem of misbehavior, this 
particular breach of state laws had been proved by the higher state officials 
in 1997 and 1998. In addition, the protesting villagers would have known 
that the cadres could not immediately rank the land again because it was 
risky, so they could confidently accuse the cadres of this crime and ask the 
higher state officials to do what they required. I am sure that many Phu 
Duong villagers who had been farming their land for years already knew 
how good the land they tilled was. Moreover, many of them would 
recognize that one technical problem relating to agricultural land ranking 
was that the patterns of agricultural land redistribution into small pieces for 
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equality in 1992 had made it very difficult to rank, in detail, one small plot 
of land. The land use tax that the tillers had to pay amounted to a small sum 
in comparison with output of their farming; and the difference between the 
first and the second rank was also minor. All these factors show that the 
misranking of agricultural land was a minor problem. Therefore, villagers in 
the other two villages of the commune who had undergone the same 
situation did not protest about this issue. 
V. Conclusion 
Generally speaking, in Vietnam the problem of local cadre corruption 
and the resulting reactions of villagers in various forms, including 
denunciation, petitions and the delay of payment of taxes and fees, were 
rooted in feudal and colonial history. During the period of collectivization, 
however, local cadre corruption was greatly reduced, so public and 
collective protests by the villagers were rarely seen. Since 
decollectivization, in the transformation from a centrally planned economy 
to a multisector-economy under socialist orientation, and in the context of 
modernization and industrialization in the countryside, local cadre 
corruption has greatly increased and occurred in various forms. This major 
feature of local corrupt practices in Vietnam endorses a strong argument that 
corruption is a consequence of economic reform in China (Ma 1989; Gong 
1997; and He 2000). Zengke He argues that the emergence of corruption in 
China was marked by the reform, but concludes that the subsequent state 
anti-corruption campaigns had little success. To curb corruption, he urges 
that further political reform towards democracy needs to be implemented 
(He 2000). Against the view that marketization is a key means to reduce the 
level of corruption, Ting Gong demonstrates that corruption in China greatly 
increased in different forms in the 1990s despite the fact that the country 
had undertaken further economic reforms (Gong 1997). 
In rural Vietnam after decollectivization, corruption became closely 
related to the communal resources, especially the land and its output, had 
several effects, and became one of the key causes for local conflicts in the 
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rural areas. Not all villagers condemned corruption; however, they did not 
tolerate "too much" corruption. Moreover, their attitudes towards the extent 
of corruption and their resulting reactions became more critical when 
corruption was closely related to other forms of wrongdoing and 
misbehavior, especially in the situation in which a number of villagers failed 
in their claims for their economic rights to land, as occurred in Phil Duong 
and D~i L(>c. In their protests, therefore, villagers used corruption as an 
opportunity to denounce, petition and fight against a number of local cadres 
who they hated for other reasons. Again this has become plain in Phil 
Duong, where the protesting villagers were not only discontent with local 
cadres because of the considerable extent of corruption and other 
wrongdoings, but also because of their misbehavior and the villagers' 
failures in their claims for the village communal land and its output. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
I. Summing Up 
For Vietnamese peasants, who constitute the majority efthe country's 
population, agricultural land has been important in at least three aspects: a 
means of production, a related source of income and occupation, and a 
valuable forntof property; These three aspects have become especially true 
·~· ....... '.. . . . . . . . ' . . ' ' 
in the dynamic context of Vietnamese society since decollectivization. 
The process of agricultural decollectivization was accompanied by a 
new land tenure system, industrialization and modernization, and also 
marked the time when Vietnam increasingly felt the effects of urbanization, 
marketization and globalization. The most important task of the 
decollectivization process was to distribute and redistribute agricultural land 
use rights to villagers, which has consequently contributed to a growth of 
the family household-based production in agriculture. Netting's general 
argument about prosperous production of small households thus has been 
demonstrated in the Vietnamese case (Netting 1993). After years of food 
shortages, Vietnam has advanced extraordinarily to be one of the top rice-
exporting countries in the world. As a result, decollectivization did not only 
prove an appropriate innovative policy in agriculture but also led to a more 
comprehensive land tenure system in Vietnam. 
On the other hand, conflicts over land resources have also occurred in 
various rural communities since decollectivization. In the province on 
which my study focuses, conflicts over land were informed by four main 
causes that I called four roads in Chapter Two, namely various types of 
villagers' land claims, numerous types of land law violation, land use rights 
compensation· and site clearance, and local cadre corruption involving land 
resources. These four roads led to various degrees of villagers' public 
resistance. 
The nature of such land-based conflicts includes discussion, tensions, 
negotiations, discontent and protests among and between various parties, 
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such as villagers, local cadres and other institutions of the state who make or 
implement the state land policy, over the questions as to how and in what 
ways land rights should be distributed, held, and used. Such land-based 
conflicts, however, are not abnormal in the transforming stage from a 
centrally planned economy to a market one, especially in a context in which 
the state formulated a land tenure regime basing on three types of land 
rights: ownership rights, management rights, and use rights for allocation 
(of these essential rights) among three main groups of holders: the entire 
people, the state, and various users. 
ConfliCts over land originated from two key sources. The first 
stemmed from contending views between villagers and the state land tenure 
policy at large. The development of a new land tenure system since 
decollectivization has indeed consolidated the position and rights of the 
state over land rights, especially in regards to agricultural land rights, in 
accordance with socialist ideology, historical precedent and scientific 
research. This consolidates the fact that for decades under the Socialist 
State, agricultural land has been a subject over which the state often claims 
key power and essential rights to decide important questions of how land 
should be owned, managed, and used. In the case of land use rights 
compensation, for example, the state decides how the compensation is to be 
conducted and what price is paid for appropriated land. Due to a lack of 
local perspective, however, such land tenure policy has not yet included the 
views of villagers and communities. In some cases, differing views among 
these parties over essential questions over agricultural land rights have been 
implicit and hence not articulated, or visible. Therefore, no conflict has 
resulted. In other cases, such contending views have been obvious, and 
become a dynamic for conflicts. Conflicts over land can be seen, therefore, 
as an expression of villagers' views towards questions of land rights 
distribution, holding and decision-making processes. The type of public 
resistance of villagers in land conflicts, however, is not parallel to the three 
types of Chinese villagers' popular resistance towards Chinese state policies 
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in rural areas, as Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien have illustrated in 
contemporary China (Li and O'Brien 1996). 
The second source for land conflicts originated from, and/or was 
exacerbated by, contending views between villagers and a number of local 
cadres, who implemented the state land tenure policy at the local level, over 
how certain areas of land or policies involving land resources should be 
handled in local communities. At times, a number of local cadres abused 
their official position and power in their management and use of land, 
especially communal land resources. In addition, they also misbehaved 
towards a number of villagers. It should be noted that not all local cadres 
committed such wrongdoings, only some. This partially explains why 
conflicts over land only occurred in some communities but not others. The 
worst situation of conflict occurred when both levels of contending views 
appeared at the same time or one after another in one community, like in 
cases of PhU Duong and D~i L<)c. 
Added to the above reasons were other factors and values that 
intensified the extent of conflicts. First, in the dynamic context of 
Vietnamese society since decollectivization, the meanings of and need for 
agricultural land use rights have gradually increased among villagers, 
entrepreneurs, and the state at large. While retaining its value as a means of 
production and related source of income and occupation, agricultural land 
use rights have revitalized its former value: a valuable form of property, 
which had almost disappeared during collectivization. This therefore shows 
a difference between my argument and that proposed by Rigg and 
Nattapoolwat (Rigg 1996; Rigg and Nattapoolwat 2001). Secondly, the 
distribution of agricultural land use rights, in fact, has meant the 
privatization of agricultural land use rights, which has therefore promoted 
private property in land in the view of many villagers. Thirdly, due to 
increased demographic pressures and the land use rights needs of villagers, 
entrepreneurs, and other institutions of the state versus the decreased supply, 
the meanings and values of agricultural land use rights have further 
increased in different ways. Fourthly, the market economy has increased the 
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The Exploration ofViews. 
In Chapter One, I outlined an approach exploring viewpoints of 
various parties to analyse their attitudes, relations and conflicts over land 
rights. In this section, I conclude that findings of my research have 
demonstrated that investigating the views of villagers and other parties on 
the question of how land rights should be distributed, held, used, by whom 
and for whose benefit, is an effective approach to analyse the multitude of 
attitudes, relations, and conflicts of various parties over land in a dynamic 
situation. 
My approach can also be used to explore and analyse attitudes, 
relations, and conflicts over land in other areas. In so doing, however, three 
of four key issues of this analystical framework, as outlined in Chapter One, 
need to be kept in mind. One relates to the parties which the researcher 
investigates to obtain their views on land. In my research, as the reader has 
seen, I have explored and analysed the views of villagers and other parties 
involved, such as the views of state land tenure policies, and state 
institutions (officials, local cadres and so forth) who make land tenure 
policies, and attempt to implement them, on decision-making, distribution 
and holding of land rights. In other areas or societies, however, the parties 
involving land might change or vary. Therefore, the researcher has to figure 
out who the involved parties are in his or her study. The second issue is 
associatated with the concepts of land tenure arrangements. In my thesis, I 
use the framework of a bundle of rights and and a bundle of rights holders to 
analyse land tenure arrangements after decollectivization. But the 
components of the bundle might vary from one society to the next, therefore 
the three types of rights: ownership rights, management rights and use rights 
in Vietnam might not correspond to those found in other countries. The 
researcher thus needs to clarify such an essential issue in his or her study. 
The last issue concerns the context and history of the studied society /area. 
Once again, these factors might differ from those found in the Red River 
delta after decollectivization, depending on the time and studied area. 
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rights or ownerships are often visible to the researcher. However, while the 
views of the state land tenure policy and authororities are often articulated 
in the legislation, the views of villagers and local cadres might need 
anthropological methods such as participant observation and different forms 
of interview to capture them in the field. 
Finally, villagers' views towards land issues also reflect other 
theoretical perspectives, which are recognized in the arguments of some 
researchers analyzed in Chapter One. For example, to a modest extent, the 
views of my villagers towards different issues in land-based conflicts 
endorse Hy Van Luong's persuasive argument about the influence of socio-
economic and cultural structure on peasants' actions (Hy Van Luong 1992). 
Their views also concern the importance of subsistence in their lives -
a key point found in Scott's moral economy argument (Scott 1976). At the 
same time, villagers' views show us their orientation of individualistic-
interests in relation to decision-making, distribution and holding of land 
rights. Thus Popkin's strong argument in regard to this issue (Popkin 1979) 
cannot be ignored in a study of attitudes, relations and conflicts over land in 
Vietnam and beyond. 
Given that often scholars cast the "rational peasant" and "moral 
economy peasant" as incompatible, my findings demonstrate that the 
peasant-villagers in contemporary Red River delta have both orientations. 
My case study of land use rights compensation in D~i L()c is a compelling 
example showing considerable evidence of this. Villagers in D~i L()c 
strongly considered the amount of subsistence land farming brings to them. 
At the same time, and more visibly, they cared and struggled for their own 
private interests. Therefore, as some researchers have argued, emphasizing 
one and forgetting the other might mislead the analysis or fail to fully 
explain the subject. Because, although subsistence remains important to a 
number of peasants, it is only one of various reasons for villagers' collective 
action. The source of subsistence today comes from land farming, not from 
the village institutional economy as it used to be prior to colonial times. 
Also, it is too simplistic to say that the maximization of individual interests 
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is the main motivation of peasant' economic and political action. Many 
villagers in the Red River delta since decollectivization not only care and 
maximize the interests of themselves or their families, but also consider the 
interests of other parties involved, like the interests of communities, local 
cadres and the state at large. 
In short, there seems to be no incompatibility between the "rational 
peasant" and "moral economy peasant." More importantly, it seems that 
none of the "rational peasant" or "moral economy peasant" economies can 
alone adequately explain the contemporary villagers' attitudes, behavior and 
action in land-based conflicts; rather, together they help explain part of the 
subject. Therefore, my argument of contending views and conflicts, which 
has been equipped with the views-investigating approach, might be a better 
one to analyse and explain attitudes, relations and conflicts over decision-
making, distribution and holding of land rights among various parties in 
contemporary dynamic Red River delta and elsewhere. 
My study also shows how and in what ways contending views and 
conflicts over land have had effects on the state and state decision-making 
in different ways and to different extents. This endorses Kerkvliet's crucial 
argument about the impact of the powerless villagers on the state and state 
policy-making (Kerkvliet 1995a, 2001). 
At the broadest level, contending views and conflicts over land have 
forced the state to continually amend land tenure policy during the past 
years. Such amendments have increasingly met the demands of villagers in 
relation to land questions about how land rights should be distributed, held, 
managed, and used, by whom and for whose benefit. The first 1988 Land 
Law in Vietnam was developed to a fuller version in 1993, and was then 
amended in 1998, 2001 and 2003, resulting in a better land tenure policy 
that, as some viewers have said, is coming closer to practice [sat wli thT,tc 
tJ]. This means that one ofthe main aims of these amendments is to reduce 
differences in views between the state land tenure system and villagers 
towards the agricultural land question in regard to three key types of rights. 
As a result, such changes have given villagers more incentives, and made 
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land policy clearer and more compatible with villagers' claims. In many 
cases, the state has even promptly satisfied villagers' needs, like returning 
necessary areas of land to indigenous people in Tay Nguyen, or giving land 
or lending money to those who had no land or too little land so they could 
regain their former land areas to use in the Mekong River delta. More 
specifically, such changes in the state land tenure system gradually widened 
the use rights of villagers, from the sole right to use the land under the 1988 
Land Law to five rights under the 1993 Land Law and ten rights in the 2003 
Land Law Amendment. Also, villagers' interests in their land use rights 
holdings have been increasingly recognized in the compensation they 
receive for land use rights. Unlike previously, the 2003 Land Law 
Amendment regulates that the amount of compensation given by the state 
must be equal to real prices in the market, which is determined by an 
agreement between buyer and seller. 
Secondly, the social unrest resulting from land conflicts concerned the 
state's central leadership. As a result, the state took steps to cope with this 
problem. This is shown by the fact that although entrepreneurs obtained 
considerable favors in land use and rents due to the state's primary objective 
of economic development, villagers have still received considerable 
attention in the eyes of the state. This has resulted in various regulations to 
prevent mismanagement and misuse of land resources, and to curb related 
problem of corruption. For example, Hy Van Luong points out that the issue 
of Grassroots Democracy Ordinance number 29 to force local authorities to 
consult with the people on various issues in relation to land, finance and 
fees is a clear result of Thai Binh social unrest in 1997 (Hy Van Luong 
2003: 24 ). The state has also punished numerous cadres, in different forms, 
for their wrongdoings, as my study points out. Actually, a number of 
villagers who breached the state legislation while resisting were also 
punished. This originated from the fact that some protesting villagers 
articulated their views and reacted both legally and illegally in relation to 
the state laws. In some cases, when their demands were not met, they took 
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stronger action that consequently violated the state laws and therefore 
created public unrest. 
The Problem of Local Cadres. 
Among the parties involved in land conflicts, a number of local cadres 
appeared to be one of the main causes of conflict. Under the current 
structure of Vietnamese state administration, local cadres are not only 
representatives of the state who implement state policies at the local level 
but also representatives of the local people and communities. In addition, in 
many cases, they are a part of local communities. Standing at such 
intersections of interests and relationships, as in China, local cadres are both 
constrained by rules imposed from higher authorities and views as well as 
by the norms of local peoples. In such a context, they have to deal with 
different kinds of relationships, and especially need to represent various 
interests (which in many cases are contending with one to another) of 
different parties, like those of the state at large, villagers and local 
communities, and even their own interests. One of the key problems related 
to local cadres since decollectivization is that a number of them did not 
adequately represent the interests of their villagers. In some cases, in 
particular, they put too much emphasis on their own economic interests. A 
study of "Village Leaders and Land-Rights Formulation in China" after the 
1979 reform came to similar conclusions that the motivations of village 
leaders to redistribute "responsibility land" (private plots) depends on three 
main factors: to protect village leaders' personal interests, to minimize 
administrative costs, and to improve equality and production efficiency. 
Among these, however, motivation to protect their own personal interests 
ranked number one (Rozelle and Li 1998). 
This is a key point about the changing perceptions of economic value 
in Vietnam, especially in the Red River delta society, in comparison to the 
period of collectivization and feudal-colonial times. After D6i Mai, 
aspirations to economic wealth became more important than ever before; 
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perceptions of, and the means to obtain, a good life seem to have also 
changed. One now needs considerable resources to cover various needs, like 
the education of one's children, house building, furniture, and other wants. 
How to gain resources to cover these is often a big question, which many 
people solve by lam an, literally meaning doing business either legally or 
illegally, or lam gidu, meaning to economically enrich oneself. However, 
how to lam an, or lam gidu, is approached differently by different people in 
the state and society. In the countryside, some local cadres abused their 
official positions and communal resources for private gain, therefore 
creating negative reactions from the villagers. 
Related to the above is the decay of morality of some local cadres. 
Although revolutionary morality is not totally identical with conventional 
morality (to see how these two are different, see Malarny's discussion in 
Culture, Ritual and Revolution in Vietnam, 2002), both share some similar 
essential virtues, namely to work for the people and to behave towards them 
properly. In the early 1990s, Nguyen Minh Nien observes that the "majority 
of local cadres preserved their revolutionary virtue, had fresh styles of life, 
and were trusted by the masses" (Nguyen Minh Nien 1991: 470). In 2000, 
however, a state-funded research project concluded that the decay of 
morality (alongside other problems) of some local cadres was one of the 
direct causes of local conflicts in the countryside (Vu Quan ly Khoa hoc va 
Cong nghe 2000). 
The above problems pose a critical need for the state to pay more 
attention towards recruitment, training and control of local cadres. Pham 
Quang Minh points out that, from the 1950s land reform to today, a group of 
cadres has been responsible for the resistance of villagers; therefore, he 
urges not to use the old methods in selection and training of local cadres in 
the future (Pham Quang Minh 2002). 
The Question of Private Property. 
One of my central arguments in this thesis is about villagers' views 
towards land rights holding. As previously analyzed, if we look at the land 
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tenure system in Vietnam since decollectivization, which formulated three 
types of rights to land, ownership rights of the entire people, management 
rights of the state, and use rights of the villagers and other parties, many 
villagers in the Red River Delta did not struggle for or compete to hold 
ownership rights of the entire people. Neither did they desire to have 
management rights of the state. Rather, they wanted to hold use rights in 
agricultural land. The holding of land use rights in this case is equal at a 
practical level to land ownership in Vietnamese history under the ownership 
rights of the entire people - which looks like the former ideological 
ownership ofthe king. Holders of land use rights can use the land, enjoy the 
product of their land use, and can also dispose of their land use rights. This 
is similar to a peasant in feudal and colonial times who held some plots of 
land, which he or she could use, enjoy the product of, and sell whenever she 
or he liked. This brings out the key issue that land use rights are private 
property, and must be regarded as private property in the form of land use 
rights holding. For many villagers, once they hold land use rights, they 
demand to have a say in the decision-making over these rights, like their 
right to determine the compensation price for land use rights for example. 
Furthermore, if land use rights are a form of property, they can be held by 
different parties, like individuals, households, village communities, state 
institutions and so forth. 
However, the state land tenure system has not yet clarified and 
distinguished between the holdings of land use rights, ownership rights and 
management rights. According to the state land tenure policy, the state 
allocates land use rights to villagers (and other parties) and can claim back 
these rights. The state also determines compensation prices for land use 
rights. This differs to the perceptions of Red River Delta villagers. More 
importantly, it indicates the fact that the state land tenure system has not yet 
paid enough attention to the question of private property in relation to 
agricultural land use rights. Although the state Land Law constantly states 
that land belongs to the entire people, the state indeed owns the land. Such a 
land tenure arrangement ensures three key points. First, it gives the state a 
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decisive role and powerful rights to decide how land rights should be 
distributed, held, and used, by whom and for whose benefit. Secondly, it 
also gives the state the power to take land use rights when it needs them. 
Finally, the state land tenure system tries to prevent a number of villagers 
from claiming their old land plots that were taken by the state during 
previous decades, in the 1950s land reform and collectivization, especially 
in the southern half of Vietnam. 
Looking back through history, however, we recognize that private 
property in agricultural land was a key part of traditional systems of land 
ownership in Vietnam, especially in the Red River delta. According to 
historian Truong Huu Quynh, private ownership of land had already 
appeared in Vietnam in the 12th century (Truong Huu Quynh 1983, volume 
1: 133). Through time, such private ownership developed through the 
opening up of virgin land [khai hoang], or in many cases, the appropriation 
of village communal land or state owned land. For example, the 
phenomenon of bidn cong vi tu indicated a common pattern, which turned 
village communal land into the private land of individuals. During the first 
half of the 19th century, although the Nguyln kings tried to consolidate the 
village communal land system, the private ownership regime continued to 
grow,1 and such a development was regarded as an indispensable process of 
history [qua trinh tdt ydu cua Itch su] (Truong Huu Quynh va Do Bang 
1997: 35-36). 
Under the colonial regime, private ownership of agricultural land 
greatly flourished. Pierre Gourou notes that new needs of the Vietnamese 
people and changes due to the colonial state's attitude towards property, i.e. 
the introduction of the French view of property that endorsed and legalized 
individual private property, increased of the incidence of large private 
ownership of land (Gourou 1955: 380). Pham Cao Duong further points out 
that large private ownership of land resulted from land appropriation by 
1 He notes that private ownership of land during the first half of the 19th century accounted 
for 82.92 per cent of agricultural land ownership in Vietnam (Truong Huu Quynh va Do 
Bang 1997: 35). It is not clear what kind of land he is discussing: agricultural land only, or 
all types ofland, and about locations: lowland only, or the whole country area? 
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rural elites and the French at the expense of village communal land and 
private land of the peasants (Pham Cao Duong 1985). In short, for a long 
period of time, unlike Western and industrialized societies, which critically 
emphasized property ownership of private individuals, Vietnamese society 
experienced a co-existence of multi-systems of practical ownership: private 
ownership, communal ownership and state ownership, all under the ultimate 
ideological ownership of the king. Among these systems, however, private 
ownership was key and evolved through time. 
During the 1950s, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
implemented land reform followed by collectivization, private ownership in 
land started to change. The 1950s land reform relatively equalized practical 
ownership of agricultural land among the rural population. In the view of 
socialist ideology, private property, or private ownership of means of 
production at large, was an enemy. In a grand study on collectivization in 
Laos, Evans writes, "The continued existence of private property in means 
of production would, [ ... ], produce a class of capitalists in the countryside 
who were opposed to the regime. If, however, property was held in 
common, then this process of class differentiation of the peasantry could not 
occur" (Evans 1995: 18). During four decades of collectivization in 
Vietnam, therefore, private ownership in agricultural land (and other means 
of production at large) was deemphasized.2 Most agricultural land in the 
Red River delta was gradually collectivized into cooperatives for collective 
management and production. This land later became the collective property 
of cooperatives of the state, not of the villagers, except for the private plots 
of five per cent agricultural land. Put another way, by strengthening the 
ownership of cooperatives and the state at large, private property in land of 
individual villagers became severely restricted. 
However, private ownership of agricultural land did not totally 
disappear. Among cooperative members, the five per cent plots of 
agricultural land that cooperative members held remained private property 
2 Grant Evans points out three principle reasons for collectivization. My point on private 
property relates to one of these three, that is collectivization prevents peasant society 
moving towards capitalism (Evans 1995: 18). 
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and, as noted previously, villagers dedicated considerable labor and care to 
this land. 3 In addition, even at the pinnacle of collectivization, a small 
number of villagers did not join, or joined but then left, cooperatives. This 
means that they remained private peasant households [h9 nang dan ca thJ]. 
In 1975, in the northern half of the country, according to Andrew 
Vickerman, 4.4 per cent of peasant households were private peasant 
households who held 4.8 per cent of the total cultivated land area 
(Vickerman 1986: 278).4 This also means that the agricultural land of those 
private peasant households did not belong to cooperatives. In the process of 
decollectivization, therefore, this group of villagers did not receive land 
from the state; instead they continued to farm their own land. Actually, 
prior to collectivization, like in other socialist countries, agricultural land 
had been the land of villagers and landlords, and collectivization 
consolidated their land into cooperatives for collective management and 
production. Decollectivization was then a privatization of land use rights, 
which actually was a return of agricultural land to villagers to use. 
According to the state land tenure policy, however, distribution as such is 
not a return of land to villagers; rather the state's allocation of land use 
rights to villagers. 
So how should the question of private property in agricultural land 
after decollectivization be tackled? In the view of villagers, as my thesis 
argues, the holding ofland use rights, as regulated by the state's current land 
tenure policy, means one level of land ownership. Under the 1988 Land 
Law, the holding of land use rights was limited in terms of time, from five 
to 15 years only. Under the 1993 Land Law, this was lengthened to 20 years 
for annual-crop agricultural land. And in a state-funded research project in 
3 The plot of five per cent land might be another controversal issue that my thesis has not 
yet thoroughly examined. In the eyes of the state, as Ben Kerkvliet observes (personal 
communication), it was the land of cooperatives which households had permission to use 
privately. However, in the views of villagers, it looked like a piece of land which they 
practically owned. As previously noted, villagers in some villages exchanged their five per 
cent land with the cooperative management board for water land that had been then allowed 
to tum into residential land, which (after decollectivization) the villagers hold use rights for 
no time limit. 
4 In earlier years, the percentage of private peasant households' land ownership was even 
higher. In 1971, for example, according to the state's statistics, the agricultural land area of 
private peasants amounted to five per cent (Nien Giam Thong ke 1975: 196). 
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2003, researchers proposed that the duration of land use rights holding 
should be further lengthened to 50 years for annual-crop agricultural land 
(Tran Toan Thang 2003: 66). In addition, current legislation gives villagers 
use rights to land, which are not only rights to use the land and enjoy the 
product of land use but also dispose of the land in various forms. In that 
sense, the holding of land use rights is really one level of land ownership, 
although constrained by the state land tenure policy. 
My analysis of both traditional and contemporary Vietnamese society 
indicates that private property in land is difficult to ignore, especially since 
D6i Mbi, for various reasons. First, the recognition of private property in 
agricultural land is a key issue, which has been well recognized by the state 
and society in Vietnam for a long period of history. Secondly, since D6i 
Mbi, agricultural land use rights have become more than a means of 
production and related source of income and occupation. They again include 
the value of property, which is held by various parties and institutions, 
including villagers, communities, state institutions and overseas parties. 
Finally, various factors, such as demographic pressures, the decreased 
supply of land resources, and other socio-economic transformations, 
especially new values and the effects of the market economy, have all 
emphasized private property. 
At the broader level, after D6i Mdi, Vietnam has recognized the 
private sector as one of the multi-sectors of the national economy under 
socialist orientation. In relation to issues other than agricultural land, the 
state has accepted a stronger recognition of private ownership. For example, 
it has been pushing the privatization of state enterprises, demonstrating that 
the state endorses private ownership in this area. A neighboring country, 
China, has moved one step ahead of Vietnam in recognizing private 
property. In 2004, the Chinese Communist Party's 16th National Congress 
voted to improve its legal system so as to protect private property, marking 
a big change in the Chinese socialist ideology, which used to ·greatly 
emphasize ownership of the state and cooperatives. This move promises 
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further recognition of private property in agricultural land and other fields in 
China in the near future. 
Prospects of Land in Vietnam. 
In the years to come, the question of land in general, and agricultural 
land in particular, will continue to be a potential subject for debate and 
conflict in Vietnam. The first issue concerns the system of ownership. This 
means that the ongoing debates on land ownership are not likely to end 
without further change. A series of debates in the 1990s and in 2002 among 
Vietnamese researchers, together with various concerns of the villagers, 
which I highlighted in previous Chapters, demonstrate that private property 
in land is essential and needs to be properly recognized. This view was also 
endorsed by a number of state officials. In discussion sessions on the 
Amendment of Land Law in 2003 in the National Assembly, some deputies 
questioned the concept of land ownership of the entire people. For example, 
deputy Nguyen Lan Dung critically stated that "the entire people's 
ownership rights of land are just unreal rights" [quyJn sir hitu tocm ddn chi 
Ia hu quyJn],5 because the people have not been asked for their views on the 
management and use of the land, but only those who hold official position 
and power have decided all key issues.6 To him, the petitions and 
denunciations by villagers on land issues during the past years were mainly 
caused by "Ong Nha nuac" [Mr State] at the local level, i.e. the local cadres. 
Therefore, if the land policy makers continue to ignore the pressing needs 
[hue xuc] of real life, petitions and denunciations on land issues will never 
end. 7 What he and other deputies referred to is, however, mainly about land 
management and use, not yet touching on the big question, which is the 
5 Vietnamnet 2003. Qu6c hQi thao lu~n v€ Lu~t Dth dai (sua dbi): "Quy€n siJ hUu toan dan 
chi hi hu quy€n"? Ngay 28110/2003, at www. vnn. vn. 
6 Vnexpress 2003. 'Sa hiiu toan dan v€ ddt dai chi Ia hu quy€n.' Ngay 27/10/2003, at 
www. vnexpress.net. 
7 Laodong 2003. Vdn d€ D~i bieu Qubc hQi va cl'r tri quan tam: Lu~t Ddt dai (sua dbi) vfut 
con "xa" vm thl,lC tien CUQC s6ng. Ngay 07/11/2003, at www.laodong.com.vn. 
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need to clarity different layers of land ownership, or in other words different 
types of rights to land. 
Although no change was made over the question of land ownership in 
the 2003 Land Law Amendment, 8 how land should be owned will probably 
be a continuing subject for debate. According to my research, the critical 
need is to clarity and distinguish between the holdings of land use rights, 
ownership rights, and management rights. In so doing, it is important to 
recognise the holding of land use rights as one practical level of land 
ownership versus the ideological ownership of the entire people. 
(Otherwise, a new system of land tenure needs to be developed.) 
The second issue of potential contention is the question of the level of 
compensation for land use rights. Many holders perceive that to hold land 
use rights is to own the land in a normal sense of practical ownership. They 
also perceive that land use rights are private property, and if they are their 
private property, then the property owners should have a say in their 
disposal. In that sense, if land use rights are subject to sale or compensation, 
their price needs to be determined by both buyer and seller. The desire to 
buy or sell is also determined by the wants of the parties involved. The 
current state regulations on compensation for land use rights remain 
determined by the state authorities alone, not by the buyer and seller, or 
market forces. In contrast, however, holders of land use rights often claim 
for a say in land use rights when they are disposed of. Therefore, the issue 
of land use rights, especially in relation to compensation between the state 
and villagers, continues to be a contentious subject. 
The third issue relates to the problem that people's petitions and 
denunciations might not end shortly .9 According to a recent report of the 
General Department of State Inspection [Tdng Thanh tra Nhii nuac], from 
1999 to April 2004, state offices received a large number of petitioners: 
1,360,000 people. Of these cases, 60 percent related to land issues. The 
8 Laodong 2003. Uy ban Thucrng Vl,l QH cho y kien ve dl,( L~t Ddt dai (sua dbi): Khong 
thay dbi ve khai niem scr hilu. Ngay 22/07/2003, at www.laodong.com.vn. 
9 In the southern half of Vietnam, another contentious issue is the claims of people for their 
old land. 
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report also reveals that in 2001 and 2002 the number of petitioners who by-
passed the authorized line to the central authorities increased 20 per cent. 10 
Such figures and my findings show that land-based conflicts might not end 
in the near future. If conflicts over land continue, land tenure policy will 
probably need to be further amended, and the coming amendments will 
create room for debates over essential questions in relation to land, like 
issues of land ownership, private property, compensation payment for land 
use rights and so forth. 
Another issue is associated with the coming redistribution of land use 
rights in 2013. According to the 1993 Land Law, agricultural land use rights 
are periodically redistributed every 20 years. How land use rights will be 
redistributed in 2013, who can receive land use rights, who not, why, and 
what redistribution methods should be used, who decides these essential 
issues? Such questions are arouse of potential contention among villagers, 
between villagers and cadres as well as state land policies in a number of 
communities. In addition, the 1988 distribution and redistribution around 
1993 have shown the numerous land claims made by the villagers when 
land use rights are to redistributed. Might the 2013 redistribution of 
agricultural land use rights lead to similar claims? More importantly, how 
long can the state maintain its periodical redistribution of agricultural land 
use rights? Might the state change this policy one day? My thesis, however, 
is not capable of answering such questions at this stage. 
The final issue is the big question of jobs for the peasants. From the 
perspective of villagers, especially those whose land use rights have been 
appropriated, one of the most burning issues is what to do when they have 
little or no land. The contending views on specific issues like the level of 
compensation for land use rights, labour employment, and the resulting 
conflicts arising from individual cases might not last for a long time; in 
many cases the state has sucessfully acquired the land for non-agricultural 
objectives. The problem of landless villagers, however, will become more 
visible in a few years when their land use rights compensation money might 
10 Requoted in VnExpress.net. "Khieu kien keo dai do ca quan cong quy€n thieu tnich 
nhiem." Ngay 21/4/2004. 
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have been spent. To wait for the next round of land use rights redistribution 
may take them about ten years. So what are they going to do during this 
period of time? Despite the fact that the state has required enterpreneurs to 
employ a number of peasants to work in their industries, and has also 
planned to export some labour to foreign countries, a large portion of 
villagers have no stable job. 
At the broader level, as agricultural land per capita continues to 
decrease for various reasons, demographic increase and agricultural land 
appropriation for example, what are the peasants going to do in the future? 
The Vietnamese population reached 81 million in 2003, of which nearly 78 
per cent lived in the rural areas. This demographic increase continues to put 
greater pressures on agricultural land per capita, especially in the Red River 
delta where the very high percentage of population versus the limited area 
of agricultural land has been a burning issue for a century or more. At the 
same time, agricultural land has been increasingly acquired in various ways 
for non-agricultural purposes. At the local level, it has been converted into 
residential land and land for specialized-use, i.e. the land for infrastructure 
of the communities. At the national level, a large area of agricultural land 
has been acquired for purposes of mordemization, industrialization, and 
urbanization. All these have reduced the land per capita in Vietnam. 
The state's view, as indicated in the state land tenure policy, like the 
20-year duration of land use rights holding and the taking of agricultural 
land use rights for non-agricultural aims, has accepted that a certain number 
of peasants hold no or few land use rights. This marks a big change in the 
socialist ideology that used to call for land for all peasants during periods of 
revolutionary struggle and collectivization. In addition, the increased 
application of machines, new varieties of seeds, fertilizers and chemicals 
alongside the development of irrigation systems have not only improved 
agricultural productivity but also increasingly reduced the size of the labour 
force required on a given area of farmed land. All these factors result in 
greater redundancy among the rural labour force. So what are they going to 
do? This big problem poses several practical questions for the state and 
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people to think about, including a critical need to develop rural industries, to 
strictly control population growth and so forth. (Vietnam does not need a 
bigger population; rather, the country really needs to improve the quality of 
population.) 
Topic of Future Research. 
My study has uncovered a complicated picture of contending views 
and conflicts over land in a number of villages in the Red River delta after 
decollectivization. Its spatial emphasis is, however, mainly limited to parts 
of Bile Ninh province, while other areas of the delta have not yet been 
examined. Beyond the Red River delta, in Tay Nguyen, Northern 
mountainous areas and the Mekong River delta for example, we have 
witnessed considerable signals of contending views and conflicts over land 
since decollectivization. Nevertheless, there have been few detailed studies 
of the topic. Therefore, contention and conflicts over land beyond my field 
sites are really appealing issues for further research. 
Another key issue is corruption. Owning to its prevalence and 
diversity, corruption can be an interesting and compelling topic for more in-
depth and systematic research. To this date, there are still a few studies on 
some limited types of corruption. For example, what I have done in this 
thesis focuses mainly on local cadre corruption involving land resources and 
resulting reactions of the state and villagers. Thus, to achieve an adequate 
understanding of the big problem of corruption in Vietnam, much more 
research needs to be done. To research this topic, one might desire to answer 
several key questions often posed in the literature, which query the areas, 
forms, causes, consequences, and perceptions of, and attitudes and reactions 
towards, corruption. Research on corruption also needs to cover various 
types of corruption in different parts of the state and society. Generally 
speaking, data on corruption should be drawn from various sources, like 
documents and reports issued by different institutions at different levels of 
the state, newspapers, interviews, surveys, and so forth. A comparative 
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perspective might be useful, for example to compare contemporary 
corruption with that in traditional society, and between Vietnam and China, 
or other countries in the region like Thailand and Indonesia. How to explain 
the problem of corruption and reactions of the state and villagers to it might 
be answered in different ways. In this study, I offer one way to do it. 
Finally, the problem of local cadres is another fascinating topic for 
further research. Local cadres have played an important role in interaction 
between local people and higher authorities, and in the management of 
resources and implementation of state polcies in rural communities. 
However, like in China, villagers' protests against local cadres increased in 
a number of rural communities after decollectivization. Why has this 
occurred? Are there reasons other than those I have pointed out? Are there 
similarities and differences between the problems of local cadres in Vietnam 
and China after the reforms, and so forth? Again, much more research 
needs to be done into the topic to answer such questions. 
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